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ABSTRACf 
This study is concerned with the impact of the 1986 Stock Market deregulation, or Big Bang, on the 
efficiency of the United Kingdom government securities market. The main theoretical finding is that the 
change to dual capacity dealing with negotiated commissions cannot be justified economically without 
the inclusion of a best execution rule for broker/dealers. 
The empirical section of the study has three parts. The first part uses established and new auto-
correlation techniques to test market efficiency in the traditional weak-form efficient market hypothesis 
paradigm. The second part tests market efficiency through an analysis of pricing residuals from fitting 
term structure curves. A new method to fit these curves is developed. The third section tests market 
efficiency by examining evidence of anomalies in the shape and movements of the term structure. From 
all three sources, there is strong evidence that the changes introduced by Big Bang improved efficiency 
in the gilt-edged market. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
Introduction 
1.1. Objectives of the Study 
The deregulation of the United Kingdom Stock Exchange in October 1986, known colloquially 
as "Big Bang", saw the creation of a very different market for government securities, "gilt-
edged" stock. The market makers, whose number increased in excess of three hundred per 
cent, were to be permitted direct access to customers rather than being bound to conduct busi-
ness through broking agents; and commissions on all transactions were to be negotiable rather 
than subject to a sliding scale of charges, with a fixed minimum level. At the same time, the 
state of technology permitted a transfer of the "market-place" from the floor of the Stock 
Exchange to the video screens of market makers' dealing rooms. 
This study seeks to examine the impact of these changes on the efficiency of the market. 
There are three kinds of market efficiency: allocative efficiency, a measure of optimal resource 
allocation; operational efficiency, a measure of the cost of transacting; and informational 
efficiency, a measure of the extent to which prices reflect relevant information. This study is 
concerned primarily with examining the impact of deregulation on informational efficiency. 
The weak-form of the efficient markets model, which states that prices fully and instan-
taneously reflect all past price information and reward rational investors for accepting risk 
(Fama (1970), Jensen (1978)), is usually tested in the following manner. The statistical 
representation of the model can be written as: 
Xl = f...ll + el 
f...ll = RFI + RP, ~O. (l.l.1) 
E (e t ) = 0, E (el el+i ) = 0 (i # 0), cov (f...ls ,el ) = 0 (all s ,t)o 
where the return from holding the asset from day (-1 to day ( is defined by xl=loge(PtIPI- 1), PI 
being the price at the end of day (, where RFI is the return from risk-free investments and 
where RP, is a risk premium. This model, and the constant mean (random walk) model, imply 
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that daily returns in an efficient market are uncorrelated, and autocorrelation based studies have 
become the dominant testing paradigm. However, such tests have, on many occasions, been 
shown to have low power, and there is yet to be developed a uniformly most powerful altema-
tive. 1 
However, for the gilt-edged market (and other bond markets) it is possible to build more 
powerful efficiency tests using knowledge of the term structure of interest rates. In a perfect 
market, the relationship between the term structure of interest rates and the prices of coupon 
bonds is given by 
C 1 C 2 Cn p=---+ + ... + (1.1.2) 
(1 +R I) (1 +R 2)2 (1 +Rn t 
where, the price of the bond is P, the cash flow payments to be made at the ends of periods 
1,2, ... ,n are C bC 2, ... ,Cn , and the spot interest rates applicable to these payments are the 
series R 1,R 2,R 3, ... ,Rn. The set of these spot rates may be regarded as the term structure of 
interest rates. 
There are two elements of this decomposition that may be used to develop efficiency 
tests. Firstly, observations on the term structure can be used to create the present value of the 
coupon stream for a bond, and the residual between the present value and the market price can 
be used to discover evidence of market inefficiency. 2 The second approach comes from an 
examination of the term structure itself. By studying the dynamics of the term structure and 
those factors contributing to its shape and movements over time, it will be possible to deter-
mine whether there are anomalies in the shape of the term structure which persist over time, 
indicating market inefficiency, and the presence of possible arbitrage trading profits. 
1 See Summers (1983) and Chapter 5. 
2 As a theoretical model, equation (1.1.2) is a no arbitrage condition (see Schaefer 1980a), and thus 
any residual is evidence of inefficiency. Practical considerations such as observation error, short selling 
constraints, tax effects and the term structure estimation procedure permit residuals to take on qualities 
from which efficiency may be assessed (see chapter 6). 
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1.2. Organisation of the Study 
The fact that this study brings together many hitherto unacquainted and extensive literatures 
means that a literature survey in the usual sense is neither appropriate nor reasonably feasible. 
Instead literature surveys are included within particular chapters at a location designed to indi-
cate how this work progresses from the current state of knowledge or existing technology, and 
why it is useful to do so. 
Thus, the following chapter (usually reserved for a literature survey) describes the 
development of the gilt-edged market up to the point of deregulation, and considers the theoret-
ical aspects of proposed changes to the structure of the gilt-edged market. Chapter three con-
siders the impact of these changes on the operational efficiency of the gilt-edged market, both 
from a theoretical and empirical viewpoint, and examines how well this new market structure 
absorbed the shocks of October 1987. 
These extensively theoretical and institutional issues balance an otherwise wholly empiri-
cal and technical thesis. Chapters 5 to 8 contain the empirical and technical studies implied by 
the objective outlined above: testing the impact of Big Bang on informational-efficiency. 
Chapter 4 is in some sense a literature review for this part of the thesis, particularly so for 
chapter 5, but also contains an important theoretical result. We draw on a recent reinterpreta-
tion of the traditional theories of the term structure of interest rates to provide an interpretation 
of the efficient markets hypothesis in terms of these traditional theories. 
Tests of market efficiency using traditional weak-form autocorrelation techniques are con-
ducted in chapter 5. The low power of the standard tests leads to the use of more powerful 
tests which have been recently applied to commodity futures prices.3 Observations on the term 
structure are required for the construction of efficiency tests based upon the term structure, or 
the pricing residuals from it. In chapter 6, a new technique for measuring the term structure is 
3 See Taylor (1985) and chapter 5. 
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developed, and tests on pncmg residuals conducted. The dynamics of the term structure are 
examined in chapters 7 and 8. The dynamics of key interest rates in the term structure are 
examined in chapter 7 and the term structure as a whole examined in chapter 8. The efficiency 
tests based upon the shape of the term structure are included in chapter 8. Chapter 9 provides a 
summary of the main results and technical developments, and contains suggestions for further 
work. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
The Gilt-Edged Market and the Economics of Big Bang 
2.1. Introduction 
Gilt-edged securities are redeemable fixed interest securities issued by, or guaranteed by, 
H.M.Government, on which is paid semi-annual interest. In their simplest form, they are 
characterized by name, coupon (a nominal interest rate), and redemption date. For example, 
10% Treasury Stock 2003, makes two equal semi-annual payments of 5% and will be repaid at 
face value (usually £100) at a predetermined date in the year 2003. There are cunently over 
100 stocks with a variety of names, with coupons ranging from 2% to 15.5% and maturities of 
between only a few months and approaching 30 years. Several of these stocks have a redemp-
tion period rather than a single date: the government has the option to repay the stock at any 
time during this period. Additionally, there are a group of stocks having index-linked pay-
ments, and another group of undated stocks. This study is concerned with those gilts that are 
dated and have fixed payments. 
This chapter is structured as follows. Section 2.2 considers the operations of the market 
before Big Bang. It provides a self-contained history of the development of the market up to 
the point of deregulation. This section discusses such topics as the operations and identity of 
the market participants; the size of turnover, commissions and spreads; the relationship between 
gilts and monetary policy; and the problems that the market had encountered during its 
development and the ways in which these problems were tackled. Thus the discussion concerns 
issues of operational and allocative efficiency. 
The next section of this chapter, section 2.3, contains a theoretical analysis of the causes 
of Big Bang and discusses whether there is an economic justification for the changes intro-
duced. Popular opinion has identified the start of the events that led to deregulation with the 
infamous deal between the Stock Exchange chairman and the Secretary of State for Industry in 
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1983, in the wake of the challenge by the Director General of Fair Trading to the rule book of 
the Stock Exchange. However, we consider the event in the context of longer term economic 
events and find a rather different conclusion, based upon economic principles and technological 
development rather than legal expediency and compromise. Conclusions are summarized in 
section 2.4. 
2.2. The Gilt-Edged Market Before Big Bang 
Along side National Savings, Treasury bills, short term borrowing from the Bank of England, 
loans on overseas markets and direct loans such as those from the IMF, gilts make up the 
"National Debt". The first systematic issues of national debt appear to have been to raise £Im 
to finance the wars against Louil.; XIV of France. In fact the Bank of England was founded at 
the same time, 1694, as the quid pro quo to the financiers who raised the initial sum was their 
being granted a charter to form a bank. 
One of the major factors subsequently contributing to the growth of both the debt and the 
gilt market has been the financing of war. By 1873, the nominal value of gilts stood at £800m. 
By 1913, it had increased to £l,OOOm while the national debt stood £650m. By the end of the 
first world war, the national debt was some £7,500m and the gilt market had a nominal value 
of £5,400m. During the inter-war years the market grew a further £500m, but the second world 
war had pushed up the national debt to £21,OOOm and the size of the market to £ 12,800m by 
1945. Following the post war programme of Nationalisation, the Radcliffe committee (1959) 
reported that the gilt market now stood at £14,700m. In order to finance the corporate expan-
sion programmes of these new public corporations and also local authorities, the gilt market 
had increased to £ 1 b,200m in 1970. In the seventies, for reasons which will be discussed later, 
gilts market management became a major tool of government monetary policy and in 1986, 
just prior to Big Bang, market size had reached £122,OOOm. As such, it was substantially larger 
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than the PSBR and represented 80% of the total UK sterling debt. 
Although debt grew roughly six fold in the forty years since 1945 (see figure 2.1), its 
growth was slower than that of GDP. Over this period the ratio of debt to GDP fell from 2.37 
to 0.45. However, the prolonged period of debt financing incurred a substantial growth in debt 
service costs. This could have run the potentially explosive problem of issuing more debt to 
simply pay the interest on existing debt. Furthermore the recent sales of nationalised industries 
had artificially lowered the PSBR. Political response concentrated on the fact that interest pay-
ments are taxable transfers and hence some of the outflow was retrieved by the government. 
The psychology of whether investors take this tax effect into their decision making process, 
and the theory concerning the situation in which debt financing becomes cumulatively unstable, 
are beyond the scope of this study. 1 
The main form of issuing gilt edged securities had been through an offer for sale to the 
general public. Until the infamous "Battle of Watling Street" in February 1979, the price was 
usually fixed at the time of announcement, normally three working days before the application 
deadline. This meant that if market prices rose in the intervening period, the new issue was 
available at a substantial discount. Between the announcement and issue date of Treasury 13 
3/4% 2000/2003, the long end of the market rose dramatically, causing the issue department of 
the Bank of England (in Watling Street) to be swamped with applications, and to experience 
"disorderly scenes". Subsequently, issue was primarily through public tender. The government 
generally set a minimum price and stock was issued to those tendering the highest price and 
continuing with the next highest and so on until the issue was fully allotted. The lowest price 
at which applications were successful was the price actually paid by all allottees. If the issue 
was undersubscribed when all allottees paid the minimum tender price or if, where no 
minimum was specified, tender prices were unacceptable, the balance of the issue became the 
1 The seminal works on this topic are Barro (1974) and Blinder and Solow (1973). A comprehensive 
recent survey of the issues involved is Buiter (1986). 
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current "tap stock". This meant that it was taken in by the issue department for later sale to the 
market in response to demand. The tap process required a considerable degree of finesse from 
the issue department. Lowering the price of tap stock excessively caused immediate losses to 
existing holders and could deter them from tendering for future issues. On the other hand, 
unless the market was moving upwards, a price higher than the issue price was unlikely to 
attract further investors. However, if it was feared that the tap price might gradually increase, 
new investors might not have preferred to defer purchase. In any case, the issue department 
had the option to wait until the climate was right before turning on the tap. 
2.2.1. The Secondary Market 
From at least 1970 until Big Bang, gilts continually accounted for about 11 % of the total value 
of the secondary market in all quoted securities. Even in nominal terms, with the effects of 
share prices and interest rates removed, the proportion remained fairly constant, though at the 
rather higher 44.6% in 1970 to 48% in 1983. However, we do not see the true size of the gilt 
market unless we consider turnover. In a survey conducted by the Stock Exchange just prior to 
Big Bang, it was found that while gilts accounted for only 10.3% of total bargains, they 
accounted for 65.4% of the total value of trades. Not only this, the proportion had fallen from 
around 72% in 1975. This reflected the reversal of the trend of the seventies when, as will be 
explained below, there was a strong emphasis on gilts market management as a tool of mone-
tary policy. Despite the falling proportion, actual daily turnover had increased from £370m In 
1975 to £2,215m in 1986. 
The above figures suggest that the average bargain size for gilts was large relative to 
other securities. The average gilts bargain was just under £0.5m whereas the average equity 
bargain was just under £10,000. These figures reflected the characteristics of trading in the gilts 
market. It was dominated by institutional investors conducting primarily switching operations 
in response to changes in interest rate expectations.2 The Exchange reported that the percentage 
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of turnover in medium and long gilts carried out by individuals and agents was only 6.6% in 
1986, having fallen from only 19.8% in 1983. However, this sector still accounted for around 
60% of trades as more than half of the trades were for sums of £10,000 or less. The percentage 
of turnover carried out by institutions had also fallen during the same period due to the rise of 
in-house and overseas dealings, but remained at well over 67%. This had not always been the 
case. Table 2.1 shows the rise of the institutional share of the market and the decline of the 
banking and individuals' share of the market. Interestingly, the proportion of gilts in the 
overall financial assets of the institutions had declined noticeably since 1979 due to the relaxa-
tion of exchange controls. In other words, though the institutions dominated the market, gilts 
were less important to them than when they did not dominate that market. The proportion in 
personal financial assets had also declined, from 36% in 1966 to 4% in 1986. This was due 
to: firstly, the tax incentives of investing via the institutions which is clearly borne out in the 
above figures showing the changes in the respective shares of the market; secondly, the volatil-
ity of interest rates channelling savings to safer environments; and thirdly, the MIRAS scheme 
redirecting savings into house purchases. 
As with the equity market before Big Bang, trading in the secondary market in gilts was 
conducted under a single capacity system. This meant that the process of trading was split 
between jobbers and brokers. A broker received orders to buy and sell from his clients. He 
did not normally take a position in a security. Then he would visit a jobber's stand on the 
floor of the exchange and ask the jobber - the wholesalers of securities - for a price, without 
declaring whether he wished to buy or sell. The jobber, who was only permitted to deal with 
registered brokers or other jobbers, would respond by quoting two prices, a higher one for buy-
ing and a lower one for selling. Jobbers' remuneration was derived from the "spread" between 
the two prices. The broker would then execute the deal with the jobber who offered the most 
2 Switching operations are transactions involving switching from one or more gilts (selling) to one or 
more other gilts (buying). There are a number of motivations for such transactions such as the change in 
interest rate expectations described above. 
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favourable price. The broker made his money by charging his client a commission for carrying 
out the deal. With the exception of short-dated gilts, these commissions were detennined by 
the Exchange's rules and were a sliding scale of charges, with a fixed minimum level, related 
to deal size. 
By 1985 there were eight jobbing finns, Wedd Durlacher Mordaunt, Akroyd & Smithers 
PLC, Pinchin Denny, Wilson & Watford, Charlesworth, Giles and Cresswell, Moulsdale 
(Liverpool), and Aitken Campbell (Glasgow). The first two accounted for 80% of the business 
and with the medium sized firm Pinchin Denny virtually the whole of it. The five others 
comprised 3 small London firms and 2 regional finns. Prior to Big Bang spreads on short 
maturity gilts (under five years to redemption) were roughly 2-4 ticks (£2/32-£4/32 per cent) 
and on medium and long term gilts were 4-8 ticks. Brokers' commission charges prior to Big 
Bang were about 0.05% on long gilts and 0.008% on short gilts. The turnover profile described 
above, was reflected in the profile of brokers' commission income, the share from individuals 
and agents having fallen, while gilts commission accounted for only 10% of total commission 
income, due to their predominantly low volume, high value nature. Also, there were probably 
about 12 brokers carrying out 90% of the business by value, and with a fairly restricted client 
base. 
It is not surprising to learn that in such a tight knit community, views were generally 
shared and consequently the market had the potential to be highly sensitive to any moves in 
opinion. In order to reduce the possibility of embarrassment to jobbing firms and patchiness of 
liquidity, two avenues of assistance were available to the jobbers: the Government Broker and 
the Money Brokers. 
The office of Government Broker, colloquially "GB", had been established in 1786 and 
since 1829 had been the senior partner in the broking finn Mullen's & Co. The Government 
Broker and his department, entirely divorced from the rest of Mullen's & Co., dealt in the 
market on behalf of the Issue department of the Bank and the Commissioners for the 
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Reduction of the National Debt. The Government Broker acted as a "Jobber of Last Resort". 
Though there was no formal undertaking, he was prepared, at prices of his own choosing, to 
buy and sell stock from the jobbers in response to particular market conditions. 
In the fifties and sixties, there had been three Stock Exchange Money Brokers (SEMBs). 
By 1986 there were six, all specialist departments of the following stockbroking firms, 
Cazenove, Sheppards & Chase, Laurie Millbank, Rowe and Pitman, James Capel & Co., and 
Hoare Govett. Essentially, they acted as a market for loans of cash and stock. If a jobber 
bought stock, he could borrow money to settle the following day, against security of the stock. 
Prior to 1914, there had been account dealing. Since 1918, the market operated a system of 
cash settlement the following day. If a jobber sold stock, he could borrow the stock against the 
security of cash received. Money Brokers were permitted to use other financial institutions to 
balance their own accounts. 
2.2.2. Monetary Policy and Gilt Market Management 
In the Bank of England Quarterly Bulletin for 1966, the objectives for those who managed the 
gilt-edged market were disclosed. Most importantly, there was the task of maximising the long 
run desire of investors at home and abroad to hold British government debt; preserving the 
"attraction, health and capacity" of the market. The reason simply was the Government's con-
tinuing need at that time for large quantities of long-term finance both for current borrowing 
requirements and to replace maturing debt. Subsidiary to the above, and of a shorter term, was 
the task of assisting economic policy. There were two parts to this objective, firstly the promo-
tion or maintenance of an "appropriate pattern of interest rates", and secondly, the provision of 
assistance in reaching the targets of credit policy, by limiting government borrowing from the 
banking sector. 
In 1966, the quantitative objective of monetary policy was the limiting of the growth in 
bank lending to the domestic sector. The government sought short term finance from the bank-
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ing sector through the tender for Treasury bills and the Bank of England's financing operations 
in the money markets. This allowed the government the necessary flexibility to pursue the aims 
of long tenn gilt-edged management This management was conducted in the secondary market 
by the Government Broker. By being prepared to deal in the way described earlier, the govern-
ment could ensure the liquidity and hence the long tenn appeal of the market to the investors. 
Furthennore, the Government Broker could equally well supply or absorb stock without 
influencing the price, as do so to influence it. Thus market observation of the Government 
Broker was essential to detect any changes in policy which could directly influence the gilts 
market. 
In 1968, in agreement with the IMF, domestic credit expansIOn (DCE) replaced bank 
lending as a monetary target. This had differing effects in the primary and secondary market. 
In the primary market there was no obvious effect as the government's requirement for finance 
at that time was small. Furthermore, it was not seen as a lasting change in monetary policy. 
However, in the secondary market, the direction of attention to targeting the quantity of a 
monetary aggregate, as measured by the DCE, meant the freeing of its price. Fluctuating 
interest rates causes fluctuating gilt prices. This was evidenced by the Bank's tendency to alter 
prices at which it was prepared to deal more quickly to avoid disruptive volatility. In Sep-
tember 1971, the publication of the "Competition and Credit Control Document" marked a 
major change in monetary policy operations. The quantitative limits on bank advances ended 
and DCE control was modified in line with the broader aim of regulating the growth of the 
money supply by varying interest rates. 
Predating this by 4 months, the Bank of England had decided to modify its operations in 
the secondary market. As this remained the system until Big Bang, it is useful to describe the 
changes. The principal change was that the Government Broker was no longer prepared to 
respond to requests to buy stock outright, except for those with a maturity of one year or less; 
and he would only buy longer stocks at his discretion and initiative. He would undertake 
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exchanges of stock at prices of his own choosing only if it did not shorten the maturity of debt 
in public hands, and he would continue to respond to bids for tap stocks and other stocks 
which he wanted to sell. These changes led to increased short term fluctuations in prices and a 
reduction in liquidity. As one channel of assistance had closed, jobbers responded by increas-
ing spreads and changing prices more abruptly. The Bank did not believe however that "the 
longer-term health of the market need suffer in consequence" (BEQB (1979), p.138). 
Unfortunately, the authorities began to find that the more volatile interest rates required 
for monetary control clashed with the desire to maintain the long term health of the market. 
Ceteris paribus, such a situation could be resolved (see the discussion of variable rate stocks 
below). However, the seventies saw a period of rising and more variable inflation and an 
increased budget deficit (PSBR). During the sixties inflation had ranged from 1 % to 8%. 
Between 1970 and 1978, it varied from 7% to 27%. In 1970, the PSBR was £1 bn. In 1975, it 
was £lO.5bn, and it averaged £6bn during the seventies. Volatile inflation causes volatile nomi-
nal interest rates compounding gilt management problems, and although an increased PSBR 
required increased borrowing of some form, gilts might not be the most preferred candidate. So 
there has to be a significant other reason for the Government's unprecedented resort to the 
gilt-edged market during the seventies to finance the PSBR. 
The key point is that if Government spending is financed by making sales of securities to 
the non-bank public, the money supply in aggregate remains unchanged, since the amount 
placed in public hands by virtue of the Government's spending is exactly counterbalanced by 
the reduction in the total stock of money caused by these purchases. In contrast when the 
Government borrows from the banking system its spending increases the amount of money in 
circulation, as before, but there is no counterbalancing reduction in bank deposits, and as a 
consequence the money supply is expanded. 
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2.2.3. Developments in the Primary Market 
Against such an uncertain background, it is not surpnsmg to discover that the scale of gilt 
edged sales to the non-bank public referred to above was not achieved without some degree of 
market innovation. The new developments were the introduction of partly-paid stocks, converti-
ble stocks, variable rate stocks and index-linked stocks, and the use of "taplets". Other innova-
tions were suggested, but they were either never implemented or swept aside by the wave of 
Big Bang changes. These were: firstly, permitting sharper changes in the prices at which the 
Bank sold stock to the market; secondly, the development of a "special relationship" between 
the Bank and the main gilt-edged investors; and thirdly, introducing a further short term asset. 
Following the sterling crisis in 1976 when the Government found it necessary to make an 
application to the IMF for stand-by credit due to the huge growth of the PSBR relative to 
GOP, monetary control was accorded a high economic priority. From a post-war low of 
-0.10%, the PSBR as a percentage of GOP reached a peak of 9.58% in 1975. In March of 
1977, the Bank of England resorted to a device which had not been used since 1940. It 
announced the issue of stock on a partly-paid basis, the calls being timed to match expected 
financing requirements and to reduce the monthly fluctuations in monetary aggregates. 
Also, new forms of market instrument were introduced which were designed to be attrac-
tive under the prevailing conditions of uncertainty, especially to the non-bank public, and "The 
Grand Old Duke of York" made his market debut. At times of funding crises (1976), the 
authorities adopted the tactic of forcing up interest rates, causing gilts prices to fall, and allow-
ing tap stocks to be re-established at a much lower level. It was then hoped that demand for 
the high yielding tap stock would be forthcoming and market prices would begin to rise once 
more. The market thus adopted the oscillatory progress of the well-known nursery rhyme char-
acter. Since 1981, the "Duke" has not been recalled into active service. 
The first of the new market instruments was convertible stocks introduced in March 1973. 
They are shorter stocks (with yields close to the market yield for that maturity) which carry the 
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option to convert the holding into predefined amounts of a longer stock (with a yield close to 
that for longer dated stocks at the time the shorter dated stock was issued), at some time or 
times in the future. Conversion terms cause this to be a more expensive way of acquiring the 
longer stock at a conversion date than purchasing in the market, ceteris paribus. This difference 
is the premium investors pay for the option to convert. Expectations of long-term rates essen-
tially determine whether a particular investor will prefer to hold long-term bonds or short tern1 
bonds. The convertible bond provides the opportunity to exchange a short term bond for a long 
term bond and the attractiveness of this opportunity depends on the variability of the price ratio 
of the long term bond and the short term bond. Whether or not conversion occurs, that is 
whether or not expectations were fulfilled, is of relatively little importance to the Government 
compared to whether the stock was attractive in the first place. For if interest rates make 
conversion unfavourable, the longer bond is presumably more attractive as a market purchase, 
so it does not seem unreasonable, for portfolio balance reasons, that it should pick up a sub-
stantial quantity of the cash from the redeemed short stock. Although convertible issues are 
more expensive to manage than ordinary issues, they have significantly aided the operation of 
the primary market. 
It was mentioned earlier how the increase in the volatility of interest rates clashed with 
the desire to maintain the "health" of the gilt market. Finding a solution to this conflict was 
made more difficult in that it contained "Catch-22" characteristics. To invest in gilts, the non-
bank financial institutions who were already considerably saturated with gilts needed the pros-
pect of falling interest rates and confidence that the money supply was in control; and, whilst 
the opposite conditions prevailed, these investors were noticeably absent. The required solution 
was a capital protective instrument marketable during times of high interest rates that were not 
expected to fall. The preferred solution was the introduction of variable rate stocks. There were 
three issues of Treasury Variable Rate Stock, with maturities of 1981,1982, and 1983; the first 
issue being made in 1977. These stocks provided a degree of insurance against rising short 
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term rates in the following way. The half-yearly coupon was set equal to the average Treasury 
bill rate for the six months prior to the coupon date, plus a fixed margin of 1/2%. Apart from 
being more complex to analyse than fixed coupon gilts, their success was limited. As they were 
short term stocks, they tended to be more attractive to the banking sector rather than the non-
bank sector at which they were primarily aimed. Consequently, they were fairly thinly traded 
and perhaps did not enjoy their deserved price stability; but, in comparison to fixed coupon 
gilts of the same maturity, their prices were considerably less variable. DUling 1977-79, vari-
able rate prices ranged about 3 points (£3 per £100 nominal face value), while fixed coupon 
prices fluctuated by 12 points. 
To directly challenge the inflationary environment, index-linked stocks were introduced in 
the budget speech of 10 March 1981. The idea had been around for a number of years (see e.g. 
BEQB 1979 p147), and although inflation was falling by 1981, their attraction is that the "real" 
return to maturity is fairly clear. Institutional investors welcomed them as their liabilities rose 
with inflation. In fact, all investors concerned by the effect of rising inflation on nominal 
interest rates and hence on prices, can gain substantial compensation against the inflation com-
ponent of capital losses. For the first three issues between March 1981 and March 1982 
(£1000m 2% Index-Linked Stock 1996,£1000m 2% Index-Linked Stock 2006 and £750m 2 
1/2% Index-Linked Stock 2011), ownership was restricted to pension funds or institutions writ-
ing pension business. This resulted in poor marketability and frustrated other willing pur-
chasers. The Treasury and Bank of England responded by freeing ownership of these and sub-
sequent issues beginning with £750m 2% Index-Linked 1988 in March 1982. Coupon and 
redemption payments are weighted by the RPI for the month eight months before the payment 
date. This time lag allows for: firstly, the coupon payments to be known six months in 
advance as with ordinary gilts; secondly, the approximate 37 day ex-dividend period; and 
thirdly, the timing of RPI announcements. It is the minimum period practical. However, it does 
mean that the redemption value on the date of issue is not 100, and that there is no protection 
- 24 -
against inflation during the last eight months to maturity. By 1985, there were 11 index-linked 
stocks, of varying maturities, accounting for about 8% of the market. They have proved popu-
lar with investors. 
After 1980, the authorities modified the issue procedure to assist their sales of debt. They 
created small additional tranches of existing stocks ("tranchettes" or"taplets") and sold them to 
the Bank, which in tum "tapped" them out to the market as demand dictated. Initially regarded 
as a temporary measure, their convenience made them a regular market feature. Stock could be 
quickly issued, with no prospectus or difficult pricing problems, to meet unexpected demand 
when a new issue might have been less easily digested. Also, any need to reduce the price 
involved less embarrassment then with a new issue. 
For completeness, I will discuss those ideas that were not implemented in the gilt market. 
The first suggestion, a modification of pricing practices, consisted of two distinct aspects: a 
modification of the pricing of tap stocks, and the adoption of tendering as the general sale 
practice for new issues. The latter suggestion was introduced to some extent, but the former, 
which was based upon the proposition that "a sufficient fall in the price at which the stock is 
obtainable will ... (ceteris paribus) ... produce the required demand", was not thought appropri-
ate. Although more flexible pricing, of which three forms were considered by the Bank 
(BEQB,1979), would assist tap sales which were dependent on the state of the market, the 
Bank believed that the additional element of uncertainty would "seriously impede the making 
of a market, in any size, in gilt-edged stocks whether by jobbers, as at present, or under some 
different institutional arrangement." The view expressed in this comment also demonstrated that 
the Bank did not think that the pre-Big Bang system was sufficiently robust to handle such an 
innovation. It believed that the potential threat to liquidity could damage the long term attrac-
tiveness of the market, which could not easily be balanced against any advantage of flexible 
pricing. What happened instead was the introduction of taplets, as described earlier. 
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A second idea was to establish a more direct relationship between the Government and 
the major investors. Suggestions included the negotiation of underwriting by the institutions 
rather than the Bank, and the negotiation of direct placings with the institutions. The problem 
was that it was unclear that in a bear market the institutions would be any more likely to buy 
by way of placement than in the open market, unless offered a significant yield inducement. 
Neither would it be prudent to underwrite the issues, unless given the freedom to move the 
underwriting price. Conversely, in a bull market, the present system was quite satisfactory. 
Furthermore, and without entering arguments concerning the efficacy of government influence 
over major investors, it was likely that such an infl uence would hold yields artificially low and 
hence reduce the long term attractiveness of gilts to other investors. While the flow of funds 
from institutions may be stabilised there was no reason to expect this to be the case for the 
market overall. 
Finally, there was the suggestion of introducing a new form of short term debt. Though 
primarily targeted at institutional funds awaiting investment and company bank deposits (which 
form part of the money supply), it could also appeal to private investors to compete with non-
marketable assets (e.g. National Savings). The two marketable short term instruments already 
available, Treasury bills and gilts approaching maturity, are eligible reserve assets to the bank-
ing system. So, compared to other short term assets with which they compete, these have a 
particular value to the banks and their yield is on occasion bid down to levels unattractive to 
other investors. Therefore it was suggested that a short term asset that was not an eligible lia-
bility might be introduced. However, such an area was already heavily populated by local 
authority loans, and to compete with this may have reduced the flow of funds into the public 
sector as a whole. As for prospective demand, the proportion of short term funds which were 
held in bank deposits suggested that a close substitute would be necessary to attract funds 
away. Unfortunately, this would not have produced any meaningful reduction in liquidity in 
the economy. Furthermore, a higher yield would need to have been offered, and as non-
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marketable assets were offering high yields, the cost was likely to be unacceptable. 
2.2.4. Conclusion 
Despite the innovations in the primary market, none had worked as successfully as hoped, and 
were in any case borne out of an atmosphere of concern over the ability to secure sufficient 
public sector funding in the economic climate of the late sixties to early eighties. Furthermore, 
those alternatives that had been suggested seemed to need a more robust dealing system in 
order to produce the desired allocative result. 
The secondary market was also quite aware of its limitations. Jobbers believed that the 
assistance of the Government Broker and money brokers often failed to meet their needs, and 
that there were not a sufficient number of firms to provide the market with the level of 
liquidity it really required. 
The new gilt-edged market and the impacts of Big Bang on operational efficiency are 
described in chapter three. The next section, 2.3, considers the causes of Big Bang and con-
siders whether there is an economic justification for the changes introduced (in particular in the 
dealing system), beyond a simple response to the pressures upon liquidity examined above. 
2.3. The Economics of Big Bang: Causes and Justification 
On the 27 October 1986, the UK Stock Market underwent substantial changes. The official 
phrase to describe the events was "Deregulation". However, the use of a single day to intro-
duce the great majority of these changes caused the event to be known, colloquially, as the 
"Big Bang". Deregulation not only changed the way in which agents operated in the market 
but also the structure of the market itself. It is well documented that there were three major 
components to the changes. They were: permitting member firms to act in dual capacity, that 
is, they can act as both jobber and broker; the abolition of the system of fixed minimum 
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commissions to be replaced by negotiated commissions; and the freeing of membership restric-
tions to the Exchange. 
2.3.1. The Causes of Big Bang 
The developments which led up to deregulation fall into three broad categories; legal reasons, 
economic reasons and technological reasons. Most of the focus of attention on the causes of 
Big Bang has tended to be on the legal happenings and, hence as we shall see, its roots are 
deemed to extend back only to 1983. However, there were significant economic and technolog-
ical reasons and more deep rooted legal reasons why the road to deregulation began even ear-
lier. One implication of this line of argument is that while Big Bang fitted the "pro-
competitive" ideology of the Government at the time, this was coincidental as deregulation was 
an inevitable conclusion of legal and, more importantly, economic and technological events. 
In 1976, the powers of the Office of Fair Trading (OFT) were extended to include service 
industries. Two years later, the Director General of Fair Trading gave notice that he wished to 
challenge the Stock Exchange's rule book in the Restrictive Practices court. The DGFT 
infonned the Exchange that he had found a number of restrictions as defined by the 1973 Res-
trictive Practices Act. These were: limits to the freedom of brokers to supply their services (i.e. 
minimum commissions were in force), limits to the operation of the market system (i.e. single 
capacity), and limits to the use of agents (i.e. controls on membership of the exchange). At 
first the Exchange mounted an expensive defence knowing it would take years for the case to 
come to court. 
By 1981, the case was well underway and the prospect of a long and expensive legal bat-
tIe faced both sides. The Exchange had hoped that the change of government in 1979 would 
provide some relief. But when the Chainnan, Sir Nicholas Goodison, asked for a Royal Com-
mission to look into the matter of the restrictive practices of the Exchange, he was refused this. 
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He had argued that a court was not the right forum since it could only decide innocence or 
guilt. What was needed was a body able to recommend reform. The then Secretary of State for 
Trade and Industry, John Nott, felt that to make the Exchange an exception to the whole 
"derestrictive" nature of government policy was inappropriate. However, his successor, In 
1983, Cecil Parkinson, agreed, in July of the same year, with the Chairman of the Exchange to 
exempt the Exchange from the restrictive practices legislation on certain conditions, namely the 
abandonment of fixed minimum commissions and allowing freedom of entry for outside firms. 
Hence, several commentators have dated the beginnings of the City deregulation from this 
point. 
However, the change was not as clear cut as this may suggest. In 1979, the new Conser-
vative government had abolished Exchange controls. Though this decision fitted their ideologi-
cal preference for free markets, it had become an economic necessity. North Sea Oil was caus-
ing a large current account deficit as the rising price of the pound was making imports more 
attractive. A capital outflow was required if payments were to balance. But more seriously the 
controls were no longer performing their intended function - controlling the value of currencies 
and the direction of investment. Despite them western countries could not hold fixed parities, 
and with them, multinationals who earned profits abroad were encouraged to leave them there. 
Since the ending of these controls, there have been several foreign banks operating in the 
euro-markets admirably placed to channel funds overseas. To respond to this, the Exchange 
began to allow dealings between its own members and "Designated Dealers". 3 As foreign 
brokers were prepared to pay reciprocal commissions to British brokers who supplied them 
with business, the flow of funds overseas was profitable on both sides. In response, member 
firms of the London Stock Exchange established subsidiaries to trade on overseas exchanges, 
under their house rules. The implications are clear. If a client wished buy or sell some securi-
3 Members of another stock exchange who were prepared to perform the same function for foreign 
shares as jobbers did in London, that is, maintaining a continuous two-way price. 
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ties and his broker operated in the UK he would pay minimum commissions. But if he traded 
in Wall Street, a lower negotiated commission was possible.4 Thus, there was already great 
pressure on the exchange to remove the fixed commissions system. By 1984, the London 
Stock Exchange had formalised the procedure by defining an "international dealer" as a subsi-
diary of a member firm, but not subject to the minimum commission rules.5 Even before this, 
American Depository Receipts (ADR's) and Automated Real Time Investment Exchange Lim-
ited (ARIEL) had been used to circumvent the commission system.6 
Contrary to popular belief, the issue of dual capacity was not part of the Goodison-
Parkinson pact: it did not need to be. Stockbrokers and jobbers only have an incentive to main-
tain single capacity dealing under a system of fixed minimum brokerage commissions. If com-
missions are negotiable, the operation of dual capacity dealing will naturally follow. The rea-
sons for the link between these two aspects of market structure will now be analysed. 
Single capacity dealing had been introduced by law in 1908 to formalize the informal 
specialisation of roles that had evolved among participating firms during the nineteenth century, 
and to reestablish the lapsed regulatory control of the City authorities. However, it soon 
became apparent that it was impossible to prevent a jobber from dealing directly with a custo-
mer, as he could put the deal through a "friendly" broker or his own broking division as a for-
mality. At the same time, brokers competing on commission levels have a strong incentive to 
make markets in shares to capture the jobbers' spread income in place of commission income. 
A fixed level of brokerage commissions would remove the usefulness to the jobber of the 
dummy broker because this meant that the dummy broker received payment for no service and 
4 The UK securities internationally traded tended to be the large "blue chip" companies, and the 
clients, big UK institutions. 
5 The foreign arms of these international could act in dual capacity in the foreign market. They dealt in 
UK equities in ADR form with foreign investors in the foreign market. ADR's are described below. 
6 American Depository Receipts were huge blocks of UK blue chip securities bought by US institutions 
in the UK. Then all subsequent dealings were done in the US where there was no duty. Discontent among 
the prominent Merchant banks (Accepting Houses) over the commission levels led to their setting up Au-
tomated Real Time Investment Exchange Limited through which they dealt with each other, by-passing 
the market and its charges. To avoid a fragmented market, the system was bought out by the Exchange. 
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the jobber was not paid for his broking service. Fixed commission levels would also reduce the 
incentive for brokers to take positions in the market. So a system of fixed minimum commis-
sions was introduced in 1912. Thus it is clear that these two aspects of market structure are 
inextricably linked, and so when the Goodison-Parkinson pact signalled the end of minimum 
commissions, it also marked the end of single capacity dealing. 
While fixed commissions are a necessary condition for the maintenance of single capacity 
dealing, they are certainly not a sufficient condition. Brokers still have an incentive, albeit 
reduced under fixed commissions to take positions in stocks to capture the jobbers spread 
income. The actions pursued by both brokers and jobbers in response to this incentive demon-
strate an interesting irony concerning the causes of Big Bang. In response to the potential for 
capturing spread income and facilitated by the rise of the institutional investor (see table 2.1), 
broking firms began to transact "put-throughs". A firm finding itself with a matching buy and 
sell order would make the market itself, checking the price with a jobbing firm. Indeed, the 
Wilson committee (1980) reported that 10% of broking business was conducted this way. The 
jobbers' counter-measure was to adopt short run collusive agreements, to maximize their joint 
income. For example, a group of jobbers might make a joint book (market) in a security, or set 
an agreed spread on a security. The irony of this state of affairs is that these practices were 
highlighted by the 1978 Monopolies Commission report, and thus in some sense, the system of 
fixed minimum commissions contributed to the removal of single capacity when it was 
designed to maintain it. Furthermore, the fact that the minimum commission system was under 
investigation anyway meant that commission levels certainly could not be raised in order to 
discourage the anti-competitive practices described above. 
The third component of Big Bang was the relaxation of the Stock Exchanges membership 
restrictions. In fact the rule that outside firms must have less than a thirty per cent share in a 
member firms ended on the 1 st of March 1986. There followed a large number of mergers and 
takeovers among merchant banks, brokers and jobbers.7 The synergy in ability to monitor a 
7 For example, merchant bank S G Warburg teamed up with broker Rowe & Pitman Mullen and jobber 
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share from inception in the pnmary market, through the secondary market, until a possible 
redesign following a merger or takeover, belies some of the underlying economic reasons for 
these mergers among different financial institutions. Once again, the deregulation of the foreign 
exchange market had a key impact. A merchant banks' traditional role had been to design 
suitable issues of securities for its client companies, arrange for the issue to be underwritten 
and then distribute the securities. The abolition of exchange controls meant that client firms 
could often obtain finance cheaper from abroad by taking advantage of short run opportunities 
of low interest rates and appreciating currencies. Simultaneously, these same companies had 
begun to employ staff of equal calibre to the merchant banks, and could obtain similar infor-
mation. Some companies even began to organise the design and underwriting of the issue, 
leaving the bank with only the distribution function. This led to smaller profits for the banks, 
who sought to make them up by taking a position in the market. The cheapest way to obtain 
the necessary expertise seemed to be the acquisition of broking and jobbing firms. The City 
was also host to a growing number - about 120 - of foreign security firms and banks, who also 
used existing firms as their route to membership.8 
Although the focus of discussion has been on demonstrating that Big Bang was more the 
product of economic rather than legal forces, there is one further factor to consider; the role of 
technology. The recent technological advances in computers and telecommunications laid 
beneath many of the pressures for a change in the market structure. The ARIEL system, the 
institutional dealer arrangements and the opportunities for firms to obtain cheap short run 
finance from overseas all relied on such developments. Recently, it has been argued that tech-
nological factors are the root cause of the recent growth in new forms of securities (e.g. 
Swaps, Options and Futures) rather than the more visible short run exploitation of taxation or 
regulatory anomalies (see e.g. Cooper (1986) and Miller (1986)). Indeed Cooper further argues 
Akroyd and Smithers to form "Mercury Securities". 
8 For example, the Hong Kong and Shanghai Bank acquired James Capel and Co. 
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and provides examples which show that market structure is an endogenous response to these 
developments. Whether or not this was the case for the changes proposed to the equity and gilt 
market, the American market deregulation in 1975 had shown that it would be impossible to 
run an efficient and liquid market post deregulation without these technological aids. 
2.3.2. The Economic Justification for the Big Bang Changes 
Any threat to the liquidity of the market - the risk of having non-matching buyers and sellers -
could hinder the nation's ability to raise finance. Therefore any change in the system could be 
expected to be contentious to say the least. It is often said that stability provides a consistent 
environment which, in tum, instils confidence in those operating in that environment. But to 
believe this means a faultless system is illusory. 
The single capacity / fixed commissions market system had provided stability, but had not 
been able to (or wished to) react to recent threats to its continuity. Because of the distorting 
influence of Britain's tax structure, investment in shares had largely been channelled through 
the big institutions, and they tended to buy only "safe" shares in well-established companies. 
Jobbers who had specialised in other sectors had therefore done badly and the overall number 
of jobbers was fallingY As a result, gaps had developed in the market; that is, there were some 
sectors in which no jobber who would quote a price. 
First let us consider the economic justifications for maintaining the fixed minimum com-
missions system. It has already been seen that minimum commissions can be justified as a 
necessary condition for the maintenance of single capacity. But, this implies that we have 
already justified single capacity: we have not. lO 
9 Taking the equity and gilt-edged market as a whole, there were over 100 jobbing firms in 1970, but 
only 17 in 1984. 
10 The arguments developed in this section are similar to those used by Brealey and Hodges (1978) in 
their paper prepared for use by the Stock Exchange as part of its defense against the restrictive practices 
case. At that time the details of the Big Bang changes were not known, and their arguments could not be 
conclusive. With the full details available, a strong conclusion concerning the economic justification for 
these changes can now be made. 
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Economic theorists are widely agreed that perfectly competitive markets will allocate 
resources efficiently, in the sense that no one may be made better off without making someone 
else worse off. A firm in such a market faces a given market price and hence will produce 
until price equals marginal cost. In contrast, a profit maximising monopolist or cartel will res-
trict production to the level at which marginal revenue equals marginal cost. Output is lower 
and prices higher than under competition. This suggests that there is a prima facie case for 
supposing that any restrictive practice which limits output or imposes a minimum price above 
the competitive outcome is not in the public interest. Principal defences for such practices are 
either that there is some structural instability facing the industry or that there are social benefits 
or costs to production which are not reflected in the price. 
The first plausible defence is that fixed commissions may not imply abnormal profits, but 
rather induce competition in service rather than in price. Unlike New York, the London Stock 
Exchange did not limit the number of seats and there were few costs or barriers to entry. If 
there were large monopoly profits to broking, would-be brokers should have been clamouring 
to enter the market. The actual picture was quite the reverse - there was a general decline in 
the number of firms and exchange membership during the seventies and early eighties. Even 
under free-entry, price fixing does not guarantee monopoly profits. Rather it reduces overall 
demand for broking services and encourages competition through non-price means, such as 
research services. Though successful non-price strategies increase firms business, any increase 
in revenue is most likely to be used in paying the salaries of a superior analysis team, rather 
than boosting profits. Finally, except for gilts, there were few restrictions to setting up alterna-
tive dealing systems. Though ADR's and ARIEL were born out of dissatisfaction with fixed 
commissions, the absence of any other competition implied that either fixed commissions were 
fiction rather than fantasy (as explained earlier) or their level was little higher than would exist 
in a competitive market. 
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Secondly, and furthermore, it will be argued below that any margin between a negotiated 
rate and a competitive rate does not represent a social cost but rather is the inevitable cost of 
transferring information from private to public hands. If the additional income did reflect a 
social cost, we cannot conclude that it would be better to abolish minimum commissions 
without taking into account the costs of introducing negotiated rates. The experience of the 
USA and, with the benefit of hindsight, the UK suggest that these adjustment costs are not 
negligible. Thus there is choice between repeated small and uncertain gains on the one hand 
and once-and-for-all substantial and certain losses on the other. 
It has been argued that brokerage houses do not make excess returns. Instead of compet-
ing in price they do so in terms of research. Hence the case for minimum commissions stands 
on the argument that it must be socially desirable to have competition in service rather than in 
price. This means that there must be something special about the fact that brokerage firms are 
dealing in information rather than tangible goods. Salient features of information are that it can 
lead to both public and private gains and that it is impossible to determine property rights to it. 
Let us see how these two features can justify a system in which the collection and dissemina-
tion of information is subsidized by the community at large. 
Under negotiated commissions brokers would undertake less research and would sell it 
for cash on a confidential basis. This research would not be in the public domain. There would 
also be an incentive for investing institutions to undertake research for their own private 
benefit. Such research is socially wasteful. One investor's gain is another's loss. It would pay 
institutions instead to agree not to undertake private research. This could never be monitored. 
But the way to ensure it is not undertaken is if they consent to subsidise research which is 
made public. Hence investors are prepared to pay effectively higher commissions to generate 
publically available information; a not unrealistic description of the system of minimum com-
missions. Then these payments guarantee that institutions will not undertake socially wasteful 
research that only results in private wealth transfers between investors. 
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Now let us consider the issue of single capacity. If there were no costs to investors' con-
tinuous participation in the market, there would be no need for a jobber to take positions. Sale 
and purchase could be by public auction. In practice such a continuous public auction would be 
costly: few investors leave a continuous set of limit orders and, therefore, orders arrive in a 
discontinuous Clumpy") and haphazard way. In the absence of a market-maker, there would be 
large short-term price variations dependent on the precise sequence of orders. Hence it is worth 
paying a market maker to make the market. By observing the sequence of orders or conducting 
his own research the market maker can form an estimate of the equilibrium price of the share. 
By offering to buy below and sell above this price, he reduces the short term variability. His 
price spread is the price of intermediacy. 
While it has been argued that jobbers perform an important market-making function, it is 
far from easy to show why they must be isolated from direct contact with investors. Three 
defences have been suggested. 
Firstly, it has been argued that the separation of jobber and broker is necessary for the 
maintenance of a single market place. This seems implausible. There are strong economic pres-
sures for a central market system and these would not be eliminated by allowing a jobber 
access to investors. 
Secondly, not only is minimum commissions necessary for maintaining single capacity, 
but, the research advantages of minimum commissions are upheld by single capacity. It has 
been shown how single capacity is linked to minimum commissions. The abandonment of fixed 
commissions leads to a broker seeking to take positions in the market, and a jobber to seek 
contact with investors, using a broker only as a formality. It was argued above that there are 
welfare gains to having research undertaken by independent firms who then disseminate it 
widely. If brokers were permitted to deal on their own account, this system would no longer be 
viable. Institutions would strongly object to paying for research that is then used against them. 
In other words, if we want to have brokers undertake independent research then the separation 
- 36 -
of jobbers and brokers is essential. 
Thirdly, the combining of principal and agent could lead to a conflict of interests. If a 
broker holds stock on his own account, his independence will become in doubt. Moreover, if 
he knows the identity of his customer he may know whether he is a buyer or a seller and will 
quote accordingly. Not only is this bad news for the customer but also it reduces the value of 
the broker's services. As far as a dealer is concerned, the above could equally apply if he can 
deal directly with an investor. But, by interposing an agent between the dealer and the custo-
mer (i.e. single capacity), the customer is able to protect his anonymity. Though this is an 
important motivation for single capacity (and other agency relations), it is difficult to show that 
in the absence of rules investors would not out of self-interest go to an independent broker 
anyway. In other words, the argument can be used to defend a rule that brokers may not deal 
on their own account, but it cannot itself justify a rule that jobbers may not deal directly with 
the public. If we wish to appeal to a conflicts of interest argument to justify the latter rule, it 
seems that we are forced to contend that the public does not know what is in its best interest. 
If there was no need to prevent brokers from dealing with the public as principals (for the 
reasons described above), the strongest argument for maintaining single capacity is to uphold 
the "independent research" advantages of minimum commissions. However, the strongest 
defences for minimum commissions are, firstly, precisely this research advantage and, 
secondly, to maintain single capacity. Therefore we could not justify one without the presence 
of the other to back it up. So, the maintenance of both rests on the conflict of interest argument 
regarding brokers. This may account for the introduction of the "best execution" rule for post-
Big Bang brokers. This forbids them acting as principals unless they can better the price on 
offer by the market makers. Thus the potential conflict of interests should not occur. Hence 
there is no economic justification for a return to the old system of single capacity and fixed 
minimum commissions. 
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Furthermore, that same old system was not free of a potential conflict of interests situa-
tion arising, albeit of a different form. Since under single capacity most of the broker's reve-
nue comes from transacting business which follows from advice given to their clients; they 
may be tempted to persuade their clients to buy and sell more often than is strictly necessary or 
even desirable. This is not, though, a problem confined to stockbroking. I I 
The last element of the changes was the freeing of membership restrictions, which led to 
numerous mergers in the years preceding Big Bang. In many cases motives were ill-defined 
and purchasers appear to have paid substantial sums for what at best is an insurance policy. 
However one of the main consequences of this wider ownership is that the Exchange will 
embrace a much wider variety of interests than hitherto and as a result may find it difficult to 
maintain agreement among its members. Heterogeneity of interests is perhaps the best guaran-
tee of competition. With the mergers came an extensive transfer of employees across, into and 
out of these new partnerships. In every case substantial remunerations were paid. 
2.4. Conclusions 
Following a description of the gilt-edged market as it stood prior to Big Bang, the causes of 
deregulation are found. Rather than it being a direct result of legal expediency and comprom-
ise, as represented by the Goodison-Parkinson pact, deregulation was much more the natural 
conclusion of a process of economic events and technological developments that had been in 
motion for many years before 1983. These factors facilitated low cost circumventions of the 
old system, and it was inevitable and essential that change would take place to maintain a 
liquid market place. 
11 It could occur if a surgeon prescribed operations that were not essential but brought in large fees. 
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Anecdotal evidence of the use of a system other than that in place, that is, dual capacity 
and negotiated commissions rather than single capacity and fixed commissions, does not mean 
that a change to such a system is economically justified. This issue analyzed and it is found 
that there is no economic justification for maintaining the old system if the new system 
operates a "best-execution" rule. Such a rule was introduced as part of the Big Bang changes. 
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TABLE 2.1 
OWNERSlllP OF GILT-EDGED SECURITIES 
(in billions of pounds) 
SECTOR 1959 1970 1984 1987 
Banking 3.2 2.1 7.6 8.8 
(22%) (13%) (7%) 
-
Individuals 3.4 3.6 14.4 14.5 
(23%) (22%) (12.5%) -
Overseas - 2.3 10.4 14.4 
-
(14%) (9%) 
-
Non-bank financial - 5.9 63.4 76.3 
institutions (18.5%) • (36%) (62.2%) -
-of which-
Pension funds and - - 42.2 66.5 
insurance companies - - (42%) -
• : 1957 figure. 
Source: Thomas (1987) and BEQB various issues. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
The Effects of Big Bang on Operational Efficiency 
3.1. Introduction 
Dual capacity dealing in the presence of negotiated commissions was introduced in the United 
Kingdom Stock Exchange on Monday 26th October 1986. However, these were not the only 
changes to the structure of the gilt-edged market that were introduced at that time. These addi-
tional measures or modifications to existing services were designed to assist the promotion of 
liquid and operationally-efficient trading within the new market structure. This chapter 
describes these changes and seeks to detennine the impact on liquidity and operational 
efficiency. 
Thus, section 3.2 provides a complete description of the operational changes introduced 
in the gilt-edged market. In the next section, 3.3, relevant theories of market microstructure are 
examined, and the predictions that these theories are able to make concerning the likely impact 
of the changes on operational efficiency are drawn out. Then, the extent to which these theoret-
ical predictions are borne out by the experience of the post-Big Bang market is considered in 
section 3.4, where also the effects of the Stock Market Crash are discussed. Section 3.5 con-
cludes. 
3.2. The Gilt-Edged Market after Big Bang. 
Under the new market system, brokers and jobbers will be replaced by a new fonn of Stock 
Exchange member firms known as "broker/dealers". They are able to conduct business with 
their clients either as principals or agents. That is they may operate in a "dual capacity". As 
principals, they are able to transact their customers' business with their own book; while as 
agents, they put together deals for negotiated commission on their clients' behalf. When 
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presented with a customer order, they may choose in which capacity they wish to deal. 
In addition to the broker/dealers, there is a group of gilt-edged market makers (GEMMs) 
who may also act in a dual capacity, but who do have certain dealing commitments, undertaken 
in return for certain dealing privileges. On 12 April 1984, the Bank invited applications to 
become registered market makers. Their function was clearly identified. "The essential liquidity 
of the new gilt-edged market will be provided by a number of market makers who undertake to 
make, on demand and in any trading conditions, continuous and effective two-way prices at 
which they stand committed to deal, in an appropriate size as discussed in advance with the 
Bank." (BEQB June 1985). They are expected to make such markets across the whole spread 
of gilts, and are restricted in which other instruments they may make a market. 1 There were 29 
successful applications to become market makers, or "Primary Dealers" as the Bank preferred 
them to be known. Initially, over 150 firms had expressed an interest, but there were 31 serious 
contenders. Some major institutions decided not to apply at all and two withdrew after being 
initially accepted, leaving 27 GEMMs registered market makers at Big Bang.2 
To assist the market makers, who demonstrate the capacity - in terms of capital and of 
management and operational resources - to do so, and who are prepared to accept the Bank's 
prudential oversight, the following facilities (privileges) are available. Firstly, the market mak-
ers have a direct and exclusive relationship with the bank. The following undertakings by the 
Bank, replaced the office of the Government Broker, who dealt on the Stock Exchange floor, 
by a team of staff within the Bank's gilt division, who deal by telephone. The nature of the 
relationship is not significantly altered. The Bank is prepared to receive, on a discretionary 
basis, from market makers - just before or at any time during business hours - outright bids for 
stock, including particularly tap stocks, which it may have in its portfolio. Also on a discre-
1 For example they can deal in related instruments such as gilt futures and options, but not equities. 
2 The established firms of Schroders and Smith New Court decided not to apply, while Bank of Ameri-
ca and Union Discount Securities pulled out of the market. The remaining 27 GEMMs are listed in the 
appendix to this chapter. Further details can be found in Phillips (1987, p.14-15) 
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tionary basis, it will undertake switches of stock proposed by market makers on such terms as 
it may agree. It is prepared to bid, at a price of its own choosing, for index-linked and stock 
with less than three months to maturity offered by market makers. It is prepared to purchase 
outright, at its discretion and chosen price, other stock offered by market makers. 
Furthermore, the market makers have borrowing facilities at the Bank against approved 
security up to maximum amounts related to their capital and reserves. They also enjoy the two 
tax concessions previously available to gilt market jobbers. Firstly, they can claim relief against 
tax for the full trading loss made by buying stock cum-dividend and selling it ex-dividend in 
the course of ordinary business regardless of the time interval between purchase and sale. 
Secondly, they can use the "bull and bear" dividend arrangement, thereby offsetting, for tax 
purposes, dividends on stock they have sold against dividends received on stock purchased. 
The market makers have continued, and now exclusive, access to the money brokers. 
With the commitment to make markets, the possibility of zero inventory in a stock, necessitates 
the borrowing of stock to meet a buying order. When next the market maker has a selling 
order, he can unwind his borrowed position. Borrowing is done against security of the cash 
received from the customer. As this may be invested at money market rates, it nearly always 
pays a market maker to borrow stock for which the charge is about 3/4% per annum. Prior to 
Big Bang, the Bank was concerned with ensuring an adequate supply of borrowable stock and 
invited applications, shortly after those to become market makers, to be money brokers. The 
result saw Lazard Brothers (a merchant bank), King and Shaxson (a discount house), and Pru-
dential Bache and Clive Discount in unison added to those assisting the jobbers before Big 
Bang. These firms are obliged to keep money broking entirely separate from any other busi-
ness. 
Although market makers are quite at liberty to deal with each other, they also have the 
facility to unwind positions with each other anonymously. This business is handled by new 
Inter-dealer Brokers (lOBs), as already existed, but in a slightly less regulated framework, in 
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New York. Each market maker may input any number of bids and offers. These are displayed 
to market makers through a screen based system. Those wishing to conduct one of the deals 
available contacts the lOB who acts as principal, concealing the identities of the market makers 
involved, and matching the deal. The IDBs are remunerated by charging a small fee to the ori-
ginator of the business, of 1/128%. This facility is not available to broker/dealers or investors. 
To confine the IDB network to market makers would ensure creditworthiness when dealing 
'blind', and prevent business from being taken away from market makers when business was 
good and so hindering their operations should business become less favourable. Again, applica-
tions were invited by the Bank, and firms had to demonstrate a potential demand for their ser-
vices from the market makers. This proved slightly awkward in so far as the market makers 
felt that three or four firms were sufficient, yet there were six equally suited candidates. The 
Bank decided to authorise all six, namely: Charles Fulton (lOB), Garban Gilts, Mabon Nugent 
International, Fundamental & Marshall Brokers, Tullett & Tokyo (Gilts), and Williams Cooke 
Lott and Kissack. 
The market officially opens at 9am. when the lOB network opens. However, market mak-
ers may operate before this. There is no closing time. The market makers are permitted to 
display mid-prices on the Stock Market's screen based automated quotation system, SEAQ. 
Howev~r, unlike equity market making, they do not have to display two-way prices and deal 
size quotes wnether firm or indicative. There are two reasons for this particular visibility deci-
sion that concern the problems in maintaining an up-to-the-minute set of prices for strongly 
interrelated securities. Firstly, suppose interest rates change, this affects all gilts. If a market 
maker is not quick enough to change all his prices he could easily be embarrassed. Equities 
reflect fundamentals which generally are specific to one security or at most an industry. An 
interest rate change affects them too, but in a much more differentiated manner. Secondly, 
displaying prices contains much information about their positions in the stocks which again 
could leave them vulnerable. Market makers do have the option of displaying two-way quotes 
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within a closed access group on the TOPIC system.3 Of course, market makers are committed 
to making a market on application by telephone. However, they are at liberty to alter prices 
between an enquiry call and a call to proceed with the deal. But, they are often prepared to 
"take out" a bid at a certain price to protect a client. Details of trades are published the follow-
ing day in the Stock Exchange Daily Official List (SEDOL). Broker/dealers are clearly at a 
disadvantage in terms of facilities and scope for action. They can still view market makers 
quotations on SEAQ and TOPIC, but are unable to post prices, and, as explained in chapter 
two, they are subject to the "best execution" rule. 
Settlement procedures have been automated to assist with the conduct of business. A 
Central Gilts Office (CGO) project produced the new system in two stages. Phase one devised 
a rapid transfer of stock by an electronic system, and was brought in before Big Bang. Phase 
two, devised an assured payment arrangement, which would provide for irrevocable instruc-
tions for payment for stock to be simultaneously generated with the movement of stock 
between accounts in the system. Phase two was introduced on Big Bang day itself. 
Supervision of the new market is shared between the Stock Exchange in its role, follow-
109 merger with the International Securities Regulatory Organisation (lSRO), as a "Self-
regulating Organisation" ("SRO"), and the Bank of England. The former monitors the actual 
bargains using various reporting and direct observation techniques. The Bank using the most 
extensive and complex guidelines (see BEQB (December 1984) (June 1985», monitors the 
capital structure and risk exposure of the market makers, the facilities offered to them by firms 
such as IDB's and money brokers, and also has certain reporting requirements. 
The Bank also decided to add to the existing forms of issue procedure for gilts, to main-
tain its continued long run management aims. On May 13th 1987, the first auction of a new 
gilt issue occurred, when £Ibn of Treasury 8% 1992 was offered to the public by this method 
3 The Exchange's view data system. 
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in £50 partly-paid fonn. In this procedure, which loosely resembles US Treasury Bond auc-
tions, there is neither a minimum price nor any fonnal underwriting agreement, yet the Bank 
expected to fully allot the issue and actively encouraged all GEMMs, as part of their duty to 
the market, to take part in the auction. The Bank reserved the right not to allot all the stock if 
the auction was covered only at a deep discount, in which case the Bank would absorb the bal-
ance into its own portfolio. This particular issue method transfers the pricing risk, that is, the 
risk that an issue price will become seriously out of line with the market between announce-
ment and issue date, from the Bank to the market. To ease the risk facing the market, the 
Bank sanctioned a "when issued" or "grey" market for trading in the new security before the 
issue date. In the event, the issue was well covered (2.3 times) and this prompted a second 
auction in September 1987 which, finding itself in a pocket of favourable market sentiment, 
was 1.5 times covered. In contrast to the first auction, the stock issued was long dated, 9% 
Treasury 2008. Finally, the only fonn of instrument not in issue since Big Bang is the variable 
rate stock. 
3.3. Market Microstructure Theory and Operational Efficiency 
This section considers how these changes just described have been modelled in economIC 
theory, and what predictions such theories might imply for operational efficiency, as measured 
in particular by the costs of dealing. 
Much economic theory, in the tradition of Walras, still proceeds as if prices were set in a 
gigantic "market-place" auction in which all potential buyers and sellers participate directly. 
Market microstructure theory expands the cast of participants to include market makers as 
intennediaries who close gaps arising from the imperfect synchronization between the arrivals 
of buyers and sellers. 
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The main prediction of this theory is that in such market structures, non-trivial bid-ask 
spreads are an equilibrium property of the market. That is, at any given time, a customer wish-
ing to buy faces a higher price than a customer wishing to sell. Demsetz (1968) provided the 
first formal model of the bid-offer spread as a "mark-up that is paid for predictable intermedi-
acy of exchange in organized markets" (1968, p.36), i.e. a return for providing (passive) inter-
mediacy. He argued that the return will just equal the cost of the service, given sufficient com-
petition among market makers. 
Since that time, the literature has divided into two groups, differentiated by the assump-
tions concerning the behaviour of market makers and the behaviour of the customers. One 
group of models considers the setting of bid and ask prices by risk averse market makers so as 
to maximize their expected utility of terminal wealth, subject to uncertainty concerning the flow 
of orders and the returns on their inventory of stock and cash. Key studies in this group are 
Garman (1976), Amihud and Mendelson (1980), Mildensteen and Schleef (1983), Ho and Stoll 
(1980, 1981 and 1983) and Grossman and Miller (1988). These models divide participants into 
two groups; market makers, and customers. Customers trade when they perceive a differential, 
at current prices, between their desired holdings of an asset and their actual holdings of that 
asset. By responding to this trade, market makers are supplying immediacy to the customers 
allowing them to shed the price risk involved in waiting to close trade (the search for equal 
and opposite buy and sell orders). The market makers charge for bearing this risk by offering 
the sellers (buyers) a price that is not uncertain, but that is lower (higher), on average, than 
they could expect from delaying to close the trade, thus generating a bid-ask spread. 
The other group of models consider the determination of bid ask spreads by one or more 
risk-neutral market markers who are maximizing expected profits subject to uncertainty con-
cerning the class of investor with which they are dealing. In particular, the investor may be 
either a liquidity trader (as described above) whose trading decisions are governed by prices, or 
an information trader who trades when he has an informational advantage over the market 
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maker. Studies developing this fonn of model include: Bagehot (pseud. Treynor) (1971), Cope-
land and Galai (1983), Glosten and Milgrom (1985), Roell (1988) and Dennert (1989). The 
main feature of these models are that spreads are set to recoup losses to well-infonned traders 
(who know better than the market maker the value of the asset), with profits from liquidity 
traders. The knowledge that some investors are better infonned than the market maker means 
that a buy (sell) order could be (with some probability) a signal that the true value of a security 
is higher (lower) than the market maker had expected. To guard against this risk, a bid-ask 
spread is set about the market makers ex-ante expectation of the value of the security. 
There are two features of the deregulation of the gilt-edged market that could usefully be 
modelled using techniques from the microstructure literature: firstly, the impact on spreads of 
the change in the dealing and the price quotation system; and secondly, the impact on spreads 
of the increase in market maker numbers. However, the majority of existing studies have lim-
ited applicability by assumption or construction. Before considering those models most likely 
to predict the outcome of a thus deregulated gilt-edged market, it is useful to consider the 
shortcomings of the remaining studies as useful models for our purposes. 
The principal weakness of the majority of microstructure models is that while they recog-
nize that market makers are in competition (rather than being monopoly suppliers of intennedi-
acy), they nevertheless analyze only one representative market maker with these inter-
relationships r~maining exogenous. Consequently, they do not address the second question of 
the impact on spreads of a change in the number of market makers; that number is fixed. 
Although changes in dealing system are still of interest in the context of representative market 
maker models, such considerations have only been discussed in the relatively few multi-dealer 
models. 
The four studies which explicitly recognize dealer competition, albeit in different ways, 
are: Ho and Stoll (1980,1983), Grossman and Miller (1988), and Dennert (1989). The immedi-
ate disadvantage is that each of these models fall into one of the two groups of studies 
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mentioned earlier. It is clearly desirable for a model to combine elements of both the risk aver-
sion and the asymmetric information stories. This would not be a problem were it not for the 
fact that the predictions from each of these groups relating to our two questions are quite 
different, and seem to depend upon the assumptions concerning the degree of risk aversion on 
the part of the market maker. 
The model of Dennert (1989) provides a game theoretic treatment of the effect of adverse 
selection in dealer markets, which explicitly recognizes the price competition between dealers. 
He argues that as the number of market makers increases, so the chance of having to deal with 
an informed participant increases. The reason is that the uniformed will go to the "cheapest" 
market maker, whereas the informed traders will exploit every instance of "cheapness", gradu-
ally dominating the market. By arguments expressed earlier, an increased probability of dealing 
with an informed trader will, ceteris paribus, increase individual spreads. This growing indivi-
dual risk exposure is shown to also increase the market spread (the touch). This result relies on 
two assumptions: firstly, that dealers precommit themselves, in the sense that prices are firm 
rather than indicative; and secondly, that market makers are risk neutral. The former assump-
tion means that the model is applicable only to the alpha equity market and not the gilt-edged 
market. The second assumption causes the model not to reflect an important consideration in 
market making; inventory risk. 
Indeed, the models that derive results from the assumption of risk averse market makers 
(i.e. Ho and Stoll (1983) and Grossman and Miller (1988)) suggest that the market spread 
should fall as the number of market makers increases. In these models, a higher number of 
market makers will lead to a better allocation of the inventory risk (which plays no role in a 
risk neutral setting) of being a market maker, and thus to lower spreads. But, these models do 
not incorporate the risk exposure effect or model the interaction between market makers as a 
strategic game. 
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The opposing results of these studies perhaps suggests that market making is a natural 
oligopoly, since spreads increase whether the number of market makers increases or declines. 
However, the risk aversion studies also do not consider the infonnation content in order flow, 
the resource over which market makers are competing. An increased number of market makers 
increases the scarcity of this type of infonnation, which would tend to lead to increased rather 
than decreased spreads. Clearly, there are many competing forces at work, and a definitive 
prediction concerning the impact of the increased number of market makers is difficult to 
establish. 
The impact of screen based dealing is perhaps more predictable. The increased visibility 
in the market should reduce the amount of infonnational advantages to be had. This will both 
reduce the chances of having to trade with an infonned customer, and reduce the overall uncer-
tainty facing a market maker, for he will be better able to infer the likely price risk of a secu-
rity from the range of quotes of other dealers. Thus there should be pressure from this source 
to reduce spreads. 
Finally, and furthennore, the Ho and Stoll (1983) model predicts that an increase in 
inter-dealer trading (as is expected in the gilt-edged market with the introduction of the IDBs) 
will lead to reduced market spreads. 
3.4. Big Bang and Operational Efficiency 
Prior to Big Bang, expectations among existing participants and many commentators of the 
consequences in the gilts market were somewhat pessimistic. As with the rest of the Stock 
Market, emotions ran high, for example, "If there is to be blood on the floor anywhere ... it is 
most likely to be on the floor of the UK government gilt-edged market." (Financial Times 
27/10/86), was typical of sentiment at that time. It was expected that turnover would increase. 
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but concern that it would not increase in the same proportion as the number of market makers. 
The forecast of increased turnover had two contributory factors. Firstly, US experience had 
shown that the introduction of lOBs increased trading volume substantially. Secondly, it was 
expected that increased competition among market makers for business would lead to a reduc-
tion in spreads that would encourage further trading activity. We now know that such a definite 
expectation concerning the impact of increased dealer numbers on spreads was somewhat 
naive, but the model from which this kind of expectation was drawn ("increased competition 
reduces prices") was also rather naive. 
Table 3.1 shows that turnover after Big Bang did indeed increase substantially. This is 
both in terms of customer business where the level of business per month is running on aver-
age 50% higher than the annual figure before Big Bang. Then each month intra-market busi-
ness, openly between market makers or anonymously via lOBs, roughly matches the customer 
business figure. There was a significant decline in turnover in the summer months of 1987, but 
this was short-lived. Rapidly falling equity prices in the crash of October 1987 made the rela-
tive security of gilts attractive to investors and, in November 1987, both customer and intra-
market turnover reached record levels. The latest available figures (to March 1989) indicate 
that turnover is maintaining the high levels experienced immediately after Big Bang. However, 
there was a noticeable reduction in intra-market business in March 1989 due to the withdrawal 
of two lOBs, Mabon Nugent Gilts and Tullet & Tokyo (Gilts) Limited. 
Before Big Bang, when market making was almost in duopoly supply, there was negligi-
ble intra-market business. The two jobbers saw so much of the market that it was unlikely that 
their portfolios could be out of line with the trading pattern. Hence, initiating such business 
would reveal their position exactly to the other jobber. With many market makers the likeli-
hood of encountering a more mixed order flow is significantly increased, and the need to 
unwind positions is greater. The desire for anonymity in carrying out such transactions is evi-
denced by the fact that the majority of intra-market business is conducted through lOBs. But, 
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if the size of IDB trading reflects the dispersion of market making and the need to unwind 
mixed orders, then the size of IDB trading must also reflect the increased customer trading. 
Customer turnover was expected to increase as dealing costs were expected to fall, both 
In terms of dealing spreads as explained above and from reduced brokerage commissions. 
Before examining these in detail, it is interesting to consider three sources of downward pres-
sure on customer business in the post-Big Bang market. Firstly, a significant number of the 
major customers in the pre-Big Bang market entered the post-Big bang market as GEMMs, in 
particular Discount Houses and overseas security firms. Secondly, in February 1986, accrued 
interest on gilts with over five years to maturity became an element of income rather than capi-
tal gains for tax purposes. It had been advantageous for high rate income tax payers to switch 
out of a stock immediately before the dividend date and reinvest in a similar stock with a 
longer time to the next dividend date. Investors not subject to tax on income would, con-
versely, hold the stock for the short period around the dividend date before reversing the deal 
to restore their original portfolio. This tax switching was substantial, and was eliminated. 
Thirdly, on 2 July 1986 capital gains tax on gilts was abolished. Previously, gilts held over 
one year were exempt. This meant that investors could use gilt capital losses (effected by a 
"bed and breakfast" deal - selling and immediately repurchasing, so leaving holdings unaltered) 
over a year as a credit against capital gains elsewhere. Trading from this source was also elim-
inated. That customer turnover did increase indicates the attractiveness of the market to new 
investors which, in tum, must reflect the relative trading costs in that market. Indeed, in the 
gilt-edged market the link between dealing costs and trading volume is very strong due to the 
nature of gilt-edged trading. Most trading is driven by price anomalies between equivalent 
securities; lower dealing costs mean that smaller anomalies are now tradeable. 
Both commissions and spreads in the market are now substantially lower than pre-Big 
Bang. Virtually all large value bargains (over £250,000, and on average £2.1m) are dealt net of 
commissions, direct with market maker. Only 20% of trading occurs through an agent (average 
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size £200,000). For private clients, commission rates varied widely, but are slightly lower on 
average, at 1.0% for bargains of £ 1,000, and 0.1 % on bargains of around £ 1 0,000 to £50,000. 
On the most actively traded stocks spreads are now about 1-2 ticks on short dated gilts and 2-4 
ticks on long dated gilts. Comparing the total dealing costs before and after Big Bang on a deal 
of normal market size (around £Im nominal), the Bank of England found that there was a 60% 
to 70% reduction in dealing costs following Big Bang. Such a comparative study was facilitated 
by the fact that the size distribution of trades does not appear to have changed significantly in 
either short or long gilts. About 90% of turnover value is for deals of over £Im. This 
accounts for about 20% of the medium and long gilt bargains and 12% of the short gilt bar-
gains. The majority of transactions are for £10000 or less, and about 60% of transactions 
account for less than 0.5% of turnover value. 
There are two other issues to examine regarding dealing costs: how spreads change as 
deal size changes; and the impact of the equity market crash. For deals larger than normal 
market size, spreads will depend upon the extent to which such a transaction leaves the market 
maker unbalanced, and his expectations of the price to balance or hedge the position in another 
market. The Stock Exchange found that for deals up to £ 10m, there was no discernible spread 
premium. A market with little spread variation over deal size is said to be a "deep" market. It 
also reported that there had been a reduction in the volatility of spreads which it attributed to 
the force of competition not to widen spreads in adverse trading conditions. For smaller deals, 
the fixed costs of dealing are more significant, and less advantageous terms are to be found. 
Although, spreads increased at the time of the crash, they have narrowed once again. However, 
dealing costs are on average higher than they were immediately after Big Bang. This does not 
signify a reduction in liquidity, but rather reflects the fact that the deal size for the quoted 
spreads has increased from £Im to £pm for shorts and from £2.5m to £5m for longs. 
At the time of Big Bang, the view was widely expressed that twenty seven GEMMs was 
probably a larger number than the market could support over a prolonged period; the Bank 
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admitted prior to Big Bang that their combined market share expectations totalled 175%. How-
ever, the Bank accepted this number as it was satisfied that the applicants had adequate capa-
city to perform the desired functions. Since Big Bang, but especially since the crash, competi-
tive pressures have proved to be at least as great as foreseen; with many GEMMs experiencing 
operating losses and seven withdrawing from dealing. The Bank in a review in early 1989 
stated that, after most GEMMs had suffered losses during the summers of 1987 and 1988, by 
the end of 1988 one third of the GEMMs were achieving positive returns, one third were con-
taining losses to less than £lm, and the remaining third were making significant operating 
losses. It believed that there would be a further reduction in the number of GEMMs, although, 
significantly, it has granted GEMM status to two further firms, Daiwa Europe (Gilts) Limited 
and Nomura Gilts Limited.4 The Bank also reported that throughout the post-Big Bang era the 
GEMMs performed their market making function well. 
In the early summer of 1987, financial journalists were suggesting that gilt-edged market 
making was a highly concentrated service industry (see e.g. Financial Times 26th May p.9). 
The Stock Exchange Quality of Markets group confirmed this view in their summer issue. The 
Exchange found that on one day, five firms undertook 40% of trading and, with a further five, 
over two thirds of the business. However, a more recent survey by the Bank (1989) interprets 
this finding differently. It finds that throughout 1987, there appeared to be three groupings: 
about six firms with relatively large market shares of at least 5%, accounting for around 45% of 
turnover; another six with a relatively small market share 1 % - 2V2% each accounting for 
around 10% of turnover; and the remainder in between with market shares in the range 2Vz% -
5% each, accounting for the remaining 45% of turnover. The Bank does not consider this a 
high degree of concentration for two reasons: firstly, although the shares above remained con-
stant, firms have been continually changing category; and secondly, there has been no tendency 
4 A listing of Gilt-Edged Market Makers registered between March 1986 and March 1989 can be found 
in the appendix to this chapter. The source of this list is the Bank of England Quarterly Bulletin (1989, 
February). 
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for this level of concentration to increase, even temporarily, or for anyone firm to become pro-
gressively more dominant. 
The Bank also reported that the new market structure is providing an efficient service for 
small deals. Five of the GEMMs provide a regular market making service in small business. 
One, Aitken-Campbell (Glasgow), has operated as a specialist in small deals, continuing its pre 
Big Bang jobbing specialisation in that type of business; the other four, Baring Wilson and 
Watford, James Capel Gilts, NatWest Gilts, and Phillips and Drew Moulsdale, have provided a 
small deals service as an adjunct to their wholesale market making activity. The Bank viewed 
this development as ensuring the maintenance of the attractiveness of gilts with the investing 
public. Agency broking has also continued in gilts and accounts for around 10% of customer 
business. 
At the time of Big Bang, three further firms were permitted to act as money brokers; 
making a total of nine firms. Although there was some concern that there may not be sufficient 
stock available to meet the needs of an expanded market making population, and that the exist-
ing firms would not be able to fully respond to the new active trading environment, neither of 
these fears were realized. The SEMBs have expanded the stock available for lending and suc-
cessfully adapted their operations. Furthermore an additional money broking licence has been 
granted, to SLH Gilts Money Brokers Ltd. 
In December 1987, membership of the gilt-edged settlement procedure (phase 2) (see 
chapter 2) was made available to any participant in the gilt-edged market, either through direct 
membership on the same terms as existing members (i.e. all the major participants: GEMMs, 
IDBs, SEMBs, etc), or via a nominee existing member. This was planned to further reduce the 
overall paperwork involved in stock transfers, and has worked well with capacities never 
exceeded. 
Although, as explained earlier, it was deemed desirable not to force a centralised price 
display on the market, there was a fear that inconsistencies in prices may occur between 
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GEMM trades with customers and GEMM trades with lOBs, and also between deals of normal 
market size and larger than normal market size. Reporting in the immediate aftermath Big 
Bang, the Stock Exchange found no evidence of such inconsistencies. 
The developments in the primary market since the crash have been arguably more 
significant than those in the secondary market. The immediate post crash period followed much 
as before, with another auction of stock planned for January 1988. However, the general 
market background for the third auction was much less comfortable than it had been for the 
two previous auctions. In the wake of the stock market crash, interest rates were reduced to 
stave off recession and correspondingly yields on gilts fell. Uncertainties surrounding the 
December G7 meeting were also undermining market confidence. Against this background, the 
auction stock possessed features designed to attract purchasers: it was partly paid; free of tax to 
residents abroad (FOTRA); could be hedged in the new medium gilt futures contract; and, to 
enhance its liquidity, comprised part of the largest gilt issue (8 3/4% Treasury 1997 - medium 
dated). However, bidders held back ahead of the U.S. trade figures announced two days later, 
and the issue was only just covered (1.06 times). However, the resulting spread of accepted 
bids and good U.S. trade figures stimulated retail interest thereafter. At that point two further 
auctions were planned for August 1988 and February 1989. 
However, during 1988 government policy towards debt and debt financed budget deficits 
changed. It was clear that the government intended to achieve a PSBR surplus (or at least 
avoid at deficit), and that this was going to be achieved, not by raising taxes or clltting expen-
diture but by using the revenue raised from a series of privatizations in 1987. As a result the 
PSBR moved into surplus and the government took the opportunity of reducing the national 
debt by buying back, through the Government Broker, certain issues of stock. The ultimate 
reversal of plans occurred in January 1989, when the Bank conducted a reverse auction of 
stock, purchasing £500m of two short dated stocks. There have been no new issues of gilt-
edged stock since the end of 1988, and significant buying back (particularly of long dated 
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stock) since the middle of 1988. 
A further feature of the post Big Bang era is the important role played by derivative pro-
ducts - notably the gilt-edged futures contracts operated by LIFFE. Although activity in the 
short and medium contracts is subdued, the long gilt contract has contributed substantially to 
the market's liquidity, by enabling participants greater scope for risk management LIFFE's 
market in options on the long gilt future has served a similar purpose. The Stock Exchange has 
also developed a framework for negotiated options on individual gilts and some GEMMs have 
marketed gilt warrants. Subject to appropriate regulation, derivative products seem likely to 
make an increasing contribution to the liquidity of this market. 
In contrast to the successes, and the markets able handling of the aftermath of the equity 
market crash, there have been a few problems. Firstly, the increased volume of transactions has 
put heavy pressure on the paper settlements procedures. The Stock Exchange is however, 
accelerating the introduction of the new automated settlement system (TAURUS). A surprising 
problem was created as a by product of the new telephone based dealing system. Though com-
mitted to deal, if the market is loosing confidence, then a market maker need not pick up the 
telephone. The wish to do so must however be matched against the loss of any "profitable" 
business. There has also been some evidence that some of the new merchant bank / broker / 
jobber conglomerates are suffering from diseconomies of scale. The integration of different 
activities and personnel have proved less straightforward than was perhaps anticipated. 
3.5. Conclusions 
This chapter has provided a description of the new gilt-edged market structure introduced at 
Big Bang, and considered the impact of the changes on operational efficiency. A simple 
transformation from single capacity and fixed commissions to dual capacity and negotiated 
commissions bely some extensive changes which took place in the market, such as the 
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introduction of inter-dealer brokers and the substantial increase in market making capacity. 
The impact on operational efficiency was analyzed from both a theoretical and empirical 
perspective. However, it was found difficult to draw predictions from the microstructure theory 
for two reasons. Firstly, the predictions seemed heavily dependent upon the assumptions of the 
particular model studied and there was no consensus of opinion among models. Secondly, as 
they have been so far constructed, providing predictions of relevant outcomes to Big Bang 
requires them to perform tasks for which they were not designed. Consequently, the impact on 
operational efficiency is best appreciated from an empirical point of view. It was found that the 
costs of dealing were around 65% lower after Big Bang than beforehand across the market in 
deals of average size, and that there was no significant spread premium for deals of sizes well 
in excess of this figure. Some market makers have also established specialist departments for 
small deals. The provision of liquidity by the market makers has been highly satisfactory, and 
robust to the Stock Market Crash. Thus the Big Bang changes have resulted in a significant 
improvement in the operational efficiency of the gilt-edged market. 
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TABLE 3.1 
GILT-EDGED MARKET DAILY AVERAGE TURNOVER 
(in millions of pounds) 
YEAR OR CUSTOMER INTRA-MARKET 
MONTH BUSINESS BUSINESS 
1981 580 -
1982 804 -
1983 836 -
1984 1066 -
1985 1038 -
1986 1372 * -
Nov 1986 1400 1844 
Dec 1986 1480 1565 
Jan 1987 1913 2057 
Feb 1987 1907 2155 
Mar 1987 2992 2770 
Apr 1987 2338 2384 
May 1987 2586 2334 
Jun 1987 2579 2240. 
Jul 1987 1971 1836 
Aug 1987 1683 1665 
Sep 1987 1746 1723 
* : First nine months of 1986 only. 
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TABLE 3.1 (cont.) 
GILT-EDGED MARKET DAILY AVERAGE TURNOVER 
(in millions of pounds) 
YEAR OR CUSTOMER INTRA-MARKET 
MONTH BUSINESS BUSINESS 
Oct 1987 2388 2194 
Nov 1987 3114 2735 
Dec 1987 2017 1787 
Jan 1988 2241 2290 
Feb 1988 2219 2185 
Mar 1988 2694 2350 
Apr 1987 2481 2290 
May 1988 1963 1823 
Jun 1988 2303 2196 
Jul 1988 1991 1933 
Aug 1988 1802 1890 
Sep 1988 1911 2013 
Oct 1988 2343 2135 
Nov 1988 2045 2067 
Dec 1988 1958 1773 
Jan 1989 2632 1737 
Feb 1989 2351 2084 
Mar 1989 2246 1333 
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APPENDIX TO CHAPTER THREE 
Gilt-Edged Market Makers (March 1986 - March 1989) 
Aitken Campbell (Gilts) Limited 
Bank of America 
Barclays de Zoete Wedd Gilts Limited 
Baring Wilson & Watford 
BT Gilts Limited 
Cater Allen Securities Limited 
Chase Manhattan Gilts Limited 
Citicorp Scrimgeour Vickers Limited 
CL-Alexanders Laing & Cruickshank Gilts Limited 
CSFB (Gilts) Limited 
Daiwa Europe (Gilts) Limited 
Gerrard and National Securities Limited 
Goldman Sachs Government Securities (U.K.) Limited 
Greenwell Montagu Gilt-Edged 
Hill Samuel Wood Mackenzie (Sterling Debt) Limited 
Hoare Govett Sterling Bonds Limited 
lames Capel Gilts Limited 
Kleinwort Benson Gilts Limited 
Lloyds Merchant Bank (Government Bonds) Limited 
Merrill Lynch Government Securities Company 
Morgan Grenfell Government Securities Limited 
1 P Morgan Sterling Securities Ltd 
NatWest Gilts Limited 
Nomura Gilts Limited 
Phillips & Drew Moulsdale 
Prudential-Bache Capital Funding (Gilts) Limited 
RBC Gilts Limited 
Salomon Brothers UK Limited 
Shearson Lehman Hutton Gilts Limited 
S G Warburg, Akroyd, Rowe & Pitman, Mullens (Gilt-Edged) Ltd 
Union Discount Securities 
Key 
* = acquired or were a gilts market jobber pre- Big Bang 
-- = withdrew pre-Big Bang 
- = withdrew post-Big Bang 
+ = joined since Big Bang 
* 
* 
* 
+ 
* 
* 
* -
+ 
* 
* 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
An Efficient Markets Model of Gilt-Edged Price Movements 
4.1. Introduction 
In 1970, in an extensive study of U.S. Treasury Bills, Roll developed and tested an efficient 
markets model of that market. He invoked the established term structure theories to derive 
models of bond price movements in an efficient market. He found that the pure expectations 
model was inconsistent with market efficiency, while hypotheses recognizing a premium 
between forward rates and expected future spot rates performed well. In 1981, these esta-
blished theories were subjected to a rigorous theoretical examination by Cox, Ingersoll and 
Ross. They demonstrated that the "expectations hypothesis" of the term structure has several 
interpretations. Hence the pure expectations model used by Roll is one member of a set of 
quite distinct alternative models. Furthermore, it is shown that only one of these models, 
characterized by the equality of expected holding returns for one specific interval, is sustainable 
in a continuous time rational expectations equilibrium. This model is not the pure expectations 
model used by Roll. In this chapter, we use the formal term structure analysis of Cox, Ingersoll 
and Ross, together with the approach of Roll, to develop a model of gilt price movements that 
can then be used to test the efficient markets hypothesis, in the traditional manner. 
This chapter has three main sections. The next section, 4.2, provides a review of the trad-
itional theories of the term structure within the formal framework developed by Cox, Ingersoll 
and Ross (1981). Then, section 4.3 discusses the relationship between the term structure of 
interest rates and yield to maturity, to provide further useful insights into the linkages between 
bond prices and interest rates. In section 4.4, the preceding ideas are used to interpret the 
efficient markets model in terms of bond prices and the term structure of interest rates. Section 
4.5 provides a summary. 
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4.2. A Review of the Theory of the Term Structure of Interest Rates 
In a perfect capital market, the price, P at which any individual would be willing to hold mar-
ginal amounts of a security promising a default-free stream of payments is given by 
C 1 C 2 Cn P + + ... +---
(1 +R 1) (l +R 2)2 (1 +Rn t (4.1) 
where C bC 2, ... 'Cn are the payments in sterling to be made at the ends of periods 1,2, ... ,n 
and where R 1,R 2,R 3, ... ,Rn are the market rates of interest applicable to each payment. The 
relationship between the rates R 1,R 2, ... , Rn is called the term structure of interest rates. 
It has become conventional to analyse the term structure along lines suggested by Hicks 
(l946,pp.146-7) who showed that the market for both long and short term loans implies a for-
ward market for loans analogous to a commodities futures market. For example, an individual 
wishing to make a one period loan commencing in (n -1) periods time may achieve this by 
simultaneously making a spot loan for n periods and borrowing for (n -1) periods. If the rate of 
interest on the spot loan is Rn and on the spot borrowing is Rn-l> then the rate of interest on 
the one period forward loan between periods (n -1) and n IS 
(1 +Rn)n 
-----1. (1 +R
n
_ 1)n-1 
This is called the forward interest rate and is denoted f n • 
4.2.1. Notation 
(4.2) 
A discussion of the term structure requires that we consider interest rates at various points in 
time rather than just at a single date, the notation is thus modified to include a further subscript 
denoting the market date at which the interest rate applies. So, 
(4.3) 
denotes a time series of "j -period" spot rates for successive market dates t ,t+ 1 ,t+2, .... (the time 
series of "j -period" "long rates"). Similarly, 
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(4.4) 
denotes a set of contemporaneous spot rates applicable to payments to be made at t+ 1 ,t+2, .... 
(the set of "long rates" at time t), i.e. the term structure at market date t. 
All forward rates are expressed as one period rates, thus I},I is the forward rate for the 
period beginning t+j-1 determined at market date t. Hence 
1}+2,1-2 , 1}+l,I-1 ,I},I ,1}-l,l+l ,1}-2,1+2 (4.5) 
denotes a time senes of forward rates all referring to the same period in calendar time, i.e. 
t+j-l to t+j, while 
I 1,t,f 2,1,f 3,1' ... ,I},I' ... ,fn,1 (4.6) 
is the set of implicit forward rates determined at market date t, for periods t ,t+ 1 ,t+2, .... 
Since coupon bonds may be regarded as portfolios of pure discount bonds we may for 
the present assume without loss of generality that all bonds have zero coupons. We also 
ass ume that bond markets are perfect. 
4.2.2. The Term Structure with Certainty 
The way in which the theory is most easily introduced is by considering a simple example. 
Suppose there is an individual who, at time t, wishes to invest for two periods. One way to do 
this is to purchase a one period bond, and reinvest the proceeds into another one period bond 
which matures at time t+2. The return over the two periods is 
(l +R 1,1) (l +R 1,/+1)' (4.7) 
An alternative way is to purchase a two period bond in which case the proceeds over the two 
year period would be 
(l +R 2,1)2 = (1 +R l,t) (l +1 2,1)' 
The difference between these two returns is 
(4.8) 
(4.9) 
and it is the relationship between the forward rate and the future spot rate which detennines 
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whether this difference is positive, negative or zero. But, suppose that the individual wished to 
invest for only one period. In that case he could buy a one period bond with a return (1 +R 1,1 ). 
Alternatively, he could purchase a two period bond and sell it after one period. In that case the 
return would be 
(1+R 1,/) (1+/2,/) 
(1 +R 1,1+1) 
The difference between the returns on the two strategies is 
(1 +R l,t) (1 + / 2,1 ) (1 +R l,t ) 
------ - (1+R 1/ ) = (f2,I-R l,l+l) (1+R 1,1+1) '(l+R 1,1+1) 
(4.10) 
(4.11) 
which is also entirely dependent on the difference between future spot rate and forward rate for 
its sign. 
Term Structure theory tries, inter alia, to answer the question "What determines the 
difference between forward rates and future spot rates?". If the future spot rate was known 
with certainty, then individuals would choose the investment with the highest return. Thus for 
more than one bond to be sustainable, equilibrium must be characterized by indifference 
between between investment alternatives, that is, the forward rate and the future spot rate must 
be equal. 
4.2.3. The Term Structure under Uncertainty 
In reality, the future spot rates are unknown. Now the individual with the two period horizon 
can obtain a certain return by investing in the two period bond or an uncertain return by 
investing in two one period bonds. Similarly, the individual with the one period horizon can 
obtain a certain return by investing in the one period bond or an uncertain return by purchasing 
the two period bond and selling it after one year. The unknown future spot rate is the cause of 
the uncertainty in each case. Tenn structure hypotheses under uncertainty seek to explain the 
relationship between the forward rate implicit in the known return and the expectation of the 
- 66 -
value of the unknown future spot rate, that is, the relationship between short and long rates of 
interest. 1 
The Expectations Hypothesis 
Most of the theory underlying the Expectations Hypothesis was not developed until the late 
1930's by notably, Hicks (1939) and Lutz (1940). These and other authors have a set out a 
number of economic propositions concerning the relationship between long and short rates. For 
example, Lutz (l940,pp.37,49) states "An owner of funds will go into the long market if he 
thinks the return he can make there over the time for which he has funds available will be 
above the return he can make in the short market over the same time, and vice versa," and "a 
lender who wants to invest for only one year is in principle prepared to buy ( ... ) a bond of any 
maturity and sell it again after the first year." 
Probably the broadest interpretation of these propositions IS the conclusion that bond 
market equilibrium is characterized by an equality among expected returns on all possible 
investment strategies over all holding periods. Thus for the holding period t to t+n, the return 
on any feasible series of investment must have the same expectation: 
E [
PI+1,1+1 Pl+2,1+2 ... Pl+n,l+n 1 = th (4.12) 
. - . . - 'I't+n I 
P I ,1+1 P I+1,l+2 P I+n - 1,I+n ' 
where the price of a bond quoted at t+i which matures at time t+j is given by Pl+i ,l+j.2 The 
expected return <I> must be independent of the arbitrary reinvestment times t +i (i =0,1 , ... ,n) and 
the bonds selected, as denoted by their maturity dates t+j (t+j?t+i). 
However, this relationship can be simply invalidated (see, for example, Cox, Ingersoll 
and Ross, (CIR) (1981), p.775). We note that equation (4.6) requires that the expected return 
1 This review section will not consider the recent arbitrage theories of, inter alia, Vasicek (1977), Bren-
nan and Schwartz (1979) and Cox, Ingersoll and Ross (1985). These are discussed in chapter seven, prior 
to empirical work set within that particular framework. A review of empirical tests of the theories dis-
cussed below can be found in Dobson, Sutch and Vanderford (1976). 
2 The reader should note that where there are two subscripts on price notation, the first subscript relates 
to the date of quotation. For interest rates, where two subscripts are used, the date of quotation is the 
second subscript (see section 4.2.1). 
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on a bond maturing at t+2 over the period (t ,t+ 1) must be equal to the certain return on a bond 
maturing at t + 1 
PI ,I+l PI ,I+2 
(-l.13) 
where PI+n,l+n' the price at maturity, equals unity. Furthermore, the return expected over t ,t+2 
on a bond maturing at t+ 1 rolled over at maturity into a bond maturing at t+2 must equal the 
guaranteed return on the bond maturing at t + 2, 
(4.14) 
Together these equations imply that 
E[ 1 ] _ PI ,I+l = _1 _ 
Pt+l,I+2 PI ,1+2 E (Pt+l,I+2) 
(4.15) 
But by Jensen's inequality, (4.9) cannot be true except in the case of certainty. So all expected 
returns for all holding periods can never be the same in equilibrium. 
This contradiction can be avoided if it is postulated that expected holding period returns 
are equal for one specific holding period. The natural choice is the next basic (i.e. "shortest") 
interval. Under this assumption the Expectations Hypothesis is characterized by 
EI (Pt+l,l+n) _ 1 R 
- + 1 I 
PI,I+n ' 
(4.16) 
which when evaluated recursively leads to the statement of equilibrium 
PI,t+n = Et ([(1+R 1,/)(1+R 1,I+l)···(1+R 1,I+n-l)r1). (4.17) 
Equation (4.16) has been labelled the Local Expectations Hypothesis, (L-EH), by Cox, Inger-
solI and Ross (1981). 
Traditionally, the equilibrium relation of the expectations hypothesis has been stated in a 
different fashion. It is often assumed, as implied by Lutz's first quote above that the guaranteed 
return from holding any discount bond to maturity is equal to the return expected from rolling 
over a series of single period bonds. This is a special case of (4.6) where the arbitrary reinvest-
ment times are restricted to be at single period intervals, and can be written as 
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1 
-- = E, [(1+R 1,1 )(1+R l,t+I)···(1+R 1,I+n-I)]' 
PI,t+n 
(4.18) 
Cox, Ingersoll and Ross (1981) label this model the Returns to Maturity Expectations 
Hypothesis, (RTM-EH). 
Alternatively, some authors make a similar assumption concern 109 the equality of 
expected yields. For example, Malkiel (1966,p.20) states that" ... all differentials in anticipated 
holding period yields [are] completely eliminated ... "; i.e., 
[Pt ,t+n rlln = Et ([(1 +R l,t)(1 +R l,t+I) ... (1 +R I,t+n _I)r lln ). (4.19) 
This model is called the Yield to Maturity Expectations Hypothesis, (YTM-EH\ 
In other cases it is assumed that forward rates are unbiased estimates of future spot rates. 
This form of the hypothesis, associated primarily with Lutz (1940) and Meiselman (1962), is 
known as the Pure or Unbiased Expectations Hypothesis (U-EH), and can be written as 
(1+fn t) = E , (1+R I t+n-I)' (4.20) , , 
This was the form of the Expectations Hypothesis examined by Roll (1970). In this form, the 
implications of the Expectations Hypothesis for the shape of the term structure are easily seen. 
If investors expect the future spot rate to be higher than the current spot rate, then according to 
(4.14), the forward rate will also be higher than the current spot rate. Thus the two period rate 
must be greater than the one period rate, and hence the term structure is upward sloping. Con-
versely, this hypothesis says that the term structure will only slope downwards if investors 
expect future spot rates to be lower than current spot rates. 
Equation (4.20) may be equivalently written (for zero coupon bonds only) as 
P t ,t+n-I 
--- = Et (1 +R I t+n-I)' 
P t ,t+n ' 
A recursive evaluation of (4.21) gives the equilibrium condition 
1 
-- = (1 +R I,t )Et (1 +R l,t+I) .. ·Ec (1 +R 1,I+n-l)' 
Pt ,t+n 
(4.21 ) 
(4.22) 
This is equivalent to the (RTM-EH) hypothesis if the levels of future interest rates are not 
autocorrelated. However, empirical evidence suggests that interest rate levels are autocorrelated. 
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Many researchers have not always been careful in distinguishing among the hypotheses, 
perhaps (also) not realizing that the first three are (pairwise) incompatible. Now if we define 
the random variable Z = [(1+Rl,t)(l+Rl,t+l) ... (1+Rl,I+n-l)r1, then equations (4.17) through (4.19) 
c an be rewritten as 
p = E [Z] 
p-l = E [Z-I] 
p-lln = E [Z-lIn]. 
(4.17') 
(4.18') 
(4.19') 
Jensen's inequality assures us that at most only one of these expressions is valid. If equation 
(4.19) describes equilibrium, then the yield on an n period bond will be greater than the value 
given in (4.17) and less than the value given in (4.18). On the other hand, if equilibrium condi-
tion (4.17) [condition (4.18)] is valid, the equations (4.18) and (4.19) [equations (4.17) and 
(4.19)] give long yields which are too large [small]. 
The Expectations Hypothesis in Continuous Time 
In a continuous time formulation, the U-EH IS equivalent to the YTM-EH (see 
CIR,1981,p.776) and not the RTM-EH as was possible (but unlikely) in a discrete time frame-
work. Furthermore, CIR (1981) show that the L-EH is the only version of the Expectations 
Hypothesis which is sustainable in a continuous-time rational expectations equilibrium. In this 
case, if r( is the instantaneous rate of interest at time t, then the L-EH can be expressed as 
(4.23) 
which by integration becomes 
(4.24) 
This equation says that the bond's current price is the expected discounted value of the prom-
ised unit payment. 
However, Ahn and Thompson (1988) have shown that if the path of the short rate is 
assumed to follow a jump-diffusion process (i.e. displays discontinuities), then not even the L-
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EH is obtained in the CIR equilibrium, as the premium associated with the jump process is still 
present in the L-EH. Before considering alternative hypotheses, we consider the alleged role 
of risk neutrality in the Expectations Hypothesis. 
The Expectations Hypothesis and Risk Neutrality 
Originally, it was thought that the Expectations Hypothesis was generally obtained under con-
ditions of risk neutrality. That is when the only parameter governing investment decisions is 
expected returns. However, Meiselman (1962, p.IO, discussing in particular the U -EH) argued 
that it was not necessary to assume that risk aversion was entirely absent since, "individual 
transactors may still speculate or hedge on the basis of risk aversion, but the speculators who 
are indifferent to uncertainty will bulk sufficiently large to determine market rates on the basis 
of their mathematical expectations alone." On the other hand, Bierwag and Grove (1967, p.50) 
pointed out that it was difficult to imagine an eqUilibrium in a frictionless market dominated by 
'plungers' of this kind unless they had identical expectations. 
CIR (1981), for their preferred version of the hypothesis, the L-EH, show that it is also 
not the natural consequence of universal risk neutrality, except when interest rates are non sto-
chastic or other special circumstances obtain. They show firstly that in a risk neutral pure 
exchange economy interest rates must be non stochastic. Thus all forms of the EH are sustain-
able but only in the singular sense of a certainty model. Secondly, they show that in a risk-
neutral production-exchange economy interest rates may be certain or stochastic. In the former 
case, the Expectations Hypotheses hold (again in the singular sense); in the latter case the L-
EH does not generally obtain. Finally, they show that for each type of economy non trivial 
conditions exist under which the L-EH is sustained for risk averse agents. 
The Liquidity Preference Hypothesis 
Building on the Keynesian idea of "normal backwardation," it was argued (first by 
Hicks,1939), that the forward rate will normally exceed the expected spot rate. In other words, 
- 71 -
the expected rate of return on a long bond must exceed the expected rate on a short bond by a 
premium which compensates the lender for assuming the increased risks of price fluctuations. 
Hence, this model contains the strong behavioural assumption that risk premia are uniformly 
positive. 
Hicks (l946,p.146-7) made his argument in three parts. First, "these persons [borrowers] 
will want to hedge their future supplies of loan capital, just as they will want to hedge their 
future supplies of raw materials. They will have a strong propensity to borrow long." Second, 
"if no extra return is offered for long lending, most people (and institutions) would prefer to 
lend short, at least in the sense that they prefer to hold their money on deposit on some way or 
other." Finally, he argued that to offset this "constitutional weakness" in the supply of long 
funds, speculators will borrow short and lend long only in return for a premium as "compensa-
tion for the risk they are incurring." 
Market Segmentation Hypotheses 
In his Hedging Pressure Hypotheses, Culbertson (1957) asserts that the market is dominated by 
hedging rather than speculative behaviour. He argued that individuals have strong maturity 
preferences and that bonds of different maturities trade in separate and distinct markets. The 
demand and supply of bonds of a particular maturity are supposedly little affected by the prices 
of bonds of neighbouring maturities. There is now no reason for the term premiums to be posi-
tive and an increasing function of maturity. However, as Copeland and Weston (l983,p.70) 
point out that "While the market segmentation hypothesis can explain why implied forward 
rates and expected rates may differ, the direction and magnitudes are not systematic". Further-
more, the argument that bonds of close maturity will not be close substitutes, is difficult to sus-
tain. 
The Preferred Habitat Theory of Modigliani and Sutch (1966) began with the same 
approach. They defined an investor to have n -period habitat if "he has funds which he will not 
need for n periods and which, therefore, he intends to keep in bonds for n periods." However, 
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recognizing the implied inefficiency, they did not go so far as to assume that this investor con-
siders only n -period bonds. Investors can be "tempted out of their natural habitats by the lure 
of higher expected returns." They intended their approach as a plausible rationale for term 
premiums that does not restrict them in sign or monotonicity, rather than as a necessary causal 
explanation.3 In fact, the hypothesis implies that at least some term premia will be non-zero 
and the relationship between them and maturity will be a smooth one. 
Roll (1970) distinguishes two possible general forms of the Market Segmentation 
Hypothesis. Firstly, where the premium relating to a particular period in calendar time remains 
constant through time; secondly, where the premium relating to a particular maturity remains 
constant. 
4.2.4. Remarks on the Term Structure Theory 
It should be noticed that the above hypotheses are not mutually exclusive. In terms of its 
implications, the Liquidity Premium Hypothesis can be regarded as a special case of the Pre-
ferred Habitat Hypothesis, namely that case in which all investors have a habitat equal to the 
shortest holding period. Furthermore, the pure expectations hypothesis which asserts that all 
term premia are zero can be regarded as a form of the preferred habitat (where the preferred 
habitat of all market participants encompasses the whole maturity spectrum). 
A theoretical attempt to validate the various models has been undertaken by CIR (1981). 
They show, using a simple production economy, that unlike Hicks, term premiums may be 
either positive or negative. Furthermore, they give a different interpretation to this result than 
that of Modigliani and Sutch. They show that it is not preference for consumption at different 
times which creates "habitats," but rather the degree of risk aversion; that is, the tendency to 
hedge against changes in interest rates, as suggested by Merton (1973). 
3 See CIR (1985) footnote 2. 
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The Term Structure and Uncertain Inflation 
Term structure theory has generally assumed that future consumption pnces are known, i.e. 
that the inflation rate is deterministic. Thus uncertainty about future rates of interest was 
assumed to reflect only uncertainty in real rates of return. However, most bonds are denom-
inated in nominal terms. Indeed inflation uncertainty comprises the predominant portion of 
interest rate risk at least for short term bonds (e.g. Treasury Bills). 
A paper by Brealey and Schaefer (1977) took the opposite approach. They assume that 
the ex-ante real rate of interest is deterministic, but that the rate of inflation is uncertain. By 
assuming that investors make rational forecasts of the inflation rate, they show that real returns 
on bonds are, under their assumptions, serially independent, and, by further assuming suitable 
utility functions, were able to derive an equilibrium solution to the term structure. The relation-
ship between forward rates and expected spot rates which they derive is superficially similar to 
the liquidity preference hypothesis in that term premia are universally non-negative. However, 
these premia must be interpreted as risk premia rather than liquidity premia. This is because, 
under their assumptions, the term structure is independent of the maturity preferences of bor-
rowers and lenders. In their analysis long term bonds are riskier than short term bonds for all 
market participants. 
CIR (1981) use a model economy, in which the term structure of real interest rates is non 
stochastic, to examine the Expectations Hypothesis under uncertain inflation. The no arbitrage 
condition under deterministic real rates is that those bonds with payoffs denominated in the real 
numeraire mu&t be equal (e.g. inflation indexed bonds). For these bonds, then, all forms of the 
EH will hold. However, with uncertain inflation nominal interest rates will be stochastic, and 
nominal bonds of different maturities may have different expected rates of return. CIR show 
that if inflation is stochastic, only the L-EH can be sustained for nominal rates if risk premia 
are zero. Furthermore, they show that where investors are risk neutral, a sufficient condition to 
generate this result is that inflation must have no real consequences within the economy. Hence 
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they conclude, "This, or similar cases, appear to be the only situation in which risk-neutrality is 
compatible with both the EH and stochastic interest rates, and it obtains only because inflation 
has no real consequences in the economy." (CIR, 1981,pp.788-789). More recently, CIR have 
incorporated uncertain inflation into a general model with a stochastic term structure of real 
interest rates, (1985, p.401-405). 
Implications of Market Efficiency 
The traditional term structure theories are essentially only hypotheses which say little more 
than that forward rates should or need not equal expected spot rates. Furthermore they are all 
theories couched in ex-ante terms and they must be linked with ex-post realizations to be 
testable. 
Attempts to deal with these two elements constitute a further area of work on the term 
structure. An important result concerning the first element is given in Roll (1970) who shows 
that the sequence of forward rates, adjusted by corresponding term premia, e.g. ij,t-1[j,t, appli-
cable to a given period in calendar time follows a pure martingale sequence. That is: 
(4.25) 
Roll calls this the "fundamental dynamic equation for an efficient loan market" (1970, pp.22-
33). He derives it from firstly the futures market implicit in a loan market and secondly 
Samuelson's (1965) results concerning the fluctuations of futures prices.4 
With regard to the second element, Roll (1970), for example, has built and tested a 
mean-variance model and treated bonds symmetrically with other assets and used a condition 
of market efficiency to relate ex ante and ex post concepts. If rationality requires that ex post 
realizations do not differ systematically from ex ante views, then statistical tests can be made 
on ex ante propositions by using ex post data. 
4 It should be noted that the risk premia in this equation refer to the same period in calendar time, and 
hence have a different interpretation from those in equation (4.35). 
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Taxation 
According to the market segmentation hypotheses, investors have strict preferences for 
certain types of bonds, and these trade in distinct markets. This expression of choice can be 
explained where, for example, investors face different rates of income tax. The differential 
effect of taxes means that, if at some tax rate two bonds with different coupons offer the same 
return, they must offer different returns at all other tax rates. Taxes therefore produce segmen-
tation in the market. Non-tax payers will favour the highest coupon bonds and high tax payers 
will favour the lowest coupon bonds. Since payments on short bonds consist primarily of pay-
ments of principal, short bonds will also be relatively more attractive to high rate tax payers. 
Long bonds, which consist primarily of payments of coupon, will be relatively attractive to low 
rate tax payers. Bonds therefore have a "clientele" of investors who rationally hold that bond, 
and spot rates will be different across tax brackets. 
It has also been shown (Schaefer, 1980) that the differential effect of taxes causes the 
basic bond pricing equation to no longer be a no-arbitrage equilibrium relationship. To remove 
arbitrage possibilities, a friction in the trading process has to be introduced, and a sufficient 
(but not necessary) condition is to restrict short selling. This restores the no arbitrage condition, 
but redefines the equilibrium as an inequality with price greater than or equal to present value. 
Work on tackling the tax effects present in the market has occupied the designers of com-
plex mathematical models of the gilt-edged market. The approach is essentially one of finding 
a suitable three dimensional model (equation) linking price, coupon and maturity. Feldman 
(1977) suggested that at any particular time, there exist two discounting functions, one for 
income items (which are taxable) and one for capital payments. Furthermore, the coefficients of 
these functions can be found by applying least squares to the model and from these coefficients 
model prices can be found. The primary drawback with this model is that it is linear in 
coupon, when in fact investors tend to place price premia on stocks at the extremities of the 
coupon range - the "high rate tax payer / low coupon" effect already descrihed. In response, 
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Clarkson (1979) eschews the aforementioned compound interest functions ar:~i establishes a 
relationship instead between the flat yield glP (coupon divided by price), and the proportionate 
capital gain to redemption, liP, for all stocks. Yip (1986) provides evidence in favour of the 
Schaefer treatment of taxes, as against the mathematical models, and the agnostic view is 
presented by Leung (1980) who combines insights from both Schaefer and Feldman/Clarkson 
in a gilt market model. 
4.3. The Term Structure and Yield to Maturity 
The measure used to describe bond market returns is known as yield to maturity (or, redemp-
tion yield). For a gilt-edged security with coupon rate g % and redemption value F, yield to 
maturity y solves the equation 
P = gF + gF + ... + gF + F 
(1 +y ) (1 +y )2 (1 +y )n (1 +y )n (4.26) 
In the term structure discounting equation (4.1), payments to different bonds at the same point 
in time were discounted at the same rate, and payments to the same bond at different points in 
time were discounted at different rates. In the above yield to maturity equation, payments to 
the same bond at different points in time are discounted at the same rate, and payments to 
different bonds at the same point in time are discounted by different rates. Yield to maturity 
is, therefore, the rate of interest that would produce the same present value or price, as was 
obtained by discounting by the different spot rates, that is, it is an internal rate of return. It is 
clear from this expression that yield is a complex average of spot rates. In fact its exact form 
as the root of a polynomial of order n cannot be written down. 
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4.3.1. The Problems with Redemption Yields5 
Redemption yields continue to be used by investment managers as a basic measure of return 
and hence the relative attractiveness (implicitly, therefore, value) of particular bonds. So it is 
worth considering the limitations of this concept both as a measure of return and as a measure 
of value. 
As a measure of return it can describe only two facts. Firstly, given the current price, the 
yield that solves equation (4.26) will only be the return over the next period in one of two 
cases; a situation of certainty for all time, and a situation of certainty over the next period. 
Secondly, if the bond is held until redemption, yield is the equivalent rate of return per period. 
Yield clearly has strong limitations as a measure of return. 
The cash flows from holding a coupon bond to maturity are equivalent to a package con-
taining an n -year annuity of gF, plus a single payment of F in year n. The yield to maturity is 
discounting all the cash payments at the same rate of interest, and measures the average annual 
cost of the gF annuity and the final payment. Typically, different bonds will represent 
different combinations of annuity and final payment, and different packages will have different 
yields. Hence a comparison of yields, is not a comparison of like with like. Unless bonds offer 
the same package of cash flows over time they will have different yields. 
The dependence of yield to maturity on the coupon level has several implications. It 
means that a conventional yield curve - a smooth curve drawn through yields to maturity plot-
ted against maturity - is to some extent arbitrary because the points do not even in theory lie 
on a smooth curve. In order to obtain smooth curves, it is necessary to plot a separate curve 
for each coupon level. However, even supposing that this could be done, it is unclear what 
information it would convey. Yields are derived from bond prices and hence contain no addi-
tional information concerning value than that represented by the bond's price. 
5 The arguments in this subsection were originally published by Schaefer (1977) and proofs are given 
in Schaefer (1979). 
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It is more useful to estimate the sequence of spot rates. These correspond to the yields on 
bonds which pay no coupons. They are harder to estimate but once known, can be used to 
evaluate any bond. The spot rates may well lie on a smooth curve. Once this curve is known a 
further useful form of yield curve can be derived from it. This is called the annuity yield curve 
and it shows the correct yield for a constant stream of annuity payments of any length. As 
annuity yield is itself an average of spot rates, it will tend to lie below a rising spot rate curve 
and above a falling curve. 
The spot rate curve depicts the yield to maturity on a zero coupon bond. The annuity 
yield curve depicts the yield to maturity on a zero principal bond. Since most bonds lie 
between these two extremes: they offer positive coupons and positive principal, so the yield to 
maturity on coupon bonds must lie between these two curves. Clearly, the lower the coupon 
level, the closer will be the yield curve to the spot rate curve, and the higher the coupon level, 
the closer will be the yield curve to the annuity yield curve. If the bond is very short, the 
present value of principal repayment is likely to be much larger than the present value of the 
coupon payments. So, the yield to maturity will be fairly close to the spot rate curve. If the 
bond is very long, the present value of principal is relatively small and the yield curve tends to 
the annuity curve. For a monotonic spot rate curve, we arrive at a situation depicted in figure 
4.1. Notice that the 1 % coupon curve displays a pronounced hump and that all yield curves 
except the spot rate curve tend towards the annuity curve. In fact these same curves are all 
asymptotically horizontal no matter what shape the spot rate curve adopts. 
The problems with yield to maturity also extend to measures based upon it, of which 
volatility and duration are cases. 
4.3.2. Duration and Volatility 
We have seen how, in a certain world, price change is related to the level of the yield to matu-
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rity. From the algebra of the yield formula, it is also possible to establish the following rela-
tionships. Ceteris paribus, the percentage price change for any given percentage change in yield 
is larger (a) the smaller is the initial yield level, (b) the larger is the term to maturity, and (c) 
the smaller is the coupon rate. These relationships are shown in figures 4.2-4.4. 
The above price/yield relationships are summarized in a measure of the average life of a 
security which is known as the "duration" of the security. Duration takes its name from its 
interpretation as a weighted average of the dates on which cash flows are promised. The 
weight used at any date is the ratio of the present value of the cash flow at that date to the 
price. Thus if C =gF is the coupon payment, duration D is given by 
D=l C +2 C + ... +n C+F 
P (1 +y ) P (1 +y )2 P (1 +y )n (4.27) 
It is argued that duration is a preferable measure of the life of a security than maturity as it is a 
function of all the cash flows. It is straightforward to show that duration is equivalent to the 
measure of the responsiveness of price to a change in yield. Differentiating equation (4.26) 
term by term with respect to yield we obtain 
and so 
-dP (l+y) 
dy P 
dP -C -2C 
dy (1+y)2+ (l+y)3+··· 
C +2 C + ... +n C+F 
P (1 +y ) P (1 +y )2 P (1 +y t 
(4.28) 
(4.29) 
which is just the duration formula. 6 A related formula is known as volatility, that is, the pro-
portional change in price per unit change in yield, i.e., 
or 
V= dP.1-
dy P 
v =-(1 +y )-1 . D 
(4.30) 
Volatility is used more frequently in the U.K. by bond market practitioners than duration. It is 
6 Note that this formula is only a close approximation to duration when changes in yield are small. 
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used as both a measure of risk and to select bonds given an assessment of future interest rates. 
Thus if bond A has a higher volatility than bond B it would be argued that a given fall in yield 
would produce a larger proportional price increment in A than B, and, if yields were predicted 
to decline, A would be chosen rather than B. 
However, we saw earlier that the yield to maturity on a bond with a gIven maturity 
depends on the size of the coupon and, as a result, yields to maturity on bonds with different 
coupon levels cannot usefully be compared. This problem applies not just to yields to matu-
rity, but also volatility and duration which are based upon it. 
This means that a given change in spot rates will usually produce different yield to matu-
rity changes on bonds with different coupons. So volatility cannot be used to assist prediction 
of relative returns on bonds in the manner described above. The relationship between price 
change, volatility and change in yield to maturity is a tautology for a particular bond but does 
not help us to predict returns on other bonds as the term structure changes. A solution has been 
provided however within the field of bond portfolio immunization. 
4.3.3. Immunization and Generalized Duration 
An immunization strategy is one in which a portfolio of (component) bonds is managed so that 
its value is always as close as possible to the value of another asset: the target. The idea, and 
the term immunization, were introduced by Redington (1952), an actuary who proposed it as a 
means for life assurance companies to mitigate the effects of interest rate changes on their net 
worth. The essence of Redington's strategy is to set the duration of the assets and liabilities 
equal. 
Such a measure of duration must fully capture the effects of changes in factors affecting 
the term structure, and is therefore better served by a formula which relates bond price to spot 
rates rather than yield to maturity. We may construct a generalized model of duration in the 
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following manner.7 
Given a continuous stream of cash flows C (t), t=O,l , ... ,n for a bond with price P, we 
rewrite the basic discounting equation (4.1) in continuous time as 
n 
P = fc (t)exp-tR (t) dt 
o 
Using equation (4.2), also in continuous time 
n 
R = 1-ff (s) ds, 
no 
we may replace the spot rates by the implied forward rates since, and so 
n -If(s) ds 
P = fC(t)exp 0 dt 
o 
(4.1 ') 
(4.2') 
(4.31) 
If we assume that the forward rate to moves as a function of one factor, namely the short rate 
r, we may rewrite equation (4.31) as 
n -If (s ,r) ds 
P = fC(t)exp 0 dt (4.32) 
o 
Differentiating with respect to the short rate r and dividing by P to obtain the proportional 
change gives 
dP 1 
n[t af 1 -If(s,r) ds [ [ar(s,r) dSJC(t)exp 0 dt 
P 
(4.33) 
This is the generalization of the usual duration formula. Its principal difference from the yield 
to maturity special case is that the cash flow date t in the numerator integral in the yield case 
is itself replaced by an integral of forward rate elasticities in the general case. For parallel 
shifts in the yield curve, the integral of forward rate elasticities equals t and we have the con-
ventional duration measure. 
7 This generalization of duration follows Hodges (1975). 
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The limitation with this duration formula is that it is only a one factor model (the forward 
rate curve just depends on the short rate). By specifying a joint stochastic process for k 
influencing factors and applying results from stochastic calculus, Nelson and Schaefer (1983 
pp.63-4) have fully generalized this result. 8 
4.4. An Efficient Markets Model of Gilt-Edged Prices 
The movement of prices in speculative markets has traditionally been couched in terms of the 
random walk hypothesis. For a return from holding the asset from day (-1 to day ( defined by 
xt=loge (Pt/Pt- I ), where Pt is the price at the end of day (, the random walk hyp0Lhesis says that 
daily returns are uncorrelated and have a constant mean, i.e. 
(4.34) 
This can be distinguished from the weak form of the efficient markets model, which 
states that prices accurately reflect all past price information and reward rational investors for 
accepting risk (Fama, 1970; Jensen, 1978). Let RFt be the return from risk free investments 
and let RPx,t be the risk premium. The statistical representation of the model can be written as: 
Xt = /-lx,t + e t 
/-lx,l = RFt + RPx,t ~O. (4.35) 
E(el)=O, E(etet+i)=O (i#O), cov(/-ls,et)=O (all s,t). 
Furthermore, both the random walk model for /-lx ~O and the efficient markets model are special 
cases of the sub-martingale process (Fama, 1970): 
E [Xl I all Xt-i' i ~ 1] ~ O. (4.36) 
Both this and the special cases can be assessed by evaluating trading rules, since the sub-
martingale property implies that a rule based on past price information cannot outperform a 
8 Further details of this study and the stochastic calculus, arbitrage models are given in chapter seven. 
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buy and hold strategy. 
Using results presented in the previous sections, the efficient markets model can be inter-
preted in terms of bond prices and the term structure of interest rates. This will provide an 
efficient markets model of bond price movements. 
Let us consider the CIR preferred model of the Expectations Hypothesis, the L-EH, as 
described by equation (4.16). This can be alternatively written as 
E, (P,+1,I+n )-P, ,I+n _ R 
- 11 
P,,'+n ' 
(4.16') 
which simply says that the one period expected return from time ( to time (+ 1 is the one 
period rate for loans beginning at time (. In other words the expected return for bonds of 
different maturities over the next holding interval is the same. If we define the observed rela-
tive change in price from (-1 to t as x,, we obtain the model 
X, =llx,1 +el 
Ilx ,I = R 1,/-1 
E (e , ) = 0, E (e , et+;) = 0 (i -:t 0), COY (R 105 ,e, ) = 0 (all S ,t)o 
(4.37) 
This is exactly, what would obtain in the efficient markets model (4.35) where there were no 
risk differentials between securities, that is, the expected rate of return is equal to the risk free 
rate of return. Furthermore, if the risk free rate were constant through time, the random walk 
model can be interpreted as the L-EH. If risk preferences influence investment decisions or 
taxes segment the market, the efficient markets model can capture fully such effects with the 
term RPx,I' in (4.35).9 Finally, we note once more that although term structure theory assumes 
bonds pay no coupons, that coupon bonds are simply portfolios of pure discount bonds allows 
us to carry across the above relationships to model coupon bonds. 
9 It should be noted that the risk premium term here is different from that used by Roll in his "funda-
mental dynamic equation". For example, Roll compares the premium on a five year bond next now with 
that on a four year bond next year. In this case, we are concerned with the movements of "the five year 
risk premium" through time. 
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4.5. Summary 
This chapter has developed an efficient markets model of gilt price movements. It is shown 
how such a model follows naturally from the recent reinterpretation of the traditional theories 
of the term structure by Cox, Ingersoll and Ross (1981). 
In the next chapter, this model will be used to examine the impact of the Big Bang dere-
gulation on the efficiency of the gilt-edged market, within a traditional efficient markets testing 
framework. 
... 
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Figure 4.1, The Relationship between Spot Rates, Annuity Yields 
and Yields on Bonds with Constant Coupon. Source: Schaefer 1977 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
The Effects of Big Bang on Market Efficiency 
5.1. Introduction 
Many years and many volumes of empirical work had preceded the theoretical underpinning of 
the efficient markets hypothesis by Samuelson in 1965. More recently the rational expectations 
hypothesis in economic theory, that individuals make no systematic mistakes in forecasting the 
future, has provided the efficient markets hypothesis, with an even stronger theoretical founda-
tion. Yet still, the question of market efficiency remains an empirical one. The evidence, 
predominantly on equities and on overseas securities, suggests that although there are some 
anomalies (for example, January and weekend effects, small firm effects and low price to earn-
ings ratio effects), markets are efficient. 1 
The weak form of the efficient markets hypothesis says that prices fully reflect all past 
price information and reward rational investors for accepting risk (Fama, 1970; Jensen, 1978). 
In chapter four, the statistical representation of this model, and the special case of the random 
walk hypothesis, were interpreted in terms of traditional term structure theories to provide a 
model to test market efficiency in the gilt-edged market. The efficient markets model implies 
that returns are serially uncorrelated, and autocorrelation based studies have become the dom-
inant testing paradigm. However, over the last decade, several authors have criticised the sta-
tistical power of these tests and have suggested alternative procedures (for example, Shiller 
(1981 )). Recently, motivated by the deficiencies with the traditional autocorrelation tests, Tay-
lor (1986) has developed techniques and related efficiency tests that are free from the majority 
of these problems, but that remain within traditional paradigm. 
Hence this chapter is composed as follows. Section 5.2 reviews the historical develop-
1 A strongly d!ssenting view is that of Shiller (1981). The controversy surrounding his volatility tests is 
discussed in section 5.2 below. 
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ment of efficient market and random walk tests, and the results of previous British studies are 
noted. The volatility test controversy is discussed also. Section 5.3 examines the distribution 
of daily returns. While any change in distributional characteristics at Big Bang is interesting in 
itself, such a study will determine whether the returns series have the appropriate sample pro-
perties necessary for powerful efficiency tests. Section 5.4 reports on the methodology and 
results of the efficiency tests, which adopt the framework of Taylor (1986). Conclusions 
regarding the effect of Big Bang on market efficiency are drawn in section 5.5. 
5.2. The History of the Random Walk and the Efficient Market Hypotheses2 
Historically, market efficiency was tested using a random walk model. This is more res-
trictive than the efficient markets model and says that returns are uncorrelated and have a con-
stant mean. Though not using the term "random walk", Bachelier (1900) had concluded that 
prices in a competitive market followed a random walk. Though there was a small number of 
studies in the first half of this century, Bachelier's work remained largely unappreciated and 
certainly unmatched. In 1953, Kendall published a paper which attempted to discover patterns 
in speculative prices of a similar nature to the alleged trade cycles in economic data. He was 
extremely negative about his result that the "data behave almost like a wandering series" saying 
further that 
"To the statistician there is some pleasure in the thought that the symmetrical distri-
bution reared its graceful head undisturbed amid the uproar of the Chicago wheat-
pit. The economist, I suspect, or at any rate the trade cyclist, will look for statistical 
snags before he is convinced of the absence of systematic movements." (1953 p.13), 
2 This review is primarily concerned with the major developments in empirical methodology and their 
application to British security markets. A good review of the theoretical refinements of the concept of an 
"efficient market" can be found in Strong and Walker (1988, ch.6). 
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Once again the significance of the result in support of the random walk hypothesis was not 
fully appreciated at the time. However part of the discussion after the presentation of the paper 
(see Bartlett, 1953) foreshadowed later work (e.g. Alexander (1961) and Cootner (1962)) by 
suggesting that price changes might be dependent but not correlated, from distributions being 
either non-linear or non-normal. 
The modem interest in this subject began in 1959 following papers by Roberts and 
Osborne. Roberts presented the heuristic reasoning behind the random walk hypothesis of stock 
prices. His basic proposition was that a competitive market eliminates excess profits: only nor-
mal profits are earned. Hence, only a monopolist earns supernormal profits. So any rules, 
technical analysis, designed to earn excess returns cannot expect to be useful. His explanation 
of the "faith" in Chartism was that graphed market levels seemed to give clear signals. How-
ever, when weekly changes in the Dow-Jones index were examined statistically their behaviour 
was as if they had been generated by a pure chance model. So market levels looked like the 
cumulation of chance results. In other words, a series of cumulated random numbers is likely 
to give as clear (and as false) signals as the series of stock price levels. The implication was 
that price changes are independent of past history. 
Osborne (1959) demonstrated the fit of share price data to a model of Brownian Motion. 
He further argued, by reference to psychological considerations, that it is not absolute changes 
in price, but rather changes in the log of price that are independent. This transformation has 
since been jusrified on both theoretical and empirical, econometric grounds. Granger and Mor-
genstern (1970, p 1 07 -8) provides a full account: a summary of the main arguments follows. 
Theoretically, the distribution of prices is bounded from below by zero but is unbounded from 
above. The logarithmic transformation results in a distribution which is symmetrically 
unbounded, and hence may be more symmetric about its mean. The transformation is con-
sistent with investor utility maximising objectives. The scale for measuring prices should be 
such that a given change in the transformed variable yields a utility function that is 
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independent of the price level. If investor's utility is based approximately on rate of return 
then the logarithmic transformation has the effect of making changes independent of position. 
The transformation therefore allows the hypothesis to be tested that investors want to maximize 
expected gain as a well as maximize expected rate of return. Empirically, transformed data 
have more symmetric and more nearly normal histograms. They appear to have more time 
invariant first and second sample moments, and appear to be much closer to being independent 
observations from a random process. More recently, this transformation has been shown (Tay-
lor and Kingsman, 1979) to be the best choice from the Box-Cox set of transformations. 
In 1962, Moore published empirical results supporting the random walk / Brownian 
Motion model. Both autocorrelation tests, first used by Kendall (1953), and the runs tests were 
used. The runs test, introduced by Cowles and Jones (1937) into the field of finance, uses the 
fact that if returns are independent, the number of sequences of returns of the same sign e.g. 
(++) or (--) should equal the number of reversals (+-) or (-+). Unlike the autocorrelation test it 
is unaffected by distributional considerations : it is non-parametric. However, the null 
hypothesis, that returns are independent, is a stronger condition than a null hypothesis of no 
autocorrelation among returns. 
In 1963, Granger and Morgenstern introduced the techniques of spectral analysis into the 
study of share prices. The spectrum of a time series is a representation (through a Fourier 
transformation) of the autocorrelation function of that series. The spectrum gives a complete 
picture of autocorrelation in any stochastic process with finite variance. But, if the series is 
non-stationary or if the variance is infinite, results of this and the time domain autocorrelations 
could be ambiguous or incorrect. It was clear, even then, that distributional considerations were 
important for obtaining robust test results. 
So it is perhaps not surprising that, simultaneously, studies of the distribution along with 
more sophisticated tests were being undertaken. Work by Mandelbrot (1963) and Fama (1963) 
argued that the distributions were non-Gaussian and have infinite variance, and they believed 
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that the "Pareto-Levy" distribution was more appropriate. This distribution captured the sym-
metric, fat-tailed nature of empirical distributions. However, empirical evidence has con-
clusively rejected this hypothesis (Blattberg and Gonedes,1974; Hagerman, 1978; Perry,1983). 
Furthermore a decade later Fama preferred to use the normal distribution (Fama,1976,Ch.1.). 
The currently preferred explanation of fat-tails is that it occurs in distributions with non-
constant variance (see section 5.4.2 below). However, at that time, it was appreciated that stan-
dard serial correlation tests were not sufficient to fully capture the complex interrelationships of 
price changes. The first test to recognize non-linear dependence was Alexander (1961). He said 
that if stock price increments were independent, no trading rule could produce profits. He 
tested filter rules and found evidence of profits. Such a rule can commence by purchasing an 
asset at time i. It should then be sold on the first day j after time i for which the price is x 
percent lower than the highest price between time i and j -1 inclusive. When the price is x 
percent more than the least price on or after day j then the asset should be bought again. The 
parameter x is generally assessed within the range 0.5 to 25. However, the success of such a 
strategy could imply either non-stationarity or non-linearity. Cootner (1962) provided further 
evidence supporting either dependence or non-stationarity, and demonstrated the leptokurkic 
shape of the distribution. However, in a most extensive study of filter rules by Fama and 
Blume (1966), they concluded that "for measuring the direction and degree of dependence in 
price changes, the standard statistical tools are probably as powerful as the Alexandrian filter 
rules". 
The application of any trading rule requires the payment of transaction costs on each 
trade. Consequently, small price dependencies may not in fact produce profits in excess of 
costs, and the market should not be regarded as inefficient. Keane (1983) classifies a market 
with no price dependencies as "perfectly efficient" and one with small, but unexploitable price 
dependencies as "near efficient". Trading costs comprise brokerage commissions and taxes, 
market-making spreads and the costs of searching the lowest cost method of carrying out the 
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transaction. The conclusion of Fama and Blume (1966), based upon empirical study, was that 
"when commissions were taken into account the largest profits under the filter technique are 
those of the broker... when commissions are omitted, the returns from the filter technique were, 
of course, greatly improved, but are still not as large as the returns from simply buying and 
holding". 
The City deregulation has altered the structure of trading costs as explained in chapter 
three: on the whole they were lower afterwards. This implies that small profits from exploiting 
price dependencies, which would not cover transactions costs before Big Bang, may well do so 
afterwards. At least at an intuitive level, we can think of the efficiency losses for the market as 
consisting of two kinds: (l) transactions costs (representing operational efficiency), (2) losses 
to exploiting price dependencies (representing an aspect of informational efficiency). As the 
former are reduced, the latter will increase unless the price dependencies also decrease. 
5.2.1. The Results of some Past U.K Studies 
Brealey (1970) examined correlations in the FT all-share index and found only minor evidence 
of dependence. Also, evidence of a leptokurkic distribution was found. Dryden (1970), using 
serial correlation tests, runs tests and filter rules produced further support for the random walk 
hypothesis. Kemp and Reid (1971) used the runs test on share prices, but their results ran into 
difficulties when attempting to account for no change runs and cannot be seen as conclusive. 
Griffiths (1970) found small negative correlations, but Guy (1976) explained that this was 
probably due to measurement error. Cunningham (1973) and Girmes and Damant (1975) pro-
vide evidence of trading rules generating profits. However the former was not compared to a 
buy and hold strategy and neither looked capable of covering trading costs. Taylor (1986) does 
not reject the random walk model for share prices when tested against a model reflecting the 
slow interpretation of information. 
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5.2.2. The Volatility Test Controversy 
Relatively recently, it was argued that even though the standard statistical tests were generally 
unable to reject the null hypothesis of market efficiency this could not be taken as evidence in 
favour of the hypothesis. This principle applies to all scientific theories. Experiments can fal-
sify a theory by contradicting one of its implications. But the verification of one of its predic-
tions cannot be taken to prove or establish the theory. The positive outcome of this negative 
criticism, was an alternative testing procedure, due to Shiller (1981), which examines whether 
the efficient markets model is able to account for the historic volatility of prices. Shiller's argu-
ment runs as follows. Given perfect foresight, the price of an asset would be the present value 
of the known future dividends. Given a constant discount factor, the efficient markets 
hypothesis implies that the actual prices are participants' optimal forecasts of the perfect 
foresight price. Since optimal forecasts should vary less than the variable they are trying to 
predict, the actual variance of the stock price should be less than that of the perfect foresight 
price. This condition is known as the "variance bounds restriction". Shiller found the opposite 
situation in practice, the actual variance of stock prices was much greater than the variance of 
the perfect foresight path. He concluded that this "excess volatility" was evidence of 
inefficiency. 
However, numerous authors (e.g. Kleidon (1986)) have argued that Lhe tests are flawed. 
First] y, the actual "efficient markets" price variance is underestimated by Shiller. The perfect 
foresight price is based on information of all future dividends, whereas the actual price is based 
on current information. It is quite likely that as dividends change over time, participants revise 
their forecasts of future dividends. Since the movements of the perfect foresight price are res-
tricted so as to produce a return eq4al to the discount rate, it is quite likely that actual prices 
will appear more volatile. Secondly, and related to this objection, is work suggesting that divi-
dends should not be treated as exogenous but rather as a choice made by managers of firms 
(Marsh and Merton, 1986,1987).3 Models of aggregate dividends that assume managers try to 
3 The discussion centres on the question of whether the series of aggregate dividends is non-stationary 
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keep smooth dividends closely fit historical data. If dividends are smoothed and do not vary 
proportionately with profits, the observed dividend will vary little, and prices will appear much 
more volatile than the present value of observed dividends. Thirdly, the tests assume a con-
stant discount factor (expected rate of return), a fluctuating discount factor can explain much of 
the variance in stock prices. This is essentially the same non-stationarity weakness of the tradi-
tional tests. The recent work seems to suggest that an efficient market can account for excess 
volatility. 
A stronger criticism of efficient market tests has come from Summers (1983), who argued 
that even with negligible excess returns, it is still possible for there to be disequilibrium in 
prices. Hence for any model based on excess return arguments, "Do we really know that finan-
cial markets are efficient?" However, though there may be pricing errors, it is of course an 
empirical issue whether such miss-pricing exists. Brennan and Schwartz (1982) report that the 
differences between actual and equilibrium bond prices are not persistent. Furthermore, to 
establish miss-pricing requires the specification of an equilibrium price. While some analysts 
may estimate an equilibrium price, many others may accept the market price as an equilibrium 
price conditional on the market's information set and focus on predicting the marginal effect on 
price of new information. A study of the nature of price anomalies in the gilt-edged market is 
contained in chapter six. 
Summers also demonstrates the effects on test power of assuming stationarity and linear-
ity in the returns generating process. However, Taylor (1986) has provided a framework which 
overcomes these difficulties. This framework is adopted in the final section of this chapter. It 
was Summers also who argued that the failure to refute the hypothesis of market efficiency 
cannot be seen as evidence in favour of it. The solution is to ensure that the power of tests 
used is maximized and the tests' design made as robust as possible. The next two sections 
or stationary about a trend as assumed by Shiller. 
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adopt an overall approach which is believed to meet these criteria 
5.3. The Distribution of Daily Returns 
Observed returns, xt , are calculated as the change in the logarithm of successive days prices 
(5.1) 
where PI is the price or price index at time t. The data are a set of thirty nine individual gilt-
edged securities plus four market indexes.4 The individual price series studied are daily obser-
vations on those gilts that were quoted fully paid in the secondary market throughout the 
period of fifty two weeks either side of Big Bang. Thus all stocks with a maturity of less than 
two years in October 1985 are excluded. We also exclude all irredeemable, variable rate and 
conversion stocks. In chapters six through eight, which involve cross-sectional analysis, tax 
effects are an important consideration (see chapter six, section 6.4 on tax effects). So to main-
tain a consistent data set throughout this study, we remove those bonds liable to such tax 
effects at this stage, that is, low coupon bonds. If the remaining thirty nine bonds are not 
representative of the whole market from a time series point of view, this will be picked up by 
the results for the index series.5 
The summary statistics for the returns series are contained in table 5.1. The figures for 
the period before Big Bang sit directly above those for the period after Big Bang. The first 
column of figures, headed n, gives the sample sizes. On a daily basis the sample means, x, 
would be expected to be close to zero as, for example, an annual rate of 10% is equivalent to a 
daily return of 0.038%. Standard deviations, s, measure the extent to which prices are chang-
4 The results for the index series provide a useful, albeit unsophisticated, check upon whether the reac-
tions to the Big Bang in our sample bonds are untypical of those experienced by the market (considered 
as a whole), and the well-established maturity sub-sections of it. 
5 Precise details of the data and their source are contained in the appendix to this chapter. 
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ing. A low value indicates that the probability of a large price change is relatively low. Thus 
the riskiness of alternative securities may be contrasted by a comparison of their standard devi-
ations. Though the estimated standard deviations are small, the gilt market result is quite con-
sistent with the traditional measure of gilt market volatility. The shorter the security, the 
greater the proportional reduction in time to maturity, when comparing the period after and the 
period before Big Bang. The smaller the term to maturity, the less volatile the security. Conse-
quently, the greater the reduction in maturity, the bigger the impact on volatility. Hence the 
short securities should show the greatest reduction in volatility. This is observed to be the case; 
the short securities do show the greatest reduction in volatility, (table 5.1, column s). 
Tests for changes in standard deviation (or variance) usually specify normal distributions 
in the null hypothesis. We have no reason to impose these restrictions and so we must use a 
test which is robust to departures from normality. Though non normality robust tests for chang-
ing standard deviations exist (e.g. Layard, 1973 and Brown and Forsythe, 1974), such testing 
here will be encompassed by the use of a non parametric test for changes in all the characteris-
tics of the distribution (see below). 
The skewness statistics (column headed "Skew." in table 5.1) assess the symmetry of the 
distribution. The symmetric normal distribution has zero skewness. All the sample series exhi-
bit non-zero skewness. Medium and long maturity gilts generally show a positive value prior to 
Big Bang and a negative value after Big Bang. Gilt indexes show a stronger skew to the left 
after Big Bang, and short maturity gilts show a weaker skew to the right. The gilt market is 
therefore united in its response to Big Bang.6 Furthermore, it can be seen that the sign of the 
skewness for individual securities cannot be inferred from the market indexes. 
6 The index of short maturity gilts in fact shows a reduction in negative skewness. This is probably 
due to the exclusion from the data set of any securities redeemed during the data period. Thus all securi-
ties with a maturity of less than two years at the start of the period are excluded. Since an index of shorts 
includes stocks of a maturity up to 5 years, it is likely to have constantly changing constituents and to be 
a biased aggregate of its constituents. So, contrasting results are not surprising. 
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Outliers can often cause high values of skewness and so the presence of outliers provides 
an additional source of evidence concerning normality. For the gilts considered individually, 
the maximum number of observations beyond two standard deviations for any bond is seven-
teen and this declines with increasing bond maturity to about twelve. The maximum number 
of observations beyond three standard deviations is six and this also declines with increasing 
maturity to just one. Since outliers are smoothed on aggregation, the results for gilt indexes 
show a fewer number of outliers. On the null hypothesis that the samples had been drawn from 
a standard normal distribution, we would expect (for our sample sizes) no more than eleven 
observations beyond two standard deviations and not one beyond three standard deviations. 
None of the securities or indexes meet this standard, however the margin by which they 
overshoot is not that large given the sample size. It would therefore be unwise to make a judg-
ment on normality solely on these criteria. The number of outliers beyond 2,3 and 4 standard 
deviations from the sample mean are given in the columns headed >2, >3 and >4 respectively 
in table 5.1. 
Normal distributions have a kurtosis equal to 3. All but the short maturity gilts and their 
index show kurtosis less than 5, but all are greater than three (see column headed "Kurt." in 
table 5.1). The sample distributions thus possess a greMer peakedness, or "leptokurtosis", than 
a normal distribution. We also observe that as maturity increases so there is an increasing ten-
dency for kurtosis to increase after the Big Bang. This is borne out by a similar tendency 
among the outlying observations. As maturity increases, the number of outliers overall declines 
after the Big Bang, however, there are relatively more extreme outliers. This accounts for the 
observed increase, post Big Bang, in "fat tails" to the distributions as bond maturity increases. 
A non-parametric test will be used to test the significance of the departures from normality. 
The normality test determines the goodness of fit of a normal distribution based upon the 
sample moments to the particular sample distribution itself. The particular test used here, 
which is suitable for continuous distributions, is the Kolmogorov-Smimov Test. ThP test 
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involves specifying the cumulative frequency distribution that would occur under the 
hypothesised theoretical distribution and comparing it with the observed cumulative frequency 
distribution. The point of maximum divergence between these distributions is determined, and 
reference to the known sampling distribution indicates whether such a divergence would prob-
ably occur if the observations were really a random sample from, in this case, the normal dis-
tribution. 
The probability value associated with each series is given in the column labelled "KS 1" 
in table 5.1. At a significance level of 5 percent, which defines the region of rejection as those 
values less than 0.05, the following results emerge. The short maturity securities tended to 
reject the nonnality hypothesis, but less so after Big Bang and with increased maturity. There 
is some evidence of non-nonnality among the medium maturity gilts in the period after Big 
Bang, but this is small and not systematic. This probably reflects the gradual rise in kurtosis 
after Big Bang in these bonds. The long maturity bonds are unable to reject a hypothesis of 
normality, and none of the index series display departures from normality. 
The small evidence of non-normality observed here is in sharp contrast to results for indi-
vidual equity securities. In a study by Taylor (1986), for example, the value of the kurtosis 
figure is well in excess of six for most series. A normality test such as the above was not car-
ried out: the conclusion of non-normality was taken as directly evidenced by the size of the 
kurtosis statistics. The figures here do not provide such a strong message, and hence nonnality 
tests are essential. 
The strength of the above result is dependent on the power of the test. While it is true 
that the weaker the assumptions that constitute a statistical model, the more general are the 
conclusions, such a benefit is obtained at the expense of lower power. A relatively small sam-
ple for any given significance level, will have a relatively low power by definition. The power 
/ generality trade-off is true for any given sample size, but for the comparison of two tests on 
samples of unequal size it may not be true. For example, test A may be more powerful than 
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test B using samples of size 30. But test B may be more powerful in a sample of 30 than A is 
in a sample of 20. In other words we can avoid the problem of choosing between power and 
generality by selecting a test of broad generality and then increasing its power to that of the 
most powerful available by enlarging the size of the sample. The concept of "power-efficiency" 
is concerned with the amount of increase in sample size which is necessary to make test B as 
powerful as test A. For example if test B requires a sample of NA = 25 cases to have the same 
power as test A with NB = 20 cases, then test B has a power efficiency of 80% given by the 
following formula. 
. NA Power-efficIency of test B = (100) - per cent 
NB 
The power-efficiency of the Kolmogorov one sample test can be shown to be superior to any 
alternative non parametric tests in this situation (see Seigel (1956». Though a comparison to a 
parametric test is not performed, the two sample version of this test which will be used below 
has a known and highly satisfactory power-efficiency (see Massey (1951». 
So far, tests of the normality of each period have been carried out and a description of 
their comparative summary statistics been reported. A test will now be undertaken to determine 
the significance, if any, of the difference in the distributions between the two samples; the 
periods before and after Big Bang. The test determines whether the two samples come from the 
same population, though we do not explicitly say what that population might be. Single sam-
pIe tests have arrived at a conclusion on this question above. There are two forms of 
difference which may be tested. Firstly, we may test whether the samples differ in central ten-
dency, independently of their higher order moments. Secondly, we may test whether the sam-
pIes are from populations which differ in every respect. The most powerful tests in each 
category are, respectively, the Mann-Whitney U and Kolmogorov Smirnov Two Sample tests. 
The null hypothesis for the Mann Whitney test is that the two samples are from the same 
population. The alternative hypothesis is that one sample is stochastically larger than the other. 
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This is a directional hypothesis which means that we reject the null hypothesis if the probabil-
ity that an observation from one sample is larger than an observation from the other is greater 
than one half. If the evidence supports the alternative hypothesis, then the "bulk" of the popu-
lation for one sample is higher than the "bulk" of the population for the other sample. A two-
tailed test, where we do not impose the direction of the difference, accepts the alternative 
hypothesis if the above probability does not equal one half. 
To apply the U test, we first combine the observations from both groups and rank these 
in order of increasing size retaining each observation's identity as either sample 1 or sample 2. 
The largest negative number has the lowest rank and the largest positive number has the 
highest rank. Then choosing either the observations from group 1 or group 2, we count how 
many times an observation in that sample is preceded by an observation in the other sample. 
The statistic U is the cumulative total of these occurrences and its sampling distribution under 
the null hypothesis is known. 
For large samples we may use the following formula instead of the then tedious counting 
procedure. Identical results are obtained. We assign the rank of 1 to the lowest score in the 
combined samples, assign the rank 2 to the next lowest and so on. Then 
(5.2) 
where n 1 and n2 are the sizes of samples 1 and 2 respectively and R 1 is the sum of the ranks 
assigned to sample 1. A similar formula is available which considers the sum of the ranks in 
sample 2. As it is the smaller of these two U values which is required, we apply the following 
transformation to ensure we obtain it. 
(5.3) 
Also in the case of large samples, it has been shown (Mann and Whitney (1947» that as the 
sample sizes increase, the sampling distribution of U rapidly approaches the normal distribu-
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tion, with mean = nln2/2 and standard error = ~nln2(nl+n2+1)1l2. So we may standardize the V 
statistic by subtracting its mean and dividing by the standard error, and this is then distributed 
as standard normal. Furthermore this normal approximation means that it does not matter 
whether V or V'is used. The sign of the standardized statistic will change, but not its value. 
The power-efficiency of this test approaches 3/rc = 95.5 per cent as the size of the com-
bined sample increases (Mood, 1954), and is close to 95 per cent for even moderate sized sam-
ples. It is therefore an excellent alternative to the t test and is distribution free. The probability 
values of this test are given in the "MW" column of table 5.1. With a 5% significance level, no 
figure is statistically significant and so we conclude that there has been no significant change to 
the mean of the distribution of returns of either individual gilts or indexes following Big Bang. 
There is no prior reason to expect that the effects of Big Bang on the distribution of daily 
gilt-edged market returns should be confined to changes in the central tendency of the distribu-
tion. To determine whether the two samples are from populations with the same or different 
distributions we may use the Kolmogorov-Smirnov Two-Sample Test. The test is sensitive to 
any kind of differences in the distributions from which the two samples were drawn. 
Like the one-sample version, the Kolmogorov-Smimov test is concerned with the agree-
ment between two cumulative distributions. If the two samples have in fact been drawn from 
the same population distribution, then the cumulative distributions of both samples can be 
expected to be fairly close to each other, inasmuch as they both only show random deviations 
from the population distribution. The sampling distribution of the largest deviation between 
each cumulative distribution function is known. The test has a power efficiency of 96 percent 
in small samples and this decreases slightly for larger samples (Dixon, 1954). The probability 
values of this test are given in the column labelled "KS2" in table 5.1. Using a 5% significance 
level, the test indicates the we cannot reject the hypothesis that the samples before and after 
Big Bang are drawn from the same or identical distributions, except for the four shortest matu-
rity gilts. 
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In summary, the evidence points to there having been little impact following Big Bang on 
the parameters of the distribution of daily returns of both medi urn and long gilts. This is seen 
as evidence in favour of the distributions of returns closely approximating a stationary process. 
However, the short maturity gilts do show a significant change in distribution. Again with the 
exception of the short maturity gilts, we are unable to reject the hypothesis that the distribu-
tions of daily returns examined are drawn from normal populations with their sample mean and 
variance as parameters. 
5.4. Testing the Efficient Market Hypothesis 
This section of the chapter is comprised of five elements. The first three sub-sections conduct 
an analysis of autocorrelations within the context of three different stochastic models for price 
movements. These models are: firstly, the random walk model; secondly, a conditional variance 
model, which can explain not only the high kurtosis of observed returns but also high auto-
correlation variance that gives rise to further difficulties when using autocorrelation tests; and 
thirdly, a price trend model, which captures features suggestive of market inefficiency. The 
fourth sub-section conducts tests of the random walk hypothesis using information obtained 
from the autocorrelation analysis. The fifth sub-section considers the implications of these 
results for market efficiency. 
5.4.1. The Random Walk Hypothesis and Autocorrelation Analysis 
Let us suppose that prices follow a random walk which says that daily returns are 
uncorrelated and have a constant mean, i.e. 
H 0: X t = 11 + et (5.4) 
E(et ) = 0, E(etet+J = ° (i *- 0). 
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The market may be said to make efficient use of past price information as prices will adjust 
fully and instantaneously when new information becomes available. 
Evidence against the random walk hypothesis will be provided by evidence of non-zero 
autocorrelation in the daily returns series. The autocorrelations of returns are usually estimated 
from the sample autocorrelation function, that is, 
n-t 
~:CXI-X)(XI+c.t) 
1=1 
rt,x 1>0. (5.5) 
1=1 
where n is the sample size, 1 is the lag in days and x is the sample arithmetic mean. 
Figures for these autocorrelations for the periods either side of the market deregulation 
are given in the left-hand portion of table 5.2 under the heading "Autocorrelations of Returns". 
The coefficients for lags 1 to 30 are assigned to one of six classes according to their size: (1) 
r<-O.l, (2) -0.1~r<-0.05, (3) -0.05~r<0, (4) ~r~0.05, (5) 0.05<r~0.1, (6) O.l<r. The coefficient 
for lag one is also reported independently as r 1,x • For the short and long gilts the coefficient at 
lag one is generally smaller after Big Bang, while for gilts of a medium maturity the converse 
is largely true. All of these coefficients are positive. When the coefficients to lag thirty are 
examined, the nature of the change is more apparent. Around 23% of the coefficients exceeded 
0.01 before Big Bang while less than 5% were in the same range (class (6)) after the event. 
This move was not countered by a significant shift in all coefficients towards negative values, 
but rather an overall reduction in the absolute size of autocorrelations. 
Tests based on these statistics are generally derived from a theorem about the asymptotic 
properties of sample autocorrelations, proved by Anderson and Walker (1964). This theorem 
implies that the variance of the sample autocorrelation for n observations drawn from a finite 
variance, strict white noise process is approximately lin. By strict white noise, we mean an 
identically and independently distributed process. Since the null hypothesis of zero autocorrela-
tion does not imply a strict white noise process, lin may not be an appropriate sampling 
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variance for our autocorrelation coefficients. If, however, returns were generated by strict white 
noise, our coefficients would yield the following conclusions. Mostly all coefficients at lag one 
are insignificantly different from zero. Considering coefficients to lag thirty, where the number 
of significant negative [positive] coefficients is given in the column of table 5.2 marked # 1 
[# 6], over 12% of the coefficients were significant before Big Bang, while less than one percent 
were significant afterwards. 
Estimating Autocorrelation Variances 
It is possible to determine whether the variance approximation lIn is valid, by calculating the 
sample autocorrelation variances in a manner described by Taylor (1984). This method uses the 
null hypothesis that {Xl} is an uncorrelated process and, in addition, assumes only that the 
multivariate density of the process is symmetric and, initially, that the expected value of every 
Xl is known and can be assumed to be zero.7 An assumption of stationarity is not necessary to 
achieve the results. Multivariate symmetry defines the "special null hypothesis" (1984,p.301) 
Hs : f (x) = f (Ix I) for all vectors x , (5.6) 
under which the process will also be uncorrelated. If Hs is true then we may deduce the fol-
lowing about the density function: every sequence Xl*' l~t~n, for which each Xl* is either Xl or 
-Xl has equal likelihood, namely the likelihood of the observed data. If all the returns are non-
zero, there are 2n such sequences: zero returns reduce the number of sequences. Each sequence 
could give a realization of R tX, and these equally likely sequences thus provide a discrete con-
ditional distribution for R tX. The variance of this conditional distribution can be shown to be 
(5.7) 
and is an unbiased estimate. There can be some bias if Hs is false, but at is still an appropriate 
7 Capital letters are used to denote population quantities when a distinction between sample quantities 
is desirable. 
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estimate if the null hypothesis is true (Taylor (1986), p.123-4). 
The above estimates a't apply the assumption that the means of the XI are all zero. For a 
known constant mean Jl, all terms XI in (5.7) are replaced by xl-Jl. For observed returns, Jl is 
close to zero but unknown, so XI is replaced by XI-X. The estimate b't of n [var(R 't,x)] then 
becomes 
n -'t 
:L (XI -X)2(XI+'t-x )2 
1=1 b't -------
n 
(:L(xl -xi)2 
1=1 
(5.8) 
and if the process is strict white noise, b't::l. When b t is greater than 1, the significance level 
of a test involving R't,x will be underestimated. For example, if {XI) is uncorre] ated and the 
autocorrelation coefficients are normally distributed with mean zero and variance 21n, but we 
use a 5% significance level and falsely assume the coefficients variance is lin, then chance of 
rejecting the null hypothesis (of zero autocorrelation) is 17 per cent. 
Estimates of b't for lags from one to five days for all series are given in the five columns 
which form the right-hand portion of table 5.2. The most noticeable feature is that the 
coefficients for the period before Big Bang are generally greater than unity and larger than 
those for the following period, which are very infrequently greater than unity. We would there-
fore be unwilling to trust the results of tests based upon the standard lin rule for the period 
before Big Bang, particularly among the short maturity gilts. In order to conduct a comparative 
exercise, we need to be confident of test results for both periods. By consid~ring a possible 
cause of large autocorrelation variances, we motivate a solution to the problem. 
5.4.2. Stochastic Volatility and Conditional Variance Models 
High autocorrelation variances can be explained by changes in the variance of the process, or 
changes in the conditional variance var(XI IXI_j ,j >0) given a constant variance. Simulations 
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(Taylor, 1984) based upon these propositions indicate that the order of magnitudes observed 
here among the autocorrelation variance coefficients are consistent with the second view. 
Several studies (e.g. Granger and Morgenstern (1970), Clark (1973) and Tauchen and Pitts 
(1983)) have linked conditional standard deviations to trading volume. These models may be 
written in the form 
X t = f.! + et 
et = Vt V t 
(5.9) 
with {Vt } a standardized process having zero mean and unit vanance for all t, and {VI}' 
representing volatility, a process of positive random variables usually having var(XI Iv/) = v/ 
Stationary models for the standard deviation process have been developed by, for example Tay-
lor (1982a) and Engle (1982). In the former model changes in conditional variance are driven 
by economic forces independent of the market. One innovation drives the level of trading 
activity, determining V t which are assumed to be autocorrelated while, independently, the inno-
vation {Vt } determines the price response. In the second model, conditional variances are 
driven by the past history of returns, and hence are called autoregressive conditional heteros-
cedasticity (ARCH) models. 8 
It can be shown, (Taylor (1984), p.303), that the autocorrelation variances for both these 
processes can be arbitrarily large and as '"' increases decay towards zero. If the problem is a 
changing conditional variance, then the solution is to construct a series with a reasonably 
homogeneous conditional variance. 
Rescaled Returns and Autocorrelation Analysis 
Such a series could be given by 
(5.10) 
which will be called the rescaled returns series. It will be similar to the unobservable 
8 ARCH models are considered in greater detail in chapter seven as plausible models for spot interest 
rates processes. 
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standardized return ut = (xt -1l)/vt whenever the estimates of mean and variance are good. 
Forecasts of Vt can be obtained from the non-linear models described above. However, 
there may be occasions when the assumption of stationarity in these models is not appropriate. 
Any change in unconditional variances that could cause non-stationarity implies that it would 
be preferable to have a variance forecasting method that will reflect this change quickly and 
accurately. An exponentially-weighted moving average (EWMA) forecast achieves this by 
assigning most weight to recent observations. We now summarize the principal arguments of 
this method (Taylor and Kingsman, 1979). 
The main idea is to use past observed returns to estimate the current level of the V-
process, working from the results that E(VI ) equals IXI-Ill/b, with b=E lUll. A past return XI_P 
s >0, gives the crude estimate IXI -x lib for VI - S • Exponentially weighted averages of these esti-
mates provide improved estimates of the VI if the V-process is changing slowly.9 Thus consider 
the estimates 
00 
VI = YL(1-y)S Ixt-xl/b (5.11) 
s=o 
= (1-Y)VI -l + ylxt-xl/b 
To implement (5.11), we use y=0.04 based on the results of extensive back-optimizing (see 
Taylor (1986), p.112, table 4.2).10 Making the assumption that the returns have conditional 
normal distributions (see section 5.3), b is approximately equal to 0.798. An initial estimate V21 
20 
is calculated from the first twenty returns using 1.253 L IXt -x 1120 . 
t=1 
The benefits from rescaling can be appreciated when the variances of the autocorrelations 
coefficients for the rescaled returns are calculated. The estimated variances of the autocorrela-
9 Evidence in Taylor (1986) based on modelling the two conditional variance processes mentioned 
above for series of share prices, commodity prices and commodity and currency futures prices suggested 
that conditional variances change slowly. 
10 I have experimented with the range of optimal y values for the different series studied in Taylor 
(1986). The effects are negligible. 
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tion coefficients for returns {XI} were obtained by assuming the multivariate symmetry 
hypothesis Hs· When Hs is true for {XI} it will also be true for the process {YI } generating the 
rescaled returns (Y/}, if we ignore the difference between x and Jl. This follows directly from 
the definition of VI as a function of past returns which does not depend on the sign of 
Xt-s-X,S>O. Hence, the estimate b; of n* [var(R.,Y)] is 
(5.12) 
where n * is (n -20) since the first twenty observations were used to initialize V. The right hand 
side of table 5.3 gives figures for b; for lags up to five, in the same manner as table 5.2. For 
all but the short maturity gilts, the value at lag one is less than unity, both in the periods 
before and after Big Bang. Thus conclusions of tests based upon the sampling properties of 
autocorrelation coefficients should be more reliable. Furthermore, we note that the kurtosis of 
the rescaled variables is generally less than that for the unscaled variables. Thus the main-
tained assumption of normality for the medium and long maturity gilts is not adversely affected 
by this transformation. 
Autocorrelation coefficients for the rescaled returns are given are given in the left-hand 
portion of table 5.3. 11 In general, the coefficient at lag one is greater in the period after Big 
Bang. This compares with the mixed result among unadjusted returns. Once more, all of the 
coefficients are positive but most are insignificantly different from zero. To summarize the 
coefficients to lag thirty, each is assigned to six classes in the same manner, and taking the 
same values, as the unadjusted returns. Before Big Bang nearly 15% of the coefficients were 
significant (columns headed with a # as with the unadjusted returns). After Big Bang, less than 
three percent were significant. There has been a considerable change to the number of 
11 Substantial autocorrelation cannot be induced by the rescaling transfonnation. The likely maximum 
autocorrelation so induced is less than 0.004 (see Taylor, 1980). 
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coefficients exceeding 0.01. Before Big Bang, 24% were in class (6) (see table 5.3) but around 
11 % were in the same range after the event. The values of the autocorrelation coefficients of 
the rescaled returns demonstrate that the Big Bang had a significant effect on the pattern and 
level of autocorrelation in the gilt-edged market, but that the magnitude of the impact is exag-
gerated if unadjusted returns are used. 
5.4.3. Price Trend Models 
A sensible alternative hypothesis to the random walk, which implies that information is rapidly 
reflected in prices, is one which captures the idea that prices do not adjust fully and instantane-
ously when new information becomes available. Instead some new informatiOlI is incorporated 
slowly into prices. Slow interpretation of a particular item of information will cause several 
returns to be partially determined by the same information. Thus we have a price-trend model 
(Taylor, 1980) given by 
Xl = Jll + el 
Jlt -jI = at (Jlt -l-jI)+11 t (5.13) 
E(et ) = 0, E(etet+i) = 0 (i #- 0), COY (JlS'e l ) = 0 (all s,t). 
We assume initially that the returns process has a constant variance, and denote var(e l ) by a;, 
var(Jlt) by aJ, and E (Jlt) by jI. The trend model is interpreted as follows. We assume that trend 
values are determined by the current information about demand and supply, (that is, some pro-
cess which is not interpreted as an inflation term or risk adjusted expected return, and which 
does not restrict Jlt to be non-negative). We also assume that information arrives randomly at 
the market. In the trend equation, 11t measures the impact of information on day t, and is 
assumed to be a series of identically distributed random variables having zero mean, with each 
11t independent of the past trend values {Jlt, all s<t}. at measures the importance of the past 
trend information in the determination of the current trend value. at are independent random 
variables, and at and 11s are independent for all s #-t. at is not independent of 11t. Also, 
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E (111 lal )=0 and, in general, var(l1t lUI) depends on U t • 
The random walk hypothesis says that P't, the theoretical autocorrelation function, is zero 
for all 'to The above returns equation has a theoretical autocorrelation function 
(5.14) 
For the trend model we have var(et ) = a;, var(llt) = a~, and cov(llt,llt+1:) = {E(ut)}'taJ, Thus 
denoting E (u t ) by p, and substituting these into (4.6) we obtain, 
P't = p'ta~/(a~ + a;) (5.15) 
Thus the coefficients depend on p, the speed at which imperfectly reflected information is 
incorporated into prices, and the ratio aJ/a; = R alone. They are all positive and small if R «1. 
The values decline slowly if p is close to unity. Thus trends cause positive autocorrelations, 
and the effect of current information which is not fully reflected in the current price, upon 
future returns, diminishes as time goes on. Thus we define the "price-trend hypothesis" as 
Ha : P't = A p't, (5.16) 
for some A >0, and O<p<l, for all 't>0. These autocorrelations can be shown to be those of an 
ARMA(1,l) process where the moving average coefficient is chosen to be the solution of a 
quadratic equation involving p and A (see e.g. Taylor (1980), p.343-344) 
The trend model can incorporate a stochastic volatility term, as shown by Taylor (1986, 
p.79-83). In one model, the stochastic volatility effects are confined to the innovations term 
Ut , while the other supposes that Ilt-jI and Ut are multiples of a common volatility Vt • How-
ever, in either case, if all processes are stationary then the autocorrelations of Xt are still A p't 
or very similar, which does not affect the results of the test to be described below. 
5.4.4. Testing the Random Walk Hypothesis 
Many random walk tests have been based upon autocorrelation coefficients calculated from 
returns (see e.g. the U.K. studies mentioned earlier) and can be criticised for being incorrect as 
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they assume sampling properties about the autocorrelation coefficients which are likely to be 
unrealistic. However, if we use instead the autocorrelation coefficients calculated from rescaled 
returns, we cannot be similarly at fault. Unfortunately, these tests have also been criticised for 
having low power even, more recently, against plausible alternative hypotheses (see e.g. Sum-
mers, 1983). However, in this paper we outline a test developed by Taylor (l982b) which is 
powerful against the alternative hypothesis of the price trend model described above. These 
tests are described below and the results are given in table 5.4. As with the earlier tables, the 
figures for the period before Big Bang sit directly above those for the period after Big Bang. 
Critical values for each statistic are given at the top of each table: the null hypothesis is 
rejected for figures in excess of the critical values. 
A simple test uses the first autocorrelation coefficient. It applies the result ...JnR 1'" N (0,1), 
approximately, when H 0 is true, and rejects the null hypothesis at the 5% level of significance 
if .y;;*lrl,y 1>1.96. This test is both logical and powerful if dependence is expected to be 
between consecutive returns. An alternative method to examine the coefficients collectively is 
the Box-Pierce (1970) statistic 
k 
Qk = n L r; (5.17) 
't=l 
which is approximately xl when H 0 is true and given the assumed independence of the R's. 
The statistic is calculated for k = 1 0 , 30 ,and 50. 
By examining the figures in the four appropriate columns of table 5.4, we can see that, 
firstly, in most of the short maturity gilts, there has been a substantial drop in the size of the 
first order autocorrelation, enough to alter the significance of the coefficient on the shortest 
maturity security. Secondly, although there has appeared to be a rise in nearly all coefficients 
on longer maturity gilts, it has not been of a size to send all but a handful of coefficients from 
their insignificant state before Big Bang into a state of being statistically different from zero 
afterwards. So in general, the magnitude of first order autocorrelation seems to have remained 
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on balance insignificant. This pattern is not however repeated in the consideration of 
coefficients to higher lags. Virtually all the gilts have experienced a fall in the level of auto-
correlation when considering lags up to 10, with 90% transferring from the significant to 
insignificant regions. Up to lag 30, over 90% have experienced a fall in the level of autocorre-
lations, with over 70% moving from the region of significance to insignificance. To lag 50, still 
some 80% saw a decline in the level of autocorrelation, but now only a quarter moved from 
significance to insignificance. This latter statistic is not contradictory, for the remainder have 
stayed as they were prior to Big Bang, insignificant. So, in summary, there has been a dramatic 
fall in the level and reduction in the significance of autocorrelation as a result of Big Bang. 
An alternative to studying autocorrelations is spectral analysis. This is particularly 
appropriate when cycles in returns are the alternative hypothesis to random behaviour. Spectral 
theory relevant to economic studies is described by Granger and Newbold (1977, Ch.2). The 
spectral density function for a stationary process can be defined as 
S(OO)=02/(21t)[1+2 i: p. COS(-coo)] 
't=l 
(5.18) 
with 0 2= var(Xt ). The integral of s (00) from 0 to 21t equals 0 2 and S (oo)=s (21t-00), so it is only 
necessary to consider the frequency range 0 to 1t. If the random walk hypothesis is true, S (00) 
will be constant for all 00. So to test Howe need to estimate s (00) and test for a constant spec-
tral density. 
Estimates of f (oo)=21tS (00)/02 have the general form 
M-l ! (00) = 1 + 2 L 'l'tr ~os (-coo) (5.19) 
't=l 
with positive and monotonically decreasing 'l't ensuring consistent estimates. The 'l't 'lag win-
dow generators' are defined, for fixed M by (Parzen, 1961) 
'1'. = 1 - 6-c2(M-T)/M3 
2(M _-C)3 
= M3 
0< T::;; M /2 
M /2::;; -c < M. (5.20) 
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Spectral estimates are calculated using M =100. Praetz(1979) has shown that f (001) and f (C1}z) 
are correlated estimates only if 1001-0021 ~ 3n1M. Hence tests are based on f (00) evaluated for 
m=O,4nIM ,8n1M , ... ,pi, giving l+M 14 potential statistics. These statistics can be standardized 
using the asymptotic theory for sample autocorrelations to give 
Ij ~ (f (4j1tlM)-11/~ 4 ~ [A.,cos(4j~1tIM )]'In (5.21) 
for j =0,1 , ... ,M 14. The f j are effectively independent observations from N (0,1) for large sample 
sizes n when H 0 is true. The most plausible cycle is one week, <o=2nl5 and the standardized 
spectral statistic is fj' j =M 110. This test statistic is denoted f w in table 5.4 and is a one-tailed 
test. 
The results of this test indicate that there was no evidence of any weekly cycles in the 
gilt-edged market. Big Bang did not need to rectify an anomaly in this instance, though for 
about a quarter of the series, the statistic moved further into the region of insignificance. 
As returns may have a non-normal and perhaps non-stationary distribution, non-
parametric tests could be more appropriate. 12 The only such test used to date is the runs test. A 
positive [no change] [negative] run is a sequence of positive [zero] [negative] returns. Let xt* be 
1,0,-1 for positive, zero, or negative Xt • Also let h{ be 0 if x{* =X{*+l and 1 otherwise. Then h{ =1 
signifies that X{+l begins a new run and so the total number of runs of all types is 
n-l 
H=l+Lh{ (5.22) 
{=l 
Suppose there are n 1 positive returns, n2 zero returns, and n3 negative returns in the 
series. Then the mean and variance of the variable if generating H, conditional upon n j,n2, and 
E[if] = n+1-[D/ln] 
12 This test is particularly appropriate for short maturity gilts where the hypothesis of normality was re-
jected (see section 5.3). 
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and 
var (if) = { D ltD l +n +n 2)_ 2n D;' -n 3}(n 3 -n ) (5.23) 
when H ~ is true, summing over j = 1,2,3 (Mood,1940). This null hypothesis H ~ is that the XI* 
are generated by a strict white noise process {Xl*}' It is usually assumed that there is no practi-
cal difference between H 0 and H ~ . For large n, H is approximately normal so tests can use 
K =(H -E [H ])/-/var (H) (5.24) 
rejecting H~ ( and H 0) at the 5% level if IK 1>1.96. The advantage of this form of test is the 
avoidance of problems arising from variance changes. However, it has low power and thin 
trading can cause several no change runs. The latter may be responsible for less total runs than 
expected thereby refuting independence ( and H~) but not the RWH (H 0)' 
The runs test (column headed K in table 5.4) in general shows no significant evidence of 
runs in the market either before or after Big Bang. A few short maturity gilts have seen a 
transfer into the region of significance, but not very far into it, while for the rest of the market, 
the evidence is is less weak after Big Bang. However, runs tests are subject to the thin trading 
problems described earlier and these could account for the results. However, applying the tests 
to market indexes does not change the result in support of the random walk hypothesis. It is 
more likely, therefore, that the runs test is picking up the change in the distribution of the short 
rates after Big Bang, as described in section 5.3. 
An alternative non-parametric test, due to Durbin (1967) uses the cumulated periodgram 
(proportionate to the sample spectral density).If the theoretical spectral density function for 
strict white noise is horizontal, then the cumulated periodgram is the line with coordinates 
u ,j 1M), with j and M being defined earlier. A Kolmogorov - Smirnov type test may then be 
carried out upon the maximum deviation of the sample cumulated periodgram and the line. 13 
The results of this test unanimously enforce those of the parametric spectral tests, and are not 
13 Other Kolmogorov-Smimov type tests are discussed in greater detail in section 5.3, earlier. 
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reported in the results table 5.4. 
By considering the likelihood ratio statistic for tests of H ° (the random walk hypothesis 
of zero autocorrelation) against Ha (the price trend hypothesis), using as "data" the series of 
sample autocorrelation coefficients (r't), Taylor (1 982b ) has shown that a suitable set of statis-
tics for acc!... dtely recorded prices is given by 
(0<<1><1). (5.25) 
These statistics use the fact that in Ha the sample autocorrelation coefficients have monotoni-
cally decreasing positive expectations. Errors in price series decrease r 1, since an error in price 
at time t causes errors in the returns at both time t and time t+1, one positive and one nega-
tive. As test power can be lost because of errors in the data, a better set of test statistics is, in 
practice, 
(0<<»< 1). (5.26) 
It is necessary to chose k ,<» and the significance level prior to performing the test. Taylor's 
opinions derived from work on commodity prices (1978), were used in a selection procedure 
which culminated in the recommendations k=30 and <»=0.92 (Taylor, 1982b). These figures are 
still recommended (Taylor, 1986) for all speculative prices. 
For a constant variance random walk, ..Jll r 1 has asymptotic distribution N (0,1) and, for all 
't*S, r't and rs are asymptotically independent (Anderson and Walker, 1964). Therefore when 
H ° is true, 
30 
u* = U 30,0.92/(LO.922,'tn-l)V2 
1:=2 
30 
U* = 0.4649..Jn LO.92'tr 't 
1:=2 
(5.27) 
is asymptotically distributed as N (0, 1). The test is one tailed rejecting H ° when U* exceeds a 
critical value determined by the significance level. The incorporation of asymptotic sample pro-
perties of the autocorrelation coefficients into the construction of these tests means that it is 
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essential that these tests are carried out using the rescaled returns. 
The tests against the price trend alternative are not only the most powerful but also pro-
vide the clearest picture of the impact of Big Bang. The two autocorrelation tests T* and U* 
(labelled as such in table 5.4) in every case show a significant movement against rejecting the 
random walk hypothesis after Big Bang. In one third of the cases the series had significant U* 
statistics before Big Bang and insignificant ones afterwards. 
There will be a single thin peak at (0:::0 in the spectral density function if a:::1 and the 
price trend hypothesis is true. This fact has been used to develop a powerful spectral tests 
against the alternative of a price trend (see Taylor, 1986 p.143-5). Except in a few stocks of 
either extremely long or extremely short maturity, this spectral statistic f 0 shows that the evi-
dence in favour of the price trend hypothesis is reduced after Big Bang, though in all cases, at 
the 5% level the null hypothesis of a random walk is rejected. 
5.4.5. The Implications for Market Efficiency 
As Taylor (1986, p.161-163) has shown, the U* statistic can be modified to test the null 
hypothesis of market efficiency against the alternative hypothesis of a price trend. This recog-
nizes that the trend tenn Ill' which is the non-random component of the daily returns in equa-
tion (5.13) - the price trend model, could be interpreted as a time-varying risk premium. It can 
be shown that if the tenn III is a time varying risk premium then an upper bound on the auto-
correlations of returns in an efficient market can be detennined. This bound is given by the 
ratio of the variance of the risk premium to the variance of the returns. By adjusting each 
autocorrelation coefficient by this upper bound value, p * , i.e. 
30 
U ;MH = 0.4649 rn LO. 92'rcr 't - P *) , (5.28) 
't=2 
the U* test has, as the null hypothesis, the efficient markets hypothesis rather than the random 
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walk hypothesis. 
Now, let us suppose that the absolute premium over the sample is less than 20%, which is 
intended to generous. Hence, daily, Ij.l/l < 0.20/252 = 0.0007. Assuming III has a uniform distri-
bution over the range -0.0007 to 0.0007 gives var(j.l/) = (0.0014)2/12 = 1.63 x 10-7• This is very 
small with respect to the variance of the returns (a typical value from table 5.1 is 0.005), and 
hence the upper bound is likely to take a very small value relative to the autocorrelations, 
(approximately 3.26 x 10-5). 
So, given the strength of the results for tests of the effects of Big Bang assuming a null 
hypothesis of the random walk, it is very unlikely that they could be called into question if the 
null hypothesis is changed to the efficient markets hypothesis. Thus the Big Bang is deemed to 
have created a greater level of informational-efficiency in the gilt-edged market than had pre-
vailed beforehand. 
5.5. Summary and Conclusion 
This chapter sought to establish the impact of market deregulation on informational efficiency 
in the gilt-edged market, using a traditional framework, yet adopting recent developments in 
the available methodology. The development of the traditional framework for testing market 
efficiency was analyzed and the strengths and weaknesses drawn out. One principal weakness 
was that certain tests made assumptions about the distribution of sample retunis that were not 
confirmed or simply not true. An analysis of the distribution of returns was conducted to 
prevent the use of inappropriate test statistics. It was found that the distribution of returns was 
insignificantly different from a normal distribution, excepting very short maturity gilts, and that 
the returns distribution had not changed significantly after Big Bang. These results formed the 
basis for the maintained hypotheses for the subsequent work; that is, returns closely approxi-
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mate a nonnally distributed stationary process. This reasonable assumption increases the power 
of subsequent tests of the random walk and market efficiency hypotheses. However, steps are 
still taken to ensure that these tests are as powerful as possible; this involved analysing the dis-
tributional properties of the sample autocorrelations. Using this technique and other powerful 
tests, including using an explicit alternative hypothesis which reflected market inefficiencies, it 
was found that the gilt-edged market experienced a significant fall in the level of infonnational 
inefficiencies. For all long dated and most medium dated stocks, a hypothesis of market 
efficiency could not be rejected after Big Bang. 
However, the alternative hypothesis used in this chapter is just one of many alternative 
hypotheses. Thus despite all the steps taken to make the power of the tests in this chapter as 
strong as possible, it is still possible that there may exist stronger tests. The development of 
further tests forms the basis of the next three chapters. The ultimate aim being to verify the 
preliminary result from this chapter concerning market efficiency and the impact upon it of the 
Big Bang in the gilt-edged market. 
-119-
TABLE5.l 
SUMMARY STATISTICS 
"Shorts" 
SERIES n 10"x l()2s >2 >3 >4 Skew. Kun. KSI MW KS2 
EX88 251 -0.20 0.20 14 6 1 0.41 6.16 0.000 
0.207 0.000 
246 0.45 0.09 16 5 1 0.10 6.36 0.000 
TR89 251 -0.64 0.26 18 5 - 0.34 5.47 0.029 
0.233 0.003 
246 0.40 0.16 12 4 1 0.02' "'5~97 "0.026 
TI0H 251 -0.36 0.31 17 6 - 0.20 5.29 0.012 
0.196 0.010 
246 0.72 0.18 14 4 
- -0.23 5.50 0.006 
EX 10 251 -0.28 0.30 15 5 - 0.46 5.24 0.003 
0.152 0.018 
246 0.91 0.19 13 4 
- -0.14 4.93 0.032 
EX 11 251 -0.52 0.30 15 5 - 0.26 4.86 0.001 
0.148 0.008 
246 0.67 0.19 13 4 
- -0.02 4.59 0.024 
T13 251 -1.19 0.32 16 1 - 0.11 5.00 0.010 
0.181 0.062 
246 0.24 0.24 14 2 - -0.27 4.34 0.047 
EX90 251 -0.55 0.33 17 6 - 0.32 5.41 0.002 
0.157 0.095 
246 0.67 0.26 12 2 - -0.22 4.30 0.045 
E12H 251 -0.97 0.33 17 3 - 0.24 4.57 0.009 
0.223 0.154 
246 0.34 0.25 13 2 - -0.20 4.17 0.078 
"Short/Mediums" 
1'91 251 -0.76 0.35 15 3 - 0.20 4.57 0.045 
0.237 0.166 
246 0.68 0.29 12 3 - -0.21 4.87 0.031 
EX91 251 -0.66 0.42 16 - - -0.02 3.77 0.152 
0.536 0.101 
246 1.01 0.32 13 - - -0.15 4.49 0.074 
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SUMMARY STATISTICS (conL) 
"Short/Mediums" (conL) 
SERIES n 1()4.i lQ2s >2 >3 >4 Skew. Kurt KSI MW KS2 
T12T 251 -0.98 0.44 14 2 
- 0.01 4.35 0.193 
0.474 0.106 
246 0.71 0.37 14 3 1 0.07 5.66 0.030 
T10 251 -0.71 0.47 17 2 - 0.00 3.60 0.201 
0.427 0.193 
246 1.47 0.39 10 4 
- -0.24 4.68 0.091 
EX92 251 -0.89 0.46 16 3 
-
_--0.25 __ 4.11 .0.162 
0.456 0.078 
246 0.99 0.39 13 4 1 -0.17 5.05 0.120 
E92 251 -0.98 0.45 14 3 - -0.10 4.18 0.237 
0.394 0.058 
246 0.81 0.38 15 5 1 -0.17 5.11 0.068 
"Mediums" 
T93 251 -0.88 0.48 14 1 
- -0.01 3.73 0.613 
0.515 0.045 
246 0.96 0.39 11 5 1 -0.30 5.33 0.030 
T13T 251 -1.13 0.46 13 4 - -0.02 4.44 0.257 
0.352 0.116 
246 0.75 0.40 13 3 - -0.28 4.70 0.032 
T14H 251 -1.08 0.44 15 4 - -0.04 4.19 0.255 
0.447 0.118 
246 0.60 0.39 12 4 - -0.28 4.42 0.110 
E94 251 -1.02 0.47 14 3 - -0.01 3.87 0.376 
0.366 0.175 
246 0.86 0.42 14 4 - -0.37 4.26 0.046 
EX94 251 -0.93 0.49 14 4 - 0.00 4.08 0.174 
0.421 0.396 
246 1.04 0.44 13 4 - -0.43 4.93 0.129 
TR12 251 -0.73 0.50 14 2 - 0.00 3.77 0.508 
0.572 0.118 
246 0.94 0.47 14 4 - -0.35 4.78 0.048 
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SUMMARY STATISTICS (conL) 
"Mediums" (COOL) 
SERIES n 10".i 102s >2 >3 >4 Skew. Kun. KSI MW KS2 
T95 251 -0.81 0.49 14 3 
- -0.16 4.22 0.309 
0.548 0.177 
246 0.84 0.46 15 4 
-
-0.40 4.98 0.016 
TR96 251 -1.01 0.47 16 3 - -0.09 4.07 0.114 
0.442 0.152 
246 0.79 0.44 15 3 
- -0.33 4.65 0.112 
T15Q 251 -1.19 0.47 14 1 
_ .. - . 0.05 _ .. 3.70 . 0.315 
0.498 0.343 
246 0.85 0.44 15 3 
- -0.31 4.39 0.149 
EX96 251 -1.08 0.51 14 1 
- 0.07 3.78 0.160 
0.462 0.260 
246 0.93 0.47 15 3 - -0.43 4.51 0.042 
T97 251 -0.10 0.52 17 1 
-
0.16 3.76 0.311 
0.444 0.204 
246 0.96 0.48 15 3 - -0.39 4.58 0.008 
EX15 251 -1.14 O.SO 12 2 
- -0.02 3.65 0.377 
0.487 0.372 
246 0.92 0.47 16 4 - -0.35 4.59 0.090 
T15H 251 -1.04 0.49 14 2 - 0.08 3.75 0.324 
0.350 0.336 
246 0.84 0.47 14 3 - -0.49 4.62 0.063 
EX98 251 -0.95 0.58 14 2 - 0.11 3.62 0.345 
O.SOI 0.594 
246 0.90 0.56 16 4 - -0.28 4.93 0.121 
EX99 251 -0.95 0.57 14 1 - 0.09 3.85 0.412 
0.515 0.545 
246 0.96 0.54 16 1 - -0.44 4.72 0.000 
TR13 251 -2.36 0.66 9 2 4 -1.83 18.33 0.021 
0.576 0.398 
246 0.93 0.54 14 3 - -0.36 4.57 0.024 
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SUMMARY STATISTICS (conL) 
"Medium/Longs" 
SERIES n l()4x 102s >2 >3 >4 Skew. Kurt. KSI MW KS2 
TOI 251 -0.88 0.54 11 3 
- 0.16 4.13 0.088 
0.493 0.385 
246 0.83 0.51 14 3 
- -0.50 4.65 0.129 
EX02 251 -2.30 0.67 9 2 3 -1.76 17.38 0.045 
0.483 0.461 
246 1.03 0.55 13 3 
- -0.45 4.30 0.090 
"Longs" 
.. 
T03 251 -2.39 0.65 11 2 5 -2.48 24.94 0.011 
0.574 0.753 
246 1.00 0.56 13 3 1 -0.02 5.87 0.087 
Tl1H 251 -1.49 0.72 12 2 4 -1.48 14.48 0.062 
0.539 0.735 
246 1.11 0.62 12 4 -0.52 4.66 0.123 
TRlO 251 -0.62 0.62 10 1 
- 0.23 3.92 0.174 
0.391 0.184 
246 1.46 0.63 12 3 
-
-0.36 4.01 0.202 
EX05 251 -0.88 0.61 15 1 1 0.37 4.11 0.116 
0.333 0.466 
246 3.16 0.68 13 3 - 0.32 6.22 0.261 
T12H 251 -0.97 0.61 13 2 - 0.24 3.88 0.213 
0.383 0.266 
246 1.10 0.62 12 3 - -0.37 4.48 0.123 
Tl1T 251 -0.90 0.65 14 2 - 0.15 3.78 0.194 
0.389 0.0376 
246 1.19 0.64 13 3 - -0.36 4.56 0.136 
T13H 251 -0.24 0.60 13 2 - 0.17 3.81 0.260 
0.380 0.510 
246 1.19 0.61 15 3 - -0.32 4.41 0.100 
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SUMMARY STATISTICS (coot) 
"Indexes" 
INDEX 0 l()4x 102s >2 >3 >4 Skew. Kurt. KSI MW KS2 
FfAGOV 251 -0.79 0.43 13 2 1 -0.449 4.752 0.421 
"All stocks" 0.553 0.800 
244 0.86 0.44 12 2 1 -0.631 4.769 0.133 
FfAGOV 251 -0.13 0.22 12 2 2 -0.705 6.345 0.059 
"0-5 years" 0.620 0.823 
244 0.38 0.20 14 3 1 -0.629 5.316 0.138 
FfAGOV 251 -0.98 0.52 14 2 1 -0.438. 4.585 0.389 
"5-15 years" 0.554 0.742 
244 1.10 0.51 13 2 - -0.588 4.612 0.151 
FfAGOV 251 -0.88 0.65 16 1 
-
-0.219 3.865 0.399 
">15 years" 0.619 0.794 
244 1.16 0.69 10 3 1 -0.494 4.225 0.350 
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TABLE 5.2 
RETURNS 
"Shons" 
AUTOCORRELATIONSOFRETURNS AUTOCORRELATION VARIANCES 
SERIES Lag 1 Lags 1-30, frequency by class· Estimates b't from returns X, at lag 
T1,x #1 1 2 3 4 5 6 #6 1 2 3 4 5 
EX88 0.155 
- 0 1 7 8 8 6 (4) 1.72 1.74 0.96 1.27 1.25 
0.127 
- 0 3 4 12 8 3 (2) 0.71 1.12 0.91 0.69 1.04 
TR89 0.145 
- 0 2 5 8 7 8 (4) 1.62 1.60 "1.05 1.36 1.57 
0.114 
- 0 2 7 13 6 2 - 1.12 0.95 0.99 0.62 0.92 
TIOH 0.040 
- 0 2 4 12 10 2 (1) 1.72 1.25 1.50 1.33 1.51 
0.089 
- 1 2 6 13 7 1 - 1.24 0.95 1.04 0.71 1.02 
EX 10 0.103 
- 1 2 4 6 11 6 (3) 1.41 1.07 1.07 1.55 1.14 
0.124 - 1 1 9 11 6 2 - 1.15 1.15 1.01 0.67 1.05 
EX 11 0.103 
- 0 2 4 8 8 8 (4) 1.49 1.23 1.24 1.56 1.20 
0.096 
- 2 1 7 9 10 1 - 1.00 1.02 1.08 0.65 0.95 
T13C 0.123 (1) 1 1 4 9 6 9 (4) 1.56 1.07 1.14 1.38 1.19 
0.002 
- 0 2 8 11 9 0 - 1.12 1.14 1.03 0.70 1.05 
EX90 0.084 
- 1 2 2 8 11 6 (4) 1.50 1.28 1.16 1.25 1.05 
0.007 - 0 3 9 10 8 0 - 0.99 1.17 1.09 0.69 0.95 
E12H 0.102 
- 0 2 3 8 10 7 (4) 1.42 1.15 1.11 1.28 1.16 
0.037 
- 0 2 8 10 10 0 - 0.98 1.06 1.56 0.70 0.97 
" ShortlMediums" 
T91C 0.150 
- 0 2 4 4 11 9 (5) 1.37 1.18 1.47 1.26 1.35 
0.082 
- 1 1 4 17 6 1 - 0.83 0.92 1.14 0.84 0.92 
EX91 0.068 - 0 1 6 7 9 7 (3) 1.32 1.24 1.70 1.29 1.60 
0.105 - 2 0 8 10 6 4 - 0.85 0.85 1.17 0.88 0.89 
T12T 0.042 - 0 2 6 7 11 4 (3) 1.16 1.21 1.79 1.20 1.52 
-0.029 - 1 3 7 12 6 1 (1) 1.13 0.78 1.02 0.67 0.71 
TIOC 0.012 - 0 0 6 10 8 6 (2) 1.32 1.31 1.53 1.36 1.50 
0.014 - 2 0 9 14 3 2 (1) 0.92 0.93 1.39 0.97 0.98 
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RETIJRNS 
"SbonJMediums" (COOL) 
AUTOCORRELATIONSOFRETIJRNS AUTOCORRELATION VARIANCES 
SERIES Lag 1 Lags 1-30, frequency by class· Estimates b't from returns X, at lag 
rl.x #1 1 2 3 4 5 6 #6 1 2 3 4 5 
EX92 0.036 
- 0 2 5 8 9 6 (3) 1.32 1.30 1.66 1.61 1.59 
0.060 - 1 1 8 10 9 1 
- 0.76 0.69 1.35 0.93 0.87 
E92C 0.026 
- 0 0 7 9 9 5 (2) 1.19 1.18 1.73 1.53 1.54 
0.046 
- 1 1 9 12 6 1 (1) 0.69 0.78 1.22 0.95 0.91 
"Mediums" 
T93C 0.038 - 0 0 8 6 9 7 (3) 1.10 1.12 1.55 1.11 1.47 
0.095 (1) 1 1 8 9 10 1 
- 0.85 0.80 1.35 1.04 1.01 
T13T 0.075 
- 0 2 3 9 5 11 (4) 1.09 1.17 1.71 1.28 1.32 
0.071 
- 0 2 7 11 . 10 0 
- 0.87 0.78 1.28 0.92 0.94 
T14H 0.073 - 0 0 4 10 5 11 (5) 1.23 1.08 1.79 1.23 1.37 
0.113 
- 0 2 8 11 8 1 - 0.84 0.81 1.14 1.07 0.93 
E94C 0.061 
- 0 1 4 7 10 8 (6) 1.21 1.12 1.72 1.19 1.37 
0.083 - 1 2 6 10 8 3 - 0.91 0.89 1.13 1.14 0.86 
EX94 0.057 - 0 2 4 8 8 8 (5) 1.16 1.11 1.58 1.15 1.36 
0.100 
- 1 1 7 12 7 2 - 0.76 0.75 1.33 1.06 0.82 
TR12 0.084 - 0 1 4 11 8 6 (3) 1.14 1.16 1.64 1.11 1.43 
0.084 - 1 2 8 9 9 1 - 0.69 0.77 1.22 1.07 0.85 
T95C 0.044 - 0 0 7 8 8 7 (6) 1.34 1.16 1.85 1.23 1.40 
0.087 - 1 2 6 10 9 2 - 0.83 0.70 1.46 1.07 0.92 
TR96 0.040 - 0 0 4 10 7 9 (6) 1.32 1.05 1.74 1.19 1.23 
0.124 - 1 1 5 11 11 1 - 0.83 0.76 1.13 1.15 0.96 
T15Q 0.091 - 0 0 7 6 8 9 (8) 1.15 1.26 1.50 1.13 1.59 
0.129 - 0 2 7 10 10 1 (1) 0.86 0.77 1.09 0.95 1.01 
EX96 0.044 - 0 0 7 9 5 9 (6) 1.07 1.24 1.33 1.14 1.49 
0.090 - 0 2 8 13 6 1 - 0.71 0.77 1.20 1.52 0.76 
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RETURNS 
"Mediums" (cont) 
AUTOCORRELATIONSOFRETURNS AUTOCORRELATION VARIANCES 
SERIES Lag 1 Lags 1-30. frequency by class· Estimates b't from returns X, at lag 
rl.¥ #1 1 2 3 4 5 6 #6 1 2 3 4 5 
T97C 0.041 
-
0 1 4 11 3 11 (3) 1.00 1.07 1.41 1.34 1.24 
0.090 - 0 2 7 10 10 1 
- 0.79 0.73 1.25 0.94 0.88 
EX15 0.059 
- 0 0 5 10 4 11 (7) 1.09 1.25 1.73 1.21 1.43 
0.119 
- 1 2 5 12 9 1 
- 0.83 o.n 1.20 1.12 0.98 
T15H 0.082 - 0 1 3 9 6 11 (5) 1.19 1.15 1.42 1.20 1.35 
0.126 - 1 1 5 14 8 1 (1) 0.80 0.79 1.26 1.08 0.93 
EX98 0.045 
- 0 2 5 9 9 5 (2) 1.10 1.04 1.20 1.19 1.43 
0.083 - 1 2 7 14 5 1 - 0.68 0.64 139 1.13 0.91 
EX99 0.043 - 1 0 7 7 7 8 (3) 1.09 1.14 1.23 1.26 1.50 
0.095 
- 0 3 9 8 9 1 - 0.76 o.n 1.29 1.10 0.97 
TR13 0.073 
-
0 2 5 11 7 5 (2) 0.79 0.81 0.90 1.10 0.87 
0.093 (1) 1 2 7 10 8 2 
-
0.74 0.71 1.24 1.09 1.01 
"Mediums/Longs" 
TOIC 0.092 - 1 1 7 8 5 8 (6) 1.04 1.04 1.20 1.06 1.48 
0.116 - 1 1 8 10 9 1 - 0.70 0.70 1.35 1.01 0.99 
EX02 0.066 - 1 0 8 8 8 5 (2) 0.99 0.69 0.90 0.70 0.93 
0.083 
- 1 2 7 14 5 1 - 0.73 0.76 1.32 1.06 0.98 
"Longs" 
T03C 0.049 - 0 0 8 9 10 3 (2) 0.68 0.70 0.75 0.74 0.92 
0.050 (1) 1 1 10 7 11 0 - 0.74 0.64 1.16 1.05 0.90 
TllH -0.083 - 0 5 6 11 5 3 - 2.51 1.01 0.73 0.79 1.21 
-0.002 
-
2 2 8 11 5 2 - 0.91 0.68 1.43 1.69 0.96 
TRIO 0.047 - 0 2 6 12 5 5 (3) 1.19 1.06 1.27 1.17 1.66 
0.031 (1) 1 3 6 10 9 0 - 0.81 0.80 1.24 1.04 0.87 
EX05 0.054 - 0 1 5 13 5 6 (3) 1.24 1.10 1.08 1.17 1.73 
0.038 - 1 3 7 10 9 0 - 0.76 0.72 1.02 1.13 0.88 
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RETURNS 
"Longs" (cont.) 
AUTOCORRELATIONSOFRETURNS AUTOCORRELATION VARIANCES 
SERIES Lag 1 Lags 1-30, frequency by class· Estimates b't from returns X, 
rl,% #1 1 2 3 4 5 6 #6 1 2 3 4 5 
TI2H 0.077 
- 0 2 6 7 lO 5 (2) 1.24 1.24 1.28 1.16 1.62 
0.064 (1) 1 3 5 12 9 0 - 0.74 0.68 1.18 1.02 0.86 
T11T 0.049 - 0 2 8 7 6 7 (2) 1.14 l.16 1.13 1.16 l.54 
0.038 (1) 1 1 lO 11 5 2 
- 0.75 0.68 1.12 1.06 0.81 
T13H 0.080 
- 0 4 2 11 5 8 (5) 1.19 1.30 1.20 l.21 l.59 
0.074 (1) 1 3 7 12 7 0 
- 0.73 0.73 l.16 0.93 0.91 
"Indexes" 
FfGOVT 0.038 
- 0 0 11 6 6 7 (5) 1.65 0.95 l.28 1.20 l.18 
0.125 
-
1 4 4 8 12 1 
-
0.81 0.67 0.81 1.35 0.95 
FTAGOV 0.041 
- 0 2 5 lO 8 5 (5) 1.54 l.13 l.70 1.72 l.29 
"All Stocks" 0.057 (1) 1 4 6 6 12 1 
-
0.82 0.69 l.18 1.21 1.06 
FTAGOV 0.059 
-
0 3 2 11 10 4 (2) 1.48 lAS 1.35 1.37 1.10 
"0-5 years" -O'()07 
- 1 3 10 5 8 3 (1) 1.34 0.79 1.25 l.05 1.06 
FTAGOV 0.038 - 0 2 5 7 9 7 (5) 1.48 l.11 l.70 1.66 1.31 
"5-15 years" 0.076 (1) 1 3 6 8 lO 2 - 0.80 0.70 1.16 1.21 l.06 
FTAGOV 0.042 - 0 4 6 8 5 7 (4) 1.47 1.05 1.54 1.68 1.29 
">15 years" 0.013 - 1 5 6 8 lO 0 - 0.82 0.73 0.93 1.12 0.99 
• The six classes are (1) r<-O.l, (2) -O.lSr<-O.05, (3) -O.05Sr<O, (4) ~g).05, (5) O.05<r~O.1, (6) O.l<r. 
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TABLE 5.3 
RESCALED RESTURNS 
"Shorts" 
AUTOCORRELATIONS OF RETURNS AUTOCORRELATION VARIANCES 
SERIES Lag 1 Lags 1-30. frequency by class· Estimates b; from returns y, at lag 
rl,y #1 1 2 3 4 5 6 #6 1 2 3 4 5 
EX88 0.175 
- 0 2 5 9 8 6 (4) 1.65 1.95 0.94 1.49 0.97 
0.127 
- 0 3 1 12 8 6 (2) 0.49 1.04 0.95 0.61 1.16 
TR89 0.137 
- 0 0 8 8 7 7- (4) L49 -1.78 0.99 1.27 2.49 
0.107 
- 0 2 6 11 9 2 
- 0.88 0.87 1.04 0.54 0.82 
TI0H 0.043 
- 0 1 7 10 8 4 (3) 1.57 1.22 1.17 1.12 2.45 
0.118 
- 1 2 7 8 9 3 - 0.84 0.86 1.07 0.61 1.08 
EX 10 0.114 
-
0 2 4 8 9 7 (4) 1.52 1.18 0.85 1.39 1.04 
0.134 
-
0 2 4 13 9 2 (2) 0.80 1.01 1.00 0.62 1.02 
EX 11 0.114 
-
0 0 8 10 3 9 (4) 1.56 1.23 1.03 1.41 1.00 
0.098 
-
1 2 5 9 11 2 
-
0.70 0.89 0.96 0.61 0.84 
T13C 0.135 
-
0 1 6 9 6 8 (5) 1.65 1.07 0.99 1.19 1.11 
0.012 - 0 2 8 11 7 2 - 0.86 1.15 1.01 0.66 1.04 
EX90 0.095 
- 0 3 5 7 8 7 (4) 1.60 1.26 0.99 1.20 1.06 
0.030 - 0 5 4 11 8 2 - 0.70 1.10 1.00 0.76 1.00 
E12H 0.121 
-
1 1 4 12 4 8 (5) 1.56 1.24 1.00 1.25 0.99 
0.049 - 0 2 7 10 10 1 - 0.78 1.04 1.12 0.67 1.09 
"short/Mediums" 
T91C 0.175 - 0 1 6 10 6 7 (6) 1.24 1.20 1.61 1.23 1.07 
0.101 - 0 2 7 9 9 3 - 0.64 0.83 1.02 0.77 1.03 
EX91 0.105 - 0 1 3 12 8 6 (5) 1.08 1.05 1.62 1.17 1.20 
0.120 
-
1 1 6 12 5 5 (2) 0.72 0.80 1.05 0.84 0.94 
T12T 0.049 - 0 0 7 10 8 5 (5) 0.97 1.06 1.61 1.07 1.12 
0.057 - 1 3 5 10 8 3 (1) 0.69 0.84 1.10 0.74 0.84 
TIOC 0.035 - 0 0 4 13 7 6 (5) 0.99 1.09 1.42 1.22 1.23 
0.040 - 1 3 5 14 5 2 (2) 0.70 0.92 1.18 1.00 1.13 
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RESCALED RESTURNS 
"ShoIt/Mediums" (cont.) 
AurocO~TIONSOF~S AUTOCORRELATION VARIANCES 
SERIES Lag 1 Lags 1-30, frequency by class· Estimates b; from returns y, at lag 
rl,y #1 1 2 3 4 5 6 #6 1 2 3 4 5 
EX92 0.054 
- 0 2 6 8 8 6 (3) 1.()9 1.22 1.49 1.56 1.28 
0.067 - 1 3 5 10 9 2 
- 0.55 0.64 1.23 0.91 0.99 
E92C 0.030 
- 0 1 4 9 10 6 (4) 0.91 1.12 1.49 1.44 1.19 
0.049 
- 1 3 5 13 6 2 
- 0.49 0.73 1.08 0.95 1.02 
"Mediums" 
T93C 0.059 - 0 0 6 7 8 9 (7) 0.98 1.04 1.38 1.03 1.26 
0.103 (1) 1 1 5 11 7 5 
- 0.63 0.74 1.24 0.99 1.06 
T13T 0.091 
- 0 1 4 8 9 8 (5) 0.86 1.05 1.55 1.23 1.03 
0.088 - 0 2 6 9 10 3 - 0.75 0.75 1.18 0.89 0.98 
T14H 0.104 
-
0 0 3 11 8 8 (7) 0.95 1.00 1.63 1.06 1.17 
0.131 - 0 2 6 9 8 5 (2) 0.75 0.79 1.08 1.02 1.04 
E94C 0.072 - 0 2 2 11 8 7 (5) 0.99 1.06 1.58 1.09 1.15 
0.106 - 1 1 6 10 5 7 (1) 0.83 0.86 1.20 1.05 0.83 
EX94 0.089 
- 0 1 5 8 7 9 (5) 0.95 1.03 1.48 1.19 1.12 
0.118 - 0 4 6 10 5 5 (1) 0.71 0.75 1.36 0.95 0.78 
TR12 0.096 - 0 2 1 13 7 7 (7) 0.92 1.08 1.59 1.08 1.26 
0.094 - 0 2 7 10 8 3 (1) 0.64 0.75 1.26 0.95 0.84 
T95C 0.073 - 0 0 5 8 8 9 (6) 0.95 0.98 1.72 1.08 1.20 
0.107 - 0 3 6 7 8 6 - 0.74 0.76 1.99 0.92 0.95 
TR96 0.073 - 0 1 4 10 7 8 (6) 0.96 0.95 1.90 1.06 1.00 
0.145 - 1 1 7 8 9 4 (2) 0.78 0.74 1.21 0.98 1.00 
T15Q 0.119 - 0 2 2 8 8 10 (8) 1.04 1.13 1.37 1.10 1.38 
0.151 - 1 1 5 12 6 5 (2) 0.82 0.69 1.26 0.86 1.11 
EX96 0.080 - 0 1 3 11 6 9 (8) 0.88 1.13 1.22 1.07 1.26 
0.116 - 0 1 6 13 6 4 (1) 0.62 0.75 1.34 1.42 0.78 
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RESCALED RESTURNS 
"Mediums" (cont.) 
AUTOCORRELATIONSOFRETURNS AUTOCORRELATION VARIANCES 
SERIES Lag 1 Lags l-JO, frequency by class· Estimates b; from returns Yt at lag 
Tl,y #1 1 2 3 4 5 6 #6 1 2 3 4 S 
T97C 0.055 - 0 1 4 9 8 8 (5) 0.82 1.08 1.32 1.29 0.96 
0.105 - 0 2 6 8 11 3 (1) 0.74 0.76 1.38 0.75 0.87 
EX15 0.083 
- 0 1 2 11 5 11 (8) 0.89 1.11 1.55 1.06 1.24 
0.154 - 0 2 6 8 10 4 (1) 0.78 0.75 1.41 1.02 1.09 
-
T15H 0.105 - 0 1 4 7 7 11 (6) 0.93 1.09 1.24 1.10 1.20 
0.157 
- 1 1 4 11 9 4 (1) 0.73 0.73 1.55 0.95 0.95 
EX98 0.051 - 0 2 3 9 12 4 (4) 0.92 1.02 1.14 1.04 1.21 
0.100 - 0 2 6 10 9 3 (1) 0.62 0.62 1.60 1.12 0.93 
EX99 0.055 
-
0 2 6 6 9 7 (4) 0.94 1.12 1.16 1.10 1.22 
0.125 - 0 2 8 8 8 4 (2) 0.67 0.69 1.50 1.03 0.96 
TR13 0.075 - 0 1 4 13 9 3 - 0.60 0.61 0.92 0.99 0.39 
0.114 
- 0 2 8 7 8 5 (1) 0.66 0.69 1.43 1.01 0.99 
"Medium/Longs" 
T01C 0.081 
-
0 3 7 5 9 6 (3) 0.87 1.02 1.16 0.95 1.20 
0.135 - 1 1 5 11 9 3 (1) 0.64 0.68 1.54 0.96 1.01 
EX02 0.018 - 0 3 6 9 8 4 (1) 1.09 0.39 0.82 0.49 0.47 
0.093 - 1 1 7 11 7 3 - 0.65 0.80 1.56 0.97 1.06 
"Longs" 
T03C 0.016 
-
0 1 7 13 5 4 - 0.38 0.66 0.47 0.54 0.60 
0.067 - 1 2 8 5 9 5 (1) 0.64 0.61 1.28 0.99 0.94 
TllH -0.100 - 1 5 7 11 5 1 (1) 2.17 1.24 0.63 0.50 0.86 
0.020 - 1 3 4 9 9 4 - 0.83 0.69 1.66 1.79 0.94 
TRIO 0.036 - 0 1 7 10 6 6 (3) 1.04 0.94 1.13 1.05 1.45 
0.049 - 0 4 6 8 10 2 - 0.75 0.85 1.34 0.99 0.86 
EX05 0.051 - 0 2 3 11 10 4 (3) 0.99 1.04 1.00 0.99 1.40 
0.062 - 0 3 6 8 9 4 (1) 0.70 0.74 1.03 1.05 0.86 
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RESCALED RESTIJRNS 
"Longs" (cont) 
AUTOCORRELATIONSOFRETURNS AlITOCORRELATION VARIANCES 
SERIES Lag 1 Lags 1-30, frequency by class· Estimates b; from returns y, at lag 
rlJ' #1 1 2 3 4 5 6 #6 1 2 3 4 5 
T12H 0.073 - 0 1 5 8 9 7 (3) 1.00 1.17 1.19 0.99 1.29 
0.082 - 2 2 7 7 9 3 - 0.66 0.72 1.22 1.00 0.84 
T11T 0.046 - 0 2 7 7 7 7 (2) 0.99 1.09 1.06 1.04 1.29 
0.060 - 1 3 7 7 10 2 (1) 0.66 0.74 1.18 1.03 0.79 
.. 
T13H 0.076 - 0 2 4 6 9 9 (4) 0.99 1.10 1.08 0.95 1.54 
0.091 - 2 2 7 6 12 1 (1) 0.64 0.77 1.23 0.89 0.93 
"Indexes" 
FI'GOVT 0.054 - 0 1 10 4 6 9 (6) 1.18 0.99 1.14 0.98 1.13 
0.153 - 0 4 5 8 11 2 (2) 0.79 0.66 1.90 1.32 0.97 
FfAGOV 0.063 - 0 3 2 9 10 6 (5) 0.95 1.23 1.30 1.40 1.29 
"All Stocks" 0.080 - 1 3 5 8 10 3 (1) 0.81 0.77 1.15 1.07 1.07 
FfAGOV 0.062 - 1 3 5 5 11 5 (2) 0.99 1.38 0.97 1.26 1.28 
"0-5 years" 0.016 - 0 2 7 11 7 3 (2) 1.34 0.77 1.07 0.93 1.00 
FfAGOV 0.061 - 0 1 3 9 10 7 (5) 0.96 1.26 1.33 1.37 1.33 
"5-15 years" 0.096 (1) 1 4 4 8 10 3 - 0.80 0.79 1.23 1.04 1.09 
FfAGOV 0.046 - 0 3 6 10 6 5 (5) 0.93 1.16 1.27 1.32 1.21 
">15 years" 0.019 - 1 2 10 7 8 2 - 0.77 0.73 0.95 1.03 1.02 
• The six classes are (1) r<-O.l, (2) -O.1~r<-O.05, (3) -O.05~<O, (4) ~~O.05, (5) O.05<r~O.1, (6) O.l<r. 
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TABLE 5.4 
RANDOM WALK STATISTICS 
"Shons" 
SERIES 1'* If 
...r,;;-rl" QIO Q30 Qso /0 /0) K 
C.Val. 1.65 1.65 ±1.96 18.31 43.77 67.50 1.65 1.65 ±1.96 
EX88 4.73 4.01 2.65 30.08 44.40 51.50 3.40 -0.35 -4.03 
3.95 3.48 1.92 15.65 36.44 54.75 4.58 -0.56 -1.84 
TR89 5.40 4.98 2.08 36.62 50.14 58.10. 3.84 -0.78 -0.67 
2.75 2.30 1.60 9.70 19.88 41.18 3.42 -1.22 -1.72 
TIOH 3.80 3.85 0.65 24.93 37.00 47.67 2.91 -1.22 0.34 
2.77 2.26 1.77 12.28 27.49 48.87 3.41 -1.01 -3.33 
EX 10 4.81 4.48 1.74 31.68 43.94 55.11 3.54 -0.42 0.11 
3.02 2.43 2.01 12.15 24.69 45.53 3.74 -0.99 -2.63 
EXll 5.11 4.82 1.73 33.84 42.76 51.47 3.63 -0.40 -0.73 
3.12 2.77 1.48 12.22 27.58 50.19 3.87 -0.88 -2.46 
T13C 5.21 4.79 2.05 40.33 52.12 63.29 3.71 -0.03 0.04 
1.51 1.57 0.18 5.43 19.91 39.14 2.46 -0.94 -0.37 
EX90 4.66 4.45 1.45 34.33 46.47 56.30 3.25 -0.56 -0.85 
1.29 1.21 0.46 4.65 20.91 39.19 2.20 -1.11 0.04 
E12H 5.32 4.99 1.85 35.37 48.19 58.87 3.62 0.04 -0.71 
1.56 1.38 0.73 5.76 18.48 36.45 2.46 -0.86 -1.08 
"ShortlMediums" 
T91C 6.25 5.66 2.65 48.15 60.12 68.47 4.58 -1.23 -1.10 
2.16 1.70 1.51 6.38 22.83 42.59 2.99 -0.60 -1.24 
EX91 5.97 5.81 1.59 41.34 55.04 66.37 4.28 -1.03 -0.73 
2.64 2.09 1.81 10.18 32.16 54.34 3.39 -0.83 -0.49 
T12T 4.99 5.10 0.75 35.06 48.07 62.07 3.63 -1.13 -0.57 
1.66 1.43 0.86 7.24 28.43 50.16 2.45 -0.79 -0.40 
TIOC 5.53 5.79 0.53 35.81 47.94 55.14 4.07 -1.10 0.58 
1.52 1.40 0.60 5.11 22.41 44.10 2.35 -0.54 0.13 
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RANOOM WALK STATISTICS 
"Sbort/Mediums" (cont) 
SERIES T* u* ~rl.y QlO Q30 Qso /0 /0) K 
C.Val. 1.65 1.65 ±1.96 18.31 43.77 67.50 1.65 1.65 ±1.96 
EX92 4.88 4.95 0.83 34.00 46.14 56.68 3.50 -1.15 -0.25 
1.86 1.59 1.01 6.91 24.94 44.05 2.68 -0.74 -0.72 
E92C 5.17 5.44 0.45 30.93 45.44 54.64 3.65 -1.04 0.49 
1.96 1.82 0.73 6.86 26.59 45.27 2.79 -0.68 -0.34 
"Mediu!J.lS" 
_. ,-
T93C 5.97 6.11 0.89 36.17 53.93 64.68 4.21 -0.98 0.12 
2.71 2.29 1.54 10.63 30.65 52.57 3.52 -0.80 -1.64 
T13T 6.39 6.36 1.39 43.98 60.48 69.53 4.63 -0.84 -1.21 
2.58 2.24 1.33 9.42 24.61 47.77 3.45 -0.64 -0.97 
T14H 6.83 6.76 1.57 49.01 62.56 70.80 4.94 -0.68 -0.48 
3.01 2.43 1.97 13.20 31.89 55.73 3.86 -0.52 -1.59 
E94C 6.15 6.22 1.09 44.42 59.59 69.16 4.55 -1.02 -0.64 
2.90 2.47 1.59 11.36 36.21 53.77 3.88 -0.67 -0.53 
EX94 6.22 6.18 1.35 43.11 59.40 66.88 4.60 -0.88 -0.22 
2.61 2.08 1.77 10.40 31.87 53.42 3.47 -0.78 -0.34 
TR12 5.96 5.86 1.46 38.58 49.46 55.31 4.25 -0.87 0.44 
2.43 2.04 1.42 7.79 27.87 49.83 3.29 -0.60 0.16 
T95C 7.09 7.24 1.11 52.32 69.13 77.14 5.10 -1.20 0.36 
2.79 2.34 1.61 11.33 33.64 56.23 3.65 -0.96 -0.33 
TR96 7.04 7.18 1.11 55.56 73.36 82.33 5.10 -1.00 -0.47 
3.44 2.80 2.19 11.94 34.93 58.24 4.25 -0.59 -1.67 
T15Q 7.69 7.59 1.87 58.28 82.49 89.06 5.50 -1.26 -0.54 
3.26 2.58 2.27 11.46 30.61 56.38 4.16 -0.41 -0.36 
EX96 6.72 6.79 1.21 47.27 65.48 77.28 4.71 -1.01 0.44 
2.78 2.28 1.75 7.79 25.66 50.04 3.59 -0.85 -0.31 
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RANDOM WALK STATISTICS 
"Mediums" (cont.) 
SERIES 1'* If 
..r,;;-rlJ' QlO Q30 Q50 /0 /6) K 
C.Val. 1.65 1.65 ±1.96 18.31 43.77 67.50 1.65 1.65 ±1.96 
T97C 5.95 6.12 0.83 41.58 58.28 70.79 4.34 -0.96 0.11 
2.93 2.51 1.58 10.22 28.62 51.70 3.77 -0.48 -1.35 
EX15 6.94 7.01 1.26 49.76 68.95 77.53 5.01 -1.08 0.07 
3.41 2.72 2.32 14.71 33.56 60.56 4.12 -0.69 -1.45 
T15H 7.11 7.05 1.59 53.63- -75.67-- -87.94 -5.24- "--0.85 ~ 0.21 
3.61 2.92 2.36 14.47 32.54 61.42 4.35 -0.77 -1.42 
EX98 4.81 4.91 0.77 31.50 46.33 56.05 3.54 -1.13 -0.28 
2.16 1.71 1.51 7.25 24.62 45.57 2.99 -0.51 -1.06 
T99C 5.20 5.36 0.68 36.59 56.42 62.39 3.94 -0.93 -0.02 
2.14 1.62 1.66 7.96 25.86 SO.81 3.01 -0.72 -1.70 
EX99 4.89 4.97 0.83 36.69 51.SO 61.83 3.53 -1.02 -0.38 
2.58 2.00 1.88 8.66 27.51 51.53 3.36 -0.70 -1.25 
TR13 3.06 2.84 1.14 11.65 21.19 27.68 2.24 -1.03 -0.25 
2.72 2.22 1.72 8.13 30.39 55.18 3.57 -0.69 -0.68 
"Medium/Longs" 
TOIC 3.75 3.55 1.24 20.08 42.39 48.18 3.04 -0.48 -0.33 
2.88 2.26 1.97 13.20 31.89 55.73 3.86 -0.52 -1.59 
EX02 2.86 2.99 0.28 12.74 27.84 34.52 1.97 -1.07 0.39 
2.37 1.98 1.39 7.44 25.82 46.76 3.20 -0.80 -0.57 
"Longs" 
T03C 2.72 2.85 0.24 11.10 21.87 26.60 1.79 -0.82 -0.25 
2.33 2.10 1.01 12.28 32.22 52.92 3.30 -0.60 0.10 
TllH 0.33 1.00 -1.51 11.67 22.87 31.48 0.273 -0.27 0.39 
1.88 1.92 0.30 8.87 29.68 45.95 2.93 -0.71 0.12 
TRIO 3.60 3.69 0.54 18.85 35.48 45.79 2.86 -1.14 0.13 
1.72 1.55 0.74 7.96 27.16 46.67 2.68 -0.52 0.12 
EX05 4.74 4.83 0.77 28.93 42.23 52.10 3.37 -1.13 0.04 
1.93 1.70 0.94 8.47 27.89 48.32 2.85 -0.60 0.67 
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RANDOM WALK STATISTICS 
"Longs" (conL) 
SERIES ~ {f V;;;-rl,y QlO Q30 Qso fo f(J) K 
C.Val. 1.65 1.65 ±1.96 18.31 43.77 67.50 1.65 1.65 ±1.96 
T12H 4.88 4.83 1.10 29.66 44.87 53.80 3.49 -1.06 0.03 
1.78 1.40 1.24 9.89 29.44 50.88 2.69 -0.43 -1.10 
TllT 4.10 4.17 0.70 24.36 39.41 50.72 3.06 -0.99 0.06 
1.61 1.37 0.91 6.91 27.90 47.50 2.54 -0.56 0.00 
T13H 5.29 5.26 1.15 32.70 53.10 -63.82 3.86 -1.22 -0.68 
1.96 1.55 1.36 10.88 31.79 53.31 2.85 -0.60 -0.51 
"Indexes" 
FfGOVT 5.04 5.13 0.82 29.96 52.86 59.40 3.64 -0.99 -0.25 
2.91 2.18 2.29 12.43 31.88 65.06 3.76 -0.00 -1.03 
FTAGOV 5.25 5.31 0.95 33.76 59.55 70.28 3.81 -1.12 0.45 
"All Stocks" 2.35 2.05 1.19 13.58 31.88 61.20 3.19 -0.62 -0.12 
FTAGOV 4.44 4.42 0.95 35.27 53.95 65.56 2.79 -0.60 -0.27 
"0-5 years" 2.34 2.44 0.24 16.21 30.22 52.22 3.31 -0.62 -1.68 
FTAGOV 5.64 5.74 0.92 35.55 62.73 74.72 4.15 -1.19 -0.06 
"5-15 years" 2.38 1.97 1.43 13.44 33.00 62.76 3.03 -0.75 -0.54 
FTAGOV 3.71 3.74 0.70 23.20 47.12 59.52 2.76 -1.17 -0.05 
">15 years" 1.07 1.04 0.29 7.09 22.73 45.12 2.05 -0.41 0.03 
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APPENDIX TO CHAPTER FIVE 
The Quality, Source and Nature of the Data Set 
The Nature of the Data Set 
This study uses a set of daily closing price observations on a group of representative gilt-edged 
securities. The data set runs from 27 October 1985 to 16 October 1987, providing a com-
parison of the year before and the year after Big Bang. To qualify for inclusion in the data set, 
the bonds had to be quoted fully paid in the market, not be undated, index-linked, variable rate 
or conversion stocks, and have high coupons. These forty-five bonds are listed in table 5.A.l., 
where their codes, used in the results tables of chapters five and six, are given. 
The high coupon requirement allows this set of gilts to be used for all parts of the study. 
In later chapters, the presence of tax effects would change maintained theoretical relationships 
and could distort empirical results. For example, in chapter six, where we seek to measure the 
underlying term structure of interest rates in the market, the presence of taxes would define dis-
tinct no-arbitrage term structures for each tax bracket. What we are seeking in chapter six, in 
fact, is the zero-tax rate term structure.! Using the knowledge that, as explained in chapter 4 
(section 4.2.4), relatively high coupon bonds tend to be preferred by relatively low rate tax 
paying investors, it is likely that high coupon bonds will be predominantly held by low (zero) 
tax rate paying investors. However, there is a spectrum of coupon levels, a range of maturities 
and a set of tax brackets, and it is thus possible that some high coupon bonds can be efficiently 
held by non-zero rate (albeit low) investors.2 The choice of a simple high-low division does 
not imply that gilts can be partitioned into two homogeneous groups, but is a simple device to 
facilitate the development and testing of subsequent procedures and hypotheses. Clearly, such a 
division will not necessarily eliminate the effects of taxes from the sample entirely, but is 
1 Even this tenn structure is not generally unique in the presence of buy/sell spreads or the restrictions 
on short selling necessary to prevent tax arbitrage. The tenn structure is conditional on what cash flows 
are being sought. However, in practice, this distinction is not important for our current purposes. 
2 See Schaefer (1980b). 
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believed to be justifiable given the tasks ahead. Checks on the magnitude of any remaining tax 
effects are made as necessary later in the study.3 
In the time series analysis of chapter five and chapter six, those bonds that were either 
redeemed or issued during the two years of the sample are not included, as one half of the data 
set would have none or very little data. Thus there were thirty nine gilts studied in chapter 
five, between forty two and forty five used for the cross-sectional work in chapter six, and the 
base thirty nine used for the time series analysis in chapter six. 
The Source of the Data 
The source of the data is the Datastream historical gilt price series. Datastream extract 
this data from TOPIC, the view data system of the Stock Exchange.4 The prices are the daily 
closing values of the SEAQ mid-prices for the individual gilts.5 These closing values (4.30 
p.m.) are calculated by the Stock Exchange Price Reporting department from prices contained 
in the GEMMs Closed User Group pages of TOPIC. Each market maker has twenty such 
pages on TOPIC allowing him to input price data and other information in any format and 
make it available to a selected (closed) client base. The Stock Exchange mid-price for a stock 
is "the average of two market makers prices selected daily on a most suitable basis". The 
market makers are unaware of whether their prices are being used on any particular day. 
To prevent spurious results when comparing the periods before and after Big Bang, it is 
essential to determine whether this current price dissemination arrangement was materially 
different before Big Bang. Firstly, Datastream report that they have used this same data source 
right throughout the two year sample period. However, the Stock Exchange, must have 
changed its price reporting system, due to the introduction of new technology at Big Bang, and 
3 See e.g. chapter 6, section 6.8. 
4 I am grateful to Martin Wheatley of the Stock Exchange and the Customer Services department of 
Datastream for assistance in verifying data sources. 
5 The SEAQ mid-price service is described in chapter three, section 3.2. 
- 138 -
the movement of the market place from the floor of the Stock Exchange to the dealing room 
desks. 
Before Big Bang, price reporters wandered around the Stock Exchange floor and col-
lected prices from the Jobbers' blackboards, throughout the day. These were then manually 
input to the TOPIC system and displayed on the screens. The closing prices were taken from 
the screens at about 3.00 p.m. each day. Thus both the reporting system and the timing 
changed at Big Bang. However, the Stock Exchange believe that this is unlikely to cause prob-
lems of inconsistency for the following reason. The gilt-edged market has a very low relative 
volume of trade (and hence likely price changes) in the last ninety minutes of the day. This is 
primarily due to the closure of LIFFE before the closure of the gilt-edged market. Thus prices 
taken at different times during this period are unlikely to be at all different. 
The Quality of the Data 
The quality of the price data currently, is entirely dependent on the quality of the underlying 
GEMMs CUGS prices. A Stock Exchange survey of the system noted the following points. 
The quality of prices and speed of update varies considerably between market makers and also 
appears to depend on the time of day. The service is noticeably slower at lunch time. In 
several cases the updates were seen to be not as regular as promised by the market makers and 
not all prices had a time tag. The most frequently updated stocks were generally the most 
heavily traded ones. Medium and long stocks were updated twice as quickly as short dated 
stocks, thus the runners pages provide the most reliable indication of market movements. 
Despite an understanding that under heavy trading conditions the market makers have 
insufficient time to input prices into the trading system, the surveys showed that, as indicated 
above, the most accurate prices are those for which there is much activity. 
The degree to which closing prices are dependent on the quality of prices during the day 
is probably quite small, and certainly as a source of closing prices, the SEAQ mid-price cannot 
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be outperfOlmed by any other publically available source. The Reuters service is similar but 
also depends entirely on market maker input from either the Topic screens or from specific 
telephone enquiry, though it appeared to be more quickly updated during the day. Again this 
is not critical for closing prices. Other sources are the individual market makers, who would 
not necessarily provide a consensus "market" price. Transaction prices are available in the 
SEDOL, but large transactions are not recorded unless both parties agree. This potentially use-
ful series is therefore full of invisible holes. 
The quality of data before Big Bang, was dependent on the quotes given to the price 
reporters. It is not clear whether these quotes would be any more or less likely to be up-to-date 
than those obtained after Big Bang. On average, there has probably been little change in this 
area. 
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TABLE 5.A.l 
Identity of Gilt-Edged Securities 
Name Coupon Redemption Code in Results Tables FOTRA=# 
"Shorts" 
Exchequer 11.75% 1986 * 
Treasury 12.00% 1986 * 
Exchequer 14.00% 1986 * 
Exchequer 13.25% 1987 * 
Treasury 10.00% 1987 * 
Treasury 12.00% 1987 * 
Exchequer 10.50% 1988 EX88 
Treasury 11.50% 1989 TR89 
Treasury 10.50% 1989 TI0H 
Exchequer 10.00% 1989 EXI0 
Exchequer 11.00% 1989 EX 11 
Treasury 13.00% 1990 T13 # 
Exchequer 11.00% 1990 EX90 # 
Exchequer 12.50% 1990 E12H 
"ShortlMediums" 
Treasury 11.75% 1991 T91 
Exchequer 11.00% 1991 EX91 
Treasury 12.75% 1992 T12T # 
Treasury 10.00% 1992 TIO 
Exchequer 12.25% 1992 EX92 
Exchequer 13.50% 1992 E92 
"Mediums" 
Treasury 12.50% 1993 T93 # 
Treasury 13.75% 1993 T13T # 
Treasury 14.50% 1994 T14H # 
Exchequer 13.50% 1994 E94 
Exchequer 12.50% 1994 EX94 
Treasury 12.00% 1995 TR12 
Treasury 12.75% 1995 T95 # 
Treasury 14.00% 1996 TR96 
Treasury 15.25% 1996 T15Q # 
Exchequer 13.25% 1996 EX96 # 
Treasury 13.25% 1997 T97 # 
Exchequer 15.00% 1997 EX15 
Treasury 15.50% 1998 T15H # 
Exchequer 12.00% 1998 EX98 
Exchequer 12.25% 1999 EX99 
Treasury 13.00% 2000 TR13 
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TABLE 5.A.1 (cont.) 
Identity of Gilt-Edged Securities 
Name Coupon Redemption Code in Results Tables FOTRA=# 
"Medium/Longs" 
Treasury 14.00% 1998-2001 T01 
Exchequer 12.00% 1999-2002 EX02 
"Longs" 
Treasury 13.75% 2000-2003 T03 
Treasury 11.50% 2001-2004 T11H 
Treasury 10.00% 2004 TRIO 
Exchequer 10.50% 2005 EX05 
Treasury 12.50% 2003-2005 T12H 
Treasury 8.50% 2007 + 
Treasury 11.75% 3003-2007 TIlT 
Treasury 13.50% 2004-2008 T13H 
Treasury 9.00% 2008 + 
Treasury 8.00% 2009 + 
Indexes 
Financial Times Government Securities Index FTGOVT 
FT Actuaries Government Securities Indexes FTAGOV(.) 
Key 
* 
+ 
Short 
Short / Medium 
Medium 
Medi urn / Long 
Long 
= 
= 
= 
= 
= 
= 
= 
Redeemed before 16 October 1987 
Issued after 27 October 1985 
Maturity of less than 5 years at 27 October 1985 
Maturity of less than 5 years at 16 October 1987 
Maturity of less than 15 years at 27 October 1987 and greater 
than 5 years at 16 October 1987 
Maturity of less than 15 years and greater than 5 years 
at 16 October 1987 
Maturity of greater than 15 years at 16 October 1987 
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CHAPTER SIX 
Price Anomalies and Market Efficiency 1 
6.1. Introduction 
In a perfect market, the market price of a bond should be equal to the present discounted value 
of the future cash flows to be received by the bond. This can be expressed in terms of the 
familiar discounting equation 
(6.1) 
The market price of the bond is P, and the payments to be made at the ends of periods 1,2, ... ,n 
are C bC 2, ... , Cn . The spot interest rates applicable to these payments are the senes 
R 1,R 2,R 3, ... , Rn, and we may regard the term structure as being the series of spot rates. 
Studies to estimate the term structure have used various methods of fitting the above 
discounting equation. The particular method chosen is largely determined by the intended use 
of the interest rate estimates, however, two techniques seem to prevail. Both estimate a linear 
approximation to the discount function, but differ in their choice of approximation functions. 
McCulloch (1971) used polynomial spline functions, whereas Schaefer (1973,1981) used a set 
of Bernstein polynomials. The residuals between the market price and the fitted price (the 
price calculated by discounting the stream of coupons by the estimated spot rates) can be used 
to test market efficiency. 
From a theoretical viewpoint, In a frictionless market, equation (6.1) represents a 'no 
arbitrage' condition. Consider a set of m riskless bonds each paying cash flows over periods 
1, ... ,no Then, as Schaefer (l980a) has shown, by applying a variant of Farkas' lemma2 we may 
show that either (a) it is possible to find a set of spot rates R 1,R 2,R 3, ... , Rn that satisfy equa-
1 A paper based upon this chapter has been accepted for publication by the Journal of Business Fi-
nance and Accounting. 
2 See e.g. Gale (1960) p.48. 
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tion (1.1.2) for each bond, or (b) it is possible to construct a zero net investment portfolio that 
provides a strictly positive cash flow in some period (l , ... ,n or the current period 0). Alterna-
tively, (b) is pure arbitrage. The implication of this result is clear. If we find any residuals at 
all, then the market is inefficient as pure arbitrage is possible. 
From a practical point of view, the interpretation of pricing residuals is not as clear cut. 
Firstly, as discussed in chapter 4 (section 4.2.4) and the appendix to chapter 5, the presence of 
taxes would cause equation (6.1) to no longer be a no-arbitrage relationship for all bonds, and 
a friction in trading (such as restrictions on short selling) is necessary to restore a no-arbitrage 
relationship (with distinct term structures defined for each tax bracket).3 For the moment we 
shall side step this issue and consider the implications of the procedure for fitting the term 
structure. As will be seen, a key consideration in fitting term structure curves is that of ensur-
ing sufficient degrees of freedom for reliable estimation.4 While, it is possible to fit an approxi-
mating function to all the kinks in the term structure, this is, typically, neither necessary nor 
desirable. Sufficiently reliable measurements of the term structure can be obtained from rela-
tively low degree functions, and thus the residuals from fitting the term structure are proxying 
the finer points of the curve. Furthermore, other sources of residuals such non-synchronous 
price data, differences in liquidity, and measurement error, do permit the residuals to be inter-
preted as indicators of the pricing efficiency of the market. Finally,it is also not clear that 
observed residuals could be regarded as pure arbitrage if the practical costs (e.g. expensive or 
restricted short selling) are prohibitive. 
In this chapter, we measure the term structure, calculate the fitted prices and examine the 
properties of the pricing residuals. In measuring the term structure, the opportunity is taken to 
develop a new method for fitting the term structure: the use of "B-Splines". In addition to the 
purpose of analyzing residuals, there are a number of other reasons why measurements of the 
3 See also Schaefer (1980a,b) and later in this chapter. 
4 See sections 6.4 and 6.5 
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term structure are useful. They can be used to value other certain cash flows (such as new 
bond issues), or test the assumptions of various term structure theories. Indeed, this technique 
is used to provide a database for the next two chapters, which examine the dynamics of the 
term structure and seek to determine whether the dynamics of the term structure are efficient. 
6.2. Measuring the Term Structure of Interest Rates 
Conceptually, term structure estimation is reasonably straightforward. Let us assume that we 
have a set of m default free bonds, where the i1h bond has a price Pi, pays an amount Ci ,j at 
time tj' and where there are n different periods. If the number of bonds with linearly indepen-
dent vectors of cash flows exceeds the number of payment dates, then because future cash 
flows are known and prices are observable, the discount function can be estimated by ordinary 
least squares from the following equation 
n 
Pi = Lei •j d1 (6.2) 
. 1 } J= 
where d 1 is the discount factor for date tj.5 This discount factor is equivalently the price of a J 
pure discount bond paying £1 at time tj in every state of nature. Each discount factor defines 
a spot rate, the rate at which the discount factor must be continuously compounded until tj to 
reach £1, and the set of these rates may be regarded as the term structure of interest rates. 
Carletop and Cooper (1976) successfully employed this method by selecting a sample of bonds 
which only incurred four different payment dates per year. However, to ensure the cash flow 
matrix had sufficient rank, it was also necessary to restrict the maximum maturity under con-
sideration to seven years. Consequently spot rates for gilts of medium and long maturities 
5 The reader is asked to note that there are some differences between the notation used in this chapter 
and that used in other chapters. This makes the presentation of the complex formulae described in this 
chapter far less cluttered. The notation used in this chapter is fully explained in the course of the text. 
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could not be obtained in this manner. Further difficulties are caused by only obtaining discrete 
point estimates. Discrete spot rate estimates will generate forward rates that do not lie on a 
smooth curve.6 
6.2.1. Approximation Functions 
An alternative approach that avoids these difficulties consists of estimating a linear approxima-
tion to the (continuous) discount function. In other words, instead of estimating each d, value 
J 
directly we substitute an approximation of the form 
L 
d(t) = Ladl(t) 
1=1 
(6.3) 
and estimate the al coefficients which are applied to the L approximating functions chosen. 
On substitution of this function into our price equation (6.2), we obtain 
L n 
Pi = Lal LCi,j fl(t). 
1=1 j=1 
(6.4) 
We still have a linear regression equation but now we can choose how many coefficients we 
wish to estimate. 
The Weierstrass Theorem has been used to justify polynomial approximation. This 
theorem says that we can approximate arbitrarily closely over a given interval any continuously 
differentiable function by a polynomial. Depending on the required degree of accuracy, a 
higher order polynomial may be necessary. There are dangers, however, in using high order 
polynomials. Although these may provide a greater degree of accuracy, if they are fitted 
through limited data, then it is possible for the approximation to fluctuate wildly over its range. 
6 However, this methodology more closely reflects economic reality than the approximation methodolo-
gy in the sense that no clear economic meaning can be attached to a spot rate estimated for a date at 
which no bond actually makes a payment. 
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6.2.2. Spline Functions 
Sections of high degree polynomials can be closely approximated, however, by several low 
degree polynomials. When joined together, they are able to approximate a continuous but 
complex shape. These piecewise polynomial functions are called spline functions, and, unlike 
polynomials have uniform convergence properties. Furthermore, they provide a high order of 
derivative continuity, which has the added advantage of fixing some of the freedom of the 
approximating function, and reducing the number of parameters to be estimated. The borders 
are defined at abscissa values and are called knots. 
It can be shown (e.g. Powell, 1981 ch.3) that a k order polynomial spline function over 
the interval a =to<t 1< ... <tn=b (i.e. fitted in n segments over [a,b]) is of the form 
k 1 n-l 
d(t) = Ly,t' + -, L8/(t-t/): 
/=0 k. 1=1 
(6.5) 
where the subscript + has the meaning (t-tl)+ = max[O,(t-t/ )]. The function has k+n coefficients 
(Y/:I=O,I, ... ,k) and (8/:I=O,I, ... ,n-I), and third degree (k=3) functions are most usually encoun-
teredo This is the minimum necessary to ensure a smooth forward rate curve. 
Spline functions were first used to estimate the term structure by McCulloch (1971). He 
used a piecewise quadratic function to approximate the discount function for u.S. Treasury 
and a number of corporate issues. As this function is only once continuously differentiable, 
the estimated forward rate curves have discontinuous first derivatives - or 'knuckles' , as 
McCulloch terms it. In later work (1975), he used a cubic spline to approximate a family of 
tax adjusted discount functions and yield curves. McCulloch's spline functions are not of the 
form of the polynomial spline function given above, but they have been shown to be equivalent 
(Shea, 1982), as estimators from both models are equivalent linear transformations of the 
discount factors. 
Alternative approximation functions were used by Schaefer (1973) in the form of a set of 
Bernstein polynomials. The important characteristic of these functions is that it is relatively 
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easy, through the use of simple non-negativity constraints on the approximation function 
coefficients ai, to constrain the discount function to ensure non-negative forward rates'? The 
result was an estimate of the term structure that was reasonably well fitted over its entire range. 
Computationally, however, the speed of convergence of Bernstein polynomials is relatively 
slow compared to spline functions. 
6.3. Appropriate Spline Functions: B-Splines 
Extreme care is required when choosing the form of the spline functions that are to be used. 
Not all bases are equally capable of defining spline regressors useful for reliable estimation. 
Powell (1981, p. 227-8) shows that it is extremely bad practice to work with the coefficients 
"I) and 8) as inaccuracies arise from the subtraction of large numbers. The inaccuracies arise 
because this and certain other bases generate a regressors' matrix which is nearly perfectly col-
linear.8 Instead, it is recommended that a basis of "B-splines", which are identically zero over 
a large portion of the approximation space, is used. These prevent the loss of accuracy due to 
cancellation and they also have good convergence properties. 
The function 
p +k + 1 [ p +k + I II 
B;(t) = L IT (t -t) (t-tl)! 
I =p h =p ,h :t=l h I 
-oo<t<oo (6.6) 
is known as a k -order B-spline. The subscript p denotes that B;(t) is only non-zero if t is in 
the interval [tp ,tp+k+d. Example graphs of first, second and third order B-splines are given in 
figure 6.1. At this point, for clarity of exposition, we shall introduce a simple example. A 
linear B-spline function (k =1) would be given by 
7 The reasons for and desirability of constraining the discount function are described in section 6.4.1, 
below. 
8 Shea (1982) has shown that these problems arise in the McCulloch formulation. 
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Bp(t)=Pf[ IT 1 ] (t-tt)+ 
l=p h=p,h-*-l(th-tt) 
-oo<t<oo. 
It is non-zero over the interval [tp ,tp+2] and takes the following values 
o 
(t - tp )/(tp+l - tp )(tp+2 - tp ) 
Bp(t) = (tp+2 - t )/(tp+2 - tp )(tp+2 - tp+1) 
o 
for t ~ tp 
for tp ~ t ~ tp+l 
for tp+l ~ t ~ tp+2' 
for tp ~ t 
(6.7) 
The first natural step to construct our basis of B-Splines is to include the n -k functions 
{B p :p =O,l, ... ,n -k -l} because they are linearly independent. We shall continue with the simple 
example and assume our approximation space has two segments (n =2 and, say, p =0). Hence, 
we first include the function B J (t) which can be evaluated in the manner described above, and 
appears as the solid line in figure 6.2. It is zero until to, after which point it has a positive 
linear slope until t 1, whereupon it takes a negative linear slope until becoming zero once more 
at t2' In fact, we require a total of (n +k) basis functions, and so another 2k basis functions are 
needed. A convenient way of choosing them so that they are also B-Splines is to introduce 
some extra knots outside the interval [a,b ].9 Then we construct a total basis of B-Splines, that 
is, {B;(t):p=-k,-k+l, ... ,n-l}. In our example, we add the knots Ll and t3 and span the approx-
imation interval with the n +k =3 functions B ~1 (t), B J (t) and B l (t) (figure 6.2). For spline 
functions of higher degree the extra 2k functions have the effect of including the right-hand 
"tails" of those functions that were first non-zero in regions to the left of to. In our linear 
example, over the interval toto t b the right hand portion of B ~l (t) is added to the existing left 
hand portion of B J (t). Hence we note the general result that each segment has present within 
it non zero portions of k + 1 functions, in our example this numbers two. 
9 Specifically, we let {tj :j=-k,-k+l, ... ,-l} and {tj:j=n+l,n+2, ... ,n+k} be any points on the real 
line that satisfy the conditions 
t-k <t -k+l< ... <t-l<tO=a 
b =tn <tn+l<tn+2< ... <tn+k 
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6.3.1. Calculation of Higher Degree B-Splines 
In order to obtain a smooth forward rate curve, we must have a spline function of at least 
order three. The calculation, by the earlier formula (6.6), is inconveniently complicated; manu-
ally or computer assisted. However, Powell (1981, p.234-5) has shown that the following 
recurrence relation holds for k -order B-splines for all real values of t 
k (t-tp )B:-1(t) + (tp+k+I-t)B:~l (t) Bp(t) = (6.8a) 
(tp+k+l-tp) 
and it is recommended that they are calculated from the tableau, figure 6.3, computing columns 
in sequence from the left. If t is in the interval [tp ,tp+d, then the numbers in the first column 
have the values 
q -:t p-l, q -:t P 
Bpl_l (t) = (tp+1 - t )/[(tp+l - tp-l)(tp+l - tp )] 
Bpl(t) = (t - tp)/[(tp+l - tp)(tp+2 - tp )] 
(6.8b) 
We already know that we need k + 1 functions for each portion of the approximation inter-
val, and for the segment tp~t~tp+l these begin with B:_k(t) and end with B:(t). It is straightfor-
ward to see that the recurrence relation will deliver the first of the k + 1 requir~J functions, i.e. 
B;_k(t), from initial calculation of the k functions Bpl_k(t) to Bpl_l (t).tO To get the first two of 
the required functions i.e. B:_k(t) and B:-k+1 (t), the k+l functions Bpl_k(t) to Bpl(t) are needed. 
Similarly, and in general, to get the k+l functions B:-k(t) to B:(t), the calculation of the 2k lm-
tial functions B/-k (t) to B/+k - l (t) is required. 11 
10 To see this, exchange the subscript p in the tableau for p -k (Figure 6.3). 
11 The papers by Shea (1984,1985) recommend a form of basis spline derived by DeBoor (1978) 
which also avoid the ill-conditioning problem. It is simple to show that these functions are non-trivially 
different from those presented here. A comparison of the implied zero-order splines, which are special 
cases of those considered here, and the results of DeBoor's recurrence program are adequate proof. 
Furthermore, the Powell presentation is more accessible and consequently the potential of the B-spline 
technology is more easily appreciated and certainly more simple to use. 
- 150 . 
6.4. Estimation Procedure 
In matrix notation, the linear regression problem described by equation (6.2) may be written as 
P=Dex+u (6.9) 
where P is a vector of gross price observations on m different bonds, ex is a vector of L =(n +k) 
approximation coefficients, D is the (m xL) matrix of the summed products of the cash flows 
and evaluated basis splines, and u is a vector of residuals. 
As a theoretical model, equation (6.9) leaves no room for residuals (apart from observa-
tion error). However, as explained in the introduction, we can interpret the residuals as estima-
tion error. We assume that they possess the classical properties, in order to support the statisti-
cal procedures in this chapter. The presence of tax effects (see sections 4.2.4 and the appendix 
to chapter 5) would invalidate the necessary properties of the residuals. Hence, the evidence on 
whether damaging tax effects do exist in this sample is also examined, later, in section 6.8. 
Mathematically, the regressors matrix D is cosntructed as follows. If tij is the point in 
time when bond i receives cash flow j, then the general element of the matrix D is given by 
n 
Di/ = Leij fl(tij) i=l, ... ,M., i=1,2, ... ,L. (6.10) 
)=1 
where 
f I (tij) = B :(tij ) and tp 5:tij <tp+l' 
The least squares estimate of the vector of coefficients on the basis functions, ex, is given by 
(6.11) 
and may be substituted into equation (6.3) to obtain an estimate of the discount function. 
6.4.1. Constraining the Discount Function 
Several authors such as Rose and Schworm (1980) and Shea (1984) have noted that term struc-
tures estimated using polynomial spline functions would often generate forward rates that were 
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unstable and fluctuated widely, often drifting off to negative values. Vasicek and Fong (1982) 
have pointed out that discount functions are principally exponential decays and since polynomi-
als have different curvature, a polynomial spline function will tend to oscillate around an 
exponential discount function, and that this explained the earlier results. However, Shea 
(1985) argued that the difficulties of modelling exponential decays with polynomial functions 
do not extend to local polynomial approximations to exponential functions. He further demon-
strated that in practice the Vasicek and Fong functions are equally likely to generate unstable 
forward rates. Chambers, Carleton and Waldman (1984) have incorporated the exponential 
characteristic in a different manner. They suggested that the spot rate curve rather than the 
discount function should be approximated, using an exponential function. Unfortunately, they 
clouded the potential of this method by considering a highly selected sample of bonds. 
Nevertheless, the need for non-linear estimation makes it computationally more difficult, partic-
ularly if the confidence intervals on the estimated interest rates are to be calculated. 
If it is desirable, we may introduce constraints on the forward rates as done by Schaefer 
(1973,1981) and examined by Shea (1984). Schaefer constrained the slope of the discount 
function to be everywhere negative, facilitated by his choice of approximation function. To 
impose that particular constraint within this framework is considerably more awkward. Shea, 
using a spline function approach, reported that simple restrictions of fixed proportions between 
first derivatives were often sufficient. For example, he found that constraining the slope at the 
last knot to be one half of the slope near to the next-to-Iast knot was sufficient to remove nega-
tive forward rates at the long maturity end of the curve. Within B-Splines technology, these 
derivatives may be obtained by differentiating, with respect to time t, both the recurrence rela-
tion relation and the associated first order B-spline formulae (6.8), and then constructing a 
tableau similar to Figure 6.3 to guide the calculation of the derivatives in the same manner as 
the levels. 
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However, the results of Shea (1984) also demonstrate that the imposition of ad hoc con-
straints can be counter-productive. He shows that non-negativity constraints can dramatically 
alter the structure of the forward rate curve in places other than where negative rates are con-
strained away. Furthermore, there may be some explanation which makes it undesirable to 
impose constraints upon estimation. In fact, the only natural constraint to impose on the func-
tion is that it should take a value of unity at time zero, that is 
l=p+n 
d(O) = L Ul Bl (0) = 1.0 (6.12) 
l=p-k 
where t=O is in the interval (tp 5:t<tp +l ), and, by construction, only the first k+l of the above 
summed functions will be non-zero, that is, those from p -k to p. By using only this one con-
straint, we both minimise the potential loss of degrees of freedom and see whether the basis 
functions described above are sufficiently robust and flexible to require no measures to prevent 
negative forward rates. The effectiveness of just this one constraint will be discussed later. 
The linear restriction on the constraints may be written as 
W u=w (6.13) 
where W is an L element row vector of basis functions evaluated at t =0, and w is the scalar, 
unity. The restricted least squares estimator of a is defined as (see e.g. Johnston (1984) p. 
205) 
a = a + (D'Drl W' [W (D'Dr l W'r\w - W c'l) 
where a is the least squares estimator of u. 
(6.14) 
Given the restricted least squares estimates of the coefficients of the basis functions, we 
may solve for the estimated discount function using equation (6.3), in matrix notation 
d=Fa (6.15) 
where d is a T element column vector of discount factors at particular time points, and F is a 
(TxL) matrix of basis splines evalua~ed at the corresponding time points. The general element 
of F is given by 
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Fa = fl(t) = B;(t) tpSt<tp+l' (6.16) 
For each discount factor dt , there is a spot rate of interest Rt , and the set of these is the term 
structure of interest rates. The fonnula to calculate the spot rates is simply 
R, = [~,r-l (6.17) 
and the implied forward rates are given by 
(6.18) 
6.4.2. Confidence Intervals 
A feature conspicuous by its absence in the majority of papers on tenn structure estimation is a 
report upon the accuracy of the estimated discount function and interest rates. The formulae 
suggested by McCulloch (1971) and also used in his later paper (1975) have been largely 
ignored in all subsequent papers. However, Schaefer (1981) does indicate those interest rates 
which are "unreliable" due to being estimated beyond the ,maturity of the longest available 
bond. 
That the standard errors of estimated interest rates have for so long gone unreported is 
perhaps not surprising when it is remembered that the errors in this model should (theoreti-
cally) be identically zero. However, as explained earlier, the residuals are being interpreted as 
estimation error, possessing the classical properties of statistical regression models. 12 A further 
reason for their absence is the fact that the procedure to retrieve the relevant variance-
covariance matrices is, relative to the rest of the procedure, statistically complex. In this thesis, 
we apply some established statistical results to generate sufficiently robust standard errors for 
all the products derived from the least squares procedure. 
12 Again, we note that these properties are dependent upon there being no tax effects present. The evi-
dence on this issue is discussed in section 6.8. 
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The standard variance-covariance estimator for an unrestricted least squares model IS 
given by 
(6.19) 
When the regression is run subject to the restriction in (6.12), the variance-covariance matrix 
can be shown to be (see e.g. Goldberger (1964 p.257)) 
var(a) = 0 2 {(D'D)-l - (D'D)-l W' [W (D'Drl W'rIW (D'D)-l ) (6.20) 
if the restriction is accepted as true. We shall denote this (L xL) matrix A. The variance-
covariance matrix of the discount function may be obtained by applying the result that the vari-
ance of a linear combination x'y is given by the quadratic form x 'var(y)x, and hence 
var(J) = FAF', (6.21) 
Since forward rates are essentially a ratio of discount factors, the variance of the forward rate 
may be estimated by var(d/_1ld/). On applying the formula for the variance of a ratio (see e.g. 
Bulmer 1979, p.79), we obtain the following approximation for the variance of the forward rate 
A _ d/~l {var(dt- l) var(dt ) 2 COY (dt-J,d/)} 
var(r/) - -2- 2 + 2 - -----
d, d/- l d, d/_1d/ 
(6.22) 
This formula can be viewed as an alternative to that of McCulloch (1971) which is derived 
from the above formula for use with instantaneous rates. The McCulloch formula pre and post 
multiplies the matrix A by a matrix representing the difference between the ratio of matrix F 
and vector J, and the derivatives of the same. The formula suggested above is computation-
ally less difficlllt. It is a satisfactory approximation provided that the variances of the discount 
factors used are substantially smaller than the square of their expected values (the square of 
discount factors themselves, for unbiased estimates), and provided that the distribution of the 
denominator discount function is positive. 
The McCulloch (1971) formula for spot rates relies on an approximation to a logarithmic 
function which may not be very accurate given the range of variables involved. When 
estimated, it was systematically smaller and hence less robust than the alternative fonnula sug-
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gested below. We already have standard errors and hence confidence bounds upon the 
discount factors which can be used to define, through application of equation (6.17), upper and 
lower bounds upon the spot rates. These may be simply reinterpreted as standard errors by 
appropriately differencing the confidence bounds. In particular, the following formula is sug-
gested 
"-
s.e.(Rt) ::: 
[ ]
llt [ ]1/1 
dt - k.
1
s.e.(dl ) - dt + k.
1
s.e.(dt ) 
2k (6.23) 
Because of the non-linear relationship between the discount factor and spot rate, there must be 
an asymmetric confidence region about the spot rate. Although, the arithmetic averaging in the 
above formula suppresses this, the discrepancy from linearizing is generally small. Further-
more, this formula is intuitively consistent with the forward rate formula, and empirically 
s.e.(f l ) = s.e.(R I) for all k in O.01<k<30. McCulloch's (1971) formulae do not possess this pro-
perty. 
6.S. Data and Parameter Definitions 
The data used for this exercise consisted of closing mid-market prices on forty nme high 
coupon, fixed interest, redeemable gilts.13 Observations were drawn at weekly intervals before 
and after Big Bang. During that period six gilts in the sample matured and three, with the 
required characteristics, were issued and subsequently quoted fully-paid. Sample sizes thus 
range between forty two and forty five. To illustrate the properties of B-splines and the 
estimated confidence intervals, it is more convenient to work with a sub-set of this data set 
13 High coupon stocks are used in an attempt to estimate the tenn structure without distortions due to 
the low coupon / short maturity preference of high rate tax payers. Details of the data used can be found 
in the appendix to chapter 5. 
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(monthly intervals between March 1986 and October 1987). However, the full weekly data set 
is used for the efficiency testing in section 6.7 later. 
There are several parameters which have to be chosen. To minimise the losses in degrees 
of freedom yet still imply smooth forward rate curves, cubic (k =3) B-splines were used. Due 
to the relatively limited supply of bonds with a maturity of greater than eighteen years, this 
was the maximum term (T=18) over which discount factors were estimated. In the sample 
chosen, the maximum bond maturity encountered was twenty four years and so the edges of 
the approximation space can be set at say a =0 and b =25. The flexible nature of the approxi-
mati on process means that the only constraint on the setting of the b knot is that it is greater 
than the maximum maturity of any bond present in the sample. In fact the knot was set at 
b =40. The further out the knot the further out can the discount function be estimated, however 
once past the maximum maturity bond (and often before, with a limited supply of data), the 
estimates become very unreliable. This phenomenon is clearly shown in Schaefer (1981 table 
3. p.430-1), though he employs a different technique of estimation. 
There is essentially only one a priori guideline for setting the within sample knots, that is, 
dividing the bonds into short, medium and long maturity as classified by the market. There are 
two difficulties with this approach. Firstly, the market definition of "short" and some partici-
pants' definitions are different: under five years and under seven years respectively. Secondly, 
such a definition causes a strong clustering of bonds, leaving the long end of the market poorly 
represented. Conversely, the clustering at the short end might imply a further division is use-
ful. In order to avoid biases and inefficiencies from accepting an under parameterized function 
while still preserving consistency, we commence with a likely over-parameterized model and 
change the position and reduce the number of knots until the standard errors of the interest 
rates are minimized. 14 This involved changing the position of the knot near the position of 
14 This "general to specific" modelling approach was popularized by Hendry (1979), and has become 
standard econometric practice. 
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worst interest rate definition, as determined by the estimated standard errors. If the knot 
moved so close to a neighbour to no longer be informative, it was eliminated. As the process 
was repeated, it was found that the interest rate estimates tended to stay within a relatively nar-
row set of values long before the standard errors were finally minimized. This is a strength of 
this methodology, as it allows reasonable confidence about the interest rate estimates even if 
standard errors are not completely minimized. The outcome of this process for the samples 
studied here suggested the following division into n =3 portions; up to five years, up to ten 
years and over ten years. This division placed approximately equal quantities of bonds in each 
segment. Such a starting point is recommended for future studies, although the number of seg-
ments has still to be chosen. This strategy maximizes degrees of freedom over individual por-
tions of the discount function. I5 
6.6. Estimated Coefficients and Interest Rates 
There were n =3 plus k =3, that is, L =6 approximation function coefficients to estimate for each 
date. The vectors of estimates a for the illustrative sub-set of data are provided in (Table 6.1). 
It can be used as a databank for other researchers who need only begin from equation (6.15) to 
generate interest rates of varying terms as required. However, it should be noted that until July 
1986, the maximum bond maturity in the samples used was 18 years, and hence interest rates 
calculated beyond this maturity are likely to be unreliable. Although the maximum maturity 
thereafter increased to twenty four years, the paucity of data means that estimation much 
beyond eighteen years is also likely to give relatively less reliable estimates. 
Figures 6.4 and 6.5 show the evolution of the estimated spot and forward rate curves for 
maturities of between one and eighteen years. The three dimensional plots were drawn from 
15 Including those outside the sample, the knot settings used were -3,-2,-1,0,5,10,40,45,50,60. 
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the set of interest rate estimates for whole numbers of years, calculated for the illustrative data 
sub-set. The spot rate curve (figure 6.4) appears humped in shape and to have moved exten-
sively in a parallel fashion. The forward rate curve (figure 6.5) exaggerates the shape of spot 
rate curve as would be expected. The short rate R 1 = r 1 is in the foreground in both diagrams 
and fluctuates more than the long rate. We note also that the forward rate curve is never nega-
tive, and confirm that even for unreliable estimates beyond eighteen years there is no tendency 
for rates to become negative. We are therefore confident in our procedure, and maintain our 
belief that even if there were negative forward rates, there may be some explanation that makes 
it undesirable to impose constraints upon estimation. 
We may further gauge this degree of confidence by examining the standard errors for the 
interest rate estimates. Figures 6.6 and 6.7 show two examples of spot rate curves and forward 
rate curves respectively with bands at one standard error drawn either side. 16 For the spot rate 
curves, the standard error is typically 0.04 percent and this rises with maturity to around 0.07 
percent at eighteen years. Similarly, the standard error of the forward rate curves rises with 
maturity to a value of 0.35 percent at year eighteen from a typical value of 0.20 percent. The 
size of the standard errors for the two chosen examples are echoed among the figures for the 
intervening periods and suggest a high degree of reliability in our estimates. This may be 
compared to the situation prior to July 1986, when there were no bonds with a maturity of 
greater than eighteen years in the chosen samples. The typical standard errors for spot rates at 
a maturity of eighteen years are little changed at around 0.08 percent, but the forward rate stan-
dard errors are around 0.95 percent. For maturities beyond eighteen years, the difference IS 
16 Specifically, these dates are chosen to be at the end of the sample and at the first date which has 
bonds with more than eighteen years until maturity. Consequently, we can be relatively confident about 
the estimates yet still appreciate the enlargement of standard errors as data becomes sparse with ever in-
creasing maturity. The spot rate confidence bounds depicted have not been linearized by equation (6.23). 
They are simply 
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more marked. At dates after July 1986, the twenty and eighteen year figures are little different, 
whereas before July 1986, the twenty year standard error is typically 0.25 percent for spot rates 
and 2.50 percent for forward rates. Clearly it is unwise to estimate interest rates for maturities 
beyond the highest bond maturity in the sample. 
Figures 6.6 an 6.7 also show that the confidence bands tend to expand at very short 
maturities. This means that constraining the discount function to pass through unity at time 
zero may not identify the short maturity end of the term structure with the required level of 
accuracy. This suggests that in markets where an appropriate short rate of interest exists, it 
may be preferable to constrain the short end of the term structure to take this particular value 
rather than constrain the discount function. 
6.7. Price Anomalies and Market Efficiency 
As outlined in the introduction, the residuals between the market price and the fitted price (the 
price calculated by discounting the stream of coupons by the estimated spot rates) can be used 
to test market efficiency. This comes from the interpretation of residuals as reflecting factors 
such as differences in liquidity, and the quality of prices. Although tax effects and estimation 
error could also give rise to errors in practice, there is no reason to expect these effects would 
be significantly different either side of Big Bang; certainly the estimation technique was identi-
cal. 17 
For those dates d~picted in figures 6.4 and 6.5, most recreated prices are less than fifty 
pence away from the !parket price (quoted in pounds), that is, most prices are less than one 
half of one percent away from the market. Significantly, this is less than the average bid-offer 
spread. Furthermore, no estimated price is greater than one percent different from the market 
price. What are primarily interested in here, is whether the size of this error (as a 
17 Tax effects are discussed in the next section. It is noted again that, theoretically, in a perfect mark-
et, there should be no residuals present at all, and that any residuals imply pure arbitrage. It has been ar-
gued earlier (see the introduction) that this might not necessarily be the case, in practice. 
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representation of price inefficiency) is significantly altered after Big Bang, and we will use 
some simple descriptive statistics and time series tests to examine this issue. 
Table 6.2 provides descriptive and autocorrelation statistics for the pricing errors based 
upon weekly term structure observations. The columns give figures for the simple mean pric-
ing error e, the mean absolute pricing error lei, the skewness of the distribution of absolute 
errors, and three autocorrelation statistics, which were used in chapter five. The top figure in 
each row refers to the year before Big Bang and the lower figure to the year after Big Bang. In 
thirty out of the thirty nine bonds common to each sample date, the mean absolute error is 
smaller after Big Bang than beforehand. In twenty five cases the absolute value of the simple 
mean error is smaller after Big Bang. i8 The errors are denominated in pounds and are of simi-
lar magnitude to the monthly observations derived from figures 6.4 and 6.5. The conclusion 
from that small monthly observed sample that the errors are numerically insignificant cannot be 
refuted for this much larger weekly observed sample. The desirable characteristic of a distribu-
tion of absolute errors is that it should strongly positively skewed, that is, have most of the 
distribution near zero. Unfortunately this means that the benefits of a general decrease in the 
mean absolute size of error could be offset by a significant reduction in the skewness of the 
distribution after Big Bang. This has not been the case. The skewness of the distributions 
have not lowered to a significant extent. 
If changes in the discrepancy between the market and model prices were predictable then 
it would suggest market inefficiencies exploitable by particular trading rules. Using three of the 
autocorrelation tests described in chapter five, the predictability of pricing errors before and 
after Big Bang is examined. The first test uses the first autocorrelation coefficient of the series 
of pricing errors. It applies the result ~nRIN N(O,l), approximately, under the null hypothesis 
of no autocorrelation. The T* and U* statistic are Taylor's (1982b) maximum likelihood 
18 The simple mean errors are the focus of the next section on tax effects. 
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statistics for testing the null hypothesis of no autocorrelation against an alternative hypothesis 
based upon a trend model (see also chapter five). In thirty of the thirty nine bonds examined, 
there was significantly less evidence of systematic effects after Big Bang than beforehand as 
measured by all three statistics. 
Taken as a whole, the message from table 6.2 is that pricing errors have been signficantly 
reduced after Big Bang. To the extent that this represents an improvement in the quality of 
price reporting in the market, this may be taken as support for the findings of chapter five. If 
this quality improvement is indicative of changes in operational as well as informational 
efficiency, these results support the findings of chapter three. 
6.8. The Effects of Taxes 
We have deliberately chosen our sample to avoid the type of tax effects examined by Schaefer 
(1981 ).19 As explained in the appendix to chapter 5, it is possible nevertheless that the choice 
rule applied has not completely removed them. Any remaining effects will be manifested by a 
strong negative relationship between coupon size and residual. This is because the market value 
of a relatively low coupon stock which is predominantly held by high rate tax payers is likely 
to be under-valued by model assuming a zero tax rate (Le. using the zero-rate discount factors). 
To assess the extent of remaining effects, the correlations between coupon and residual were 
calculated, both on an individual observation basis (i.e. for all bonds at each data observation 
date) and collectively (i.e. for the mean residuals of all bonds across the observation sets each 
side of Big Bang). 
19 Details of the sample are given in the appendix to chapter five. Discussion of the effects of taxes 
can be found in chapter 4, section 4.2.4 as well as earlier in this chapter, in particular in the introduction 
and sections 6.4.2, 6.5 and 6.7. 
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On a date by date basis, they were generally small (rarely over thirty percent), with the 
vast majority between five and fifteen percent. Collectively, the mean residuals for the periods 
either side of Big Bang together are given in the first column of table 6.2. The correlation 
coefficients between the residuals and coupon level for either side of Big Bang are -0.38 and 
-0.41 respectively. This is believed to be insufficient to seriously bias the term structure esti-
mates. However, these figure:, are probably sufficiently large to necessitate further support 
being offered for their unimportance. This comes from the fact that the term structure estimates 
produced residuals that were small and therefore generated model prices that fitted wel1.20 Con-
sequently, the correlations between residual and coupon (or, if squared, equal to the coefficient 
of variation from a regression of residual on coupon) are based on a variable (i.e. residual) that 
provides a relatively insignificant proportion of the variation of the actual price compared to 
that provided by the fitted price. Thus although it was correct to be concerned about the rela-
tionship between coupon and residual, when considered relative to the role played by the fitted 
prices in determining actual prices, it is not significant. Finally, we note the finding that the 
term structure estimates are robust to minor changes in constituent securities. 
6.9. Summary and Conclusions 
This chapter sought to use the price residuals from measuring the term structure to test market 
efficiency. Studies to estimate the term structure often use spline functions. However, unless 
spline functions are carefully chosen, certain matrices formulated in the estimation are likely to 
be ill-conditioned. Hence, this chapter presents a method of estimating the term structure using 
spline functions which will not incur this problem. This involves using a form of spline func-
tion defined by Powell (1981) and known as B-splines. Comprehensive details of the form of 
B-Splines and the estimation processes involved are given in order to establish a definitive pro-
20 The correlation between the time series of actual and fitted prices for each of the bonds in table 6.3 
are allover 96% with two exceptions at 81 % and 74%. 
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cedure for this form of tenn structure estimation. 
It is argued that the calculation of appropriate standard errors provides both useful infor-
mation during the estimation stages and a necessary guide to perfonnance at the end. The path 
of the tenn structure estimates for several dates is provided, and the estimated approximation 
function coefficients are provided as a database for other researchers. By criteria discussed 
above, the estimated interest rates fit well and thus the spline procedure is re-~stablished as a 
robust alternative to the Bernstein polynomial approach. 
In the analysis of the properties of pricing errors, the market was found to have experi-
enced a significant reduction in the presence of systematic errors after the Big Bang together 
with a reduction in the average size of pricing error. This result complements both the findings 
of chapter five on the impact of Big Bang on market infonnational efficiency, and those of 
chapter three on operational efficiency. Finally the correlations between error and coupon were 
calculated to assess whether there were any remaining tax effects in the data that could bias the 
interest rate measurements. It was found that the effects of taxes had been adequately taken 
into account prior to estimation. 
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Figure 6.1 
B-splines or deerees one, two and three. 
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Figure 6.3 
Tableau for calculating higher order B-splines 
Source: Powell (1981) 
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TABLE 6.1 
APPROXIMATION FUNCTION COEFFICIENTS 
Date Sample Size at a2 a3 a4 as a6 
06-03-86 44 8.9494 10.0127 24.4558 -3.5955 26.4838 -135.8266 
03-04-86 44 8.8771 10.1582 26.2281 -1.7565 22.1166 -95.6332· 
01-05-86 44 8.7397 10.4710 26.4010 -1.4472- 18.2164 -62.4611· 
29-05-86 43 8.7496 10.4473 26.4933 -3.3381 23.7268 -102.8525· 
26-06-86 43 8.7595 10.4316 25.8893 -3.5968 24.4475 -104.4071· 
24-07-86 44 8.8014 10.3438 25.1638 -2.9285 20.0201 -59.2118 
21-08-86 44 8.7700 10.4124 25.4618 -2.9927 22.0531 -75.2774 
18-09-86 44 8.8211 10.3130 23.8958 -3.6029 21.1760 -78.0470 
16-10-86 44 8.9050 10.1334 22.7766 -3.8561 22.8458 -85.9986 
13-11-86 44 8.8981 10.1554 22.2320 -4.2376 23.0039 -92.2683 
11-12-86 44 8.9173 10.1061 22.7165 -4.8246 24.9539 -98.3064 
08-01-87 43 8.8736 10.1947 23.7305 -2.9116 22.1254 -89.1255 
05-02-87 43 8.8411 10.2651 24.0780 -3.4023 22.6534 -86.6559 
05-03-87 43 8.7945 10.3569 25.4065 -2.4153 20.2634 -71.6676 
02-04-87 44 8.7470 10.4647 25.4821 -2.3971 22.5476 -93.5764 
30-04-87 44 8.7093 10.5456 25.9762 -1.9789 23.5021 -98.6961 
28-05-87 43 8.7157 10.5329 25.8075 -1.5656 23.4407 -96.3109 
25-06-87 43 8.7237 10.5168 25.6018 -2.5597 26.0113 -112.3366 
23-07-87 43 8.7626 10.4329 25.1455 -2.9624 25.6546 -110.3432 
20-08-87 43 8.8653 10.2140 23.6945 -3.6420 24.5855 -103.7808 
17-09-87 43 8.8087 10.3412 23.9178 -3.5880 24.7398 -102.5023 
15-10-87 42 8.8314 10.2908 23.7782 -4.7753 27.1726 -119.9067 
• : not significant at a 5% level. 
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TABLE 6.2 
Descriptive and Autocorrelation Statistics on Pricing Errors 
"Shorts" 
SERIES e lei Skew {ilrle T* u* 
, 
C.Vai. 
- - - ±1.96 1.65 1.65 
EX88 0.179 0.205 0.935 4.85 10.33 38.79 
0.055 0.089 0.959 2.69 1.92 3.38 
TR89 0.000 0.074 1.217 2.44 0.82 5.14 
-0.035 0.073 1.378 3.56 0.41 0.44 
T10H -0.083 0.137 5.829 -0.08 -1.81 -6.77 
-0.044 0.077 1.149 4.26 1.86 0.98 
EX10 -0.110 0.164 4.176 0.43 -0.92 -2.48 
-0.084 0.095 1.235 2.12 0.26 0.50 
EX11 -0.063 0.104 2.076 3.91 -0.92 -1.08 
-0.074 0.089 2.076 1.17 -0.52 0.57 
T13C 0.198 0.221 0.365 5.11 3.02 14.50 
0.116 0.141 0.582 3.98 3.01 11.48 
EX90 0.098 0.113 0.912 4.06 -0.64 -0.11 
0.028 0.068 1.317 1.42 -0.70 -3.91 
E12H 0.081 0.113 0.428 3.47 0.60 0.84 
-0.012 0.077 1.621 1.59 -0.34 0.33 
"Short/Mediums" 
T91C -0.034 0.181 1.033 4.12 7.90 29.62 
-0.048 0.095 3.102 1.97 -0.28 -0.26 
EX91 0.130 0.193 0.815 5.34 5.94 24.46 
0.122 0.195 1.440 4.43 2.81 6.88 
T12T -0.021 0.195 0.762 5.52 3.88 20.06 
0.117 0.155 2.068 0.84 0.10 0.55 
T10C 0.467 0.468 1.257 5.45 5.44 20.49 
0.441 0.442 7.025 -0.09 -1.13 -3.40 
-171-
Descriptive and Autocorrelation Statistics on Pricing Errors 
"Short/Mediums" 
SERIES e lei Skew 
-.fiZrl e T* u* 
. 
C.Val. -
- - ±1.96 1.65 1.65 
E92C 
-0.257 0.267 0.524 4.92 3.28 16.64 
-0.104 0.152 1.674 1.77 1.83 5.48 
E92C -0.458 0.472 1.773 2.64 2.86 11.96 
-0.283 0.291 2.003 1.14 2.98 12.50 
"Mediums" 
T93C 0.219 0.236 0.339 4.29 3.91 12.79 
0.102 0.157 1.828 1.62 0.68 5.33 
T13T -0.141 0.156 0.274 4.13 1.91 9.05 
-0.089 0.154 3.131 3.28 3.44 10.58 
T14H 0.538 0.538 -0.423 6.24 16.16 62.09 
0.260 0.283 1.268 1.68 2.86 14.80 
E94C -0.336 0.337 2.056 2.68 1.14 4.09 
-0.306 0.306 2.279 2.10 -0.32 -2.33 
EX94 -0.038 0.101 0.628 4.26 5.96 20.12 
-0.131 0.156 1.178 -0.17 -1.48 -7.33 
TR12 0.089 0.142 1.561 3.11 1.66 6.60 
0.088 0.159 0.438 1.73 0.22 1.21 
T95C 0.485 0.485 -0.330 2.88 0.19 0.27 
0.483 0.498 0.101 3.62 2.02 4.35 
TR96 -0.335 0.350 0.076 4.66 2.18 2.47 
-0.365 0.365 2.783 1.55 -0.63 -4.32 
T15Q -0.294 0.305 1.080 3.83 5.80 25.51 
-0.054 0.245 6.012 0.67 -0.12 2.22 
EX96 0.706 0.706 -0.260 6.41 17.08 64.03 
0.610 0.610 0.000 3.47 6.73 22.88 
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Descriptive and Autocorrelation Statistics on Pricing Errors 
"Mediums" 
SERIES e lei Skew 
..Jnrl,e T* U* 
C.Val. 
- - - ±1.96 1.65 1.65 
T97C 0.488 0.490 -0.008 3.78 5.93 23.15 
0.466 0.508 0.961 1.04 -0.12 2.98 
EX15 -1.220 1.220 1.000 5.77 14.74 50.99 
-1.025 1.025 3.673 -0.54 -1.51 -4.53 
T15H -1.007 1.007 1.003 6.23 18.36 66.28 
-0.772 0.772 3.236 0.58 -0.51 1.11 
EX98 0.149 0.374 1.003 5.73 13.18 44.78 
0.384 0.438 2.549 0.65 -1.00 -2.57 
EX99 0.241 0.427 0.221 5.03 10.29 34.61 
0.381 0.439 2.773 0.86 -0.49 -1.29 
TR13 0.014 0.601 1.950 4.60 3.55 13.07 
-0.210 0.215 5.004 0.64 -0.58 -1.82 
"Medium/Longs" 
T01C -0.309 0.708 1.414 6.10 3.66 12.30 
-0.585 0.585 5.291 0.22 0.31 0.16 
EX02 0.917 0.933 2.124 5.57 7.92 -0.98 
0.727 0.727 7.113 -0.27 28.22 -3.09 
"Longs" 
T03C -0.188 0.846 1.629 5.35 4.90 17.35 
-0.530 0.530 4.039 -0.54 -0.46 -0.81 
TI1H 1.485 1.485 1.830 6.38 12.04 43.38 
0.749 0.785 -0.095 1.51 5.26 17.72 
TRIO 0.332 0.413 1.470 6.04 4.12 12.42 
0.094 0.114 0.762 2.51 0.60 2.56 
EX05 0.257 0.457 1.971 6.17 15.47 55.21 
-0.356 0.356 0.094 -0.46 -0.04 1.64 
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Descriptive and Autocorrelation Statistics on Pricing Errors 
"Longs" 
SERIES e lei Skew rnrl.e T* u* 
C.Val. - - - ±1.96 1.65 1.65 
T12H -0.601 0.601 1.225 6.46 18.61 66.27 
-0.060 0.108 0.701 3.19 5.57 23.16 
TIlT -0.091 0.497 1.501 6.34 13.92 48.68 
0.621 0.622 -0.586 1.86 3.89 17.10 
T13H -0.526 0.562 1.029 4.05 12.34 43.16 
-0.090 0.121 1.039 3.47 8.77 35.21 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
Modelling the Dynamics of Interest Rates 
7.1. Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter is to use a series of observations on the term structure of interest 
rates, obtained using the techniques developed in chapter six, to examine whether the arbitrage 
theories of the term structure (e.g. Cox,Ingersoll and Ross (CIR) (1985) and Brennan and 
Schwartz (1979)) are able to provide a full explanation of the dynamics of the term structure. 
Previous authors, for example Brown and Dybvig (1986), have suggested that this might not be 
the case. As we wish to examine the efficiency of the dynamics of the term structure in the 
next chapter and since efficiency tests usually subsume a particular equilibrium model, it is 
desirable to examine these theories before constructing something richer. These arbitrage 
theories are tested through an examination of certain assumptions that they make, in particular, 
concerning the dynamics of interest rate processes. 
The chapter begins with a review of the arbitrage term structure theories in order to 
establish a class of stochastic processes for comparison, section 7.2. These theories assume that 
the term structure may be fully characterized by a limited number of state variables, and the 
literature can be regarded as divided between single factor models (e.g. Vasicek (1977)) and 
two factor models (e.g. Brennan and Schwartz (1979)). This categorization provides a useful 
means of dividing the empirical work in this chapter. In section 7.3, the stochastic processes 
for the short and long rate of interest are identified and estimated, and compared to the 
processes used in single factor models. In section 7.4, in the spirit of two factor models, the 
long rate is permitted to enter the model of the short rate and, similarly, the short rate is 
allowed to influence the dynamics of the long rate. With this modification, new stochastic 
processes are identified and estimated. The "orthogonality proposition" (Ayres and Barry 
(1979,1980)) is examined. This property of interest rates provides a key simplification in the 
solution of two factor models, and prompts the study of the dynamics of the process generating 
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the spread (the difference) between the long rate and the short rate of interest. Finally, an indi-
cation of explanatory power of the different theories is obtain~J. The conclusion, section 7.5, 
summarizes the main results. 
7.2. A Review of the Arbitrage Term Structure Models 
The problem with the traditional term structure hypotheses, discussed in chapter four, is that 
those that incorporate a term premium tend not to specify the exact relationship between matu-
rity and premium. However, if certain assumptions are made about the stochaJlic evolution of 
interest rates in a continuous time model, much richer theories can be derived that constrain the 
relationship between premium and maturity. This was an important motivation for the arbitrage 
theories of the term structure. 
This group of models adopts the arbitrage, or hedged portfolio, pricing techniques first 
used in the options pricing model of Black and Scholes (1973). Black and Scholes proposed 
that the value of an option is dependent upon the price of the underlying asset and the time to 
expiry only. The asset price is assumed to be lognormally distributed and to be generated by a 
diffusion process. It is taken to be the sole source of uncertainty and its dynamics are assumed 
to be fully described by one state variable. It is therefore possible to combine the option, the 
underlying asset and the riskless asset in a fully hedged (zero-variance) portfolio yielding the 
risk-free rate. This hedging condition defines a partial differential equation which may be 
solved to find the price of the option. 
In terms of bond pricing, it is assumed that the dynamics of the term structure can simi-
larly be described by a limited number of state variables, and the literature can be divided 
between those models that include one state variable (e.g. Vasicek (1977) and CIR (1985)) and 
those that use two state variables (e.g. Brennan and Schwartz (1979) and Schaefer and 
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Schwartz (1984». Let us begin by examining the single factor models. 
7.2.1. Single Factor Term Structure Models 
The short rate is assumed to be the sole source of uncertainty and to follow a diffusion pro-
cess, described by the stochastic differential equation 
dr = /-l(r ,t )dt + a(r ,t )dz (7.1) 
where r (t) is the short rate, having drift /-l(r ,t) and variance a 2(r ,t), and where z (t) is a Wiener 
process with zero mean and variance dt. The price of a bond is assumed to be a function of 
time maturity and the path of the short rate only, that is 
P (t ,n )=P (t ,n ,r (t» (7.2) 
where P (t ,n) is the price of a bond at time t which matures at time n. The market is assumed 
to be informationally-efficient (as defined in chapter four) and investors are assumed to make 
rational decisions. In the presence of a single state variable, the instantaneous returns on all 
bonds are locally perfectly correlated, to the extent that they are all correlated with the short 
rate, the only source of uncertainty in this model. 
If this were a deterministic model, then to measure the response of price to changes in 
the interest rate and calendar time, we would apply the 'chain rule' of differentiation to equa-
tion (7.2). Where ret) is stochastic, we may use 'Ito's Lemma' to differentiate P, provided that 
P (t ,n ,r (t» is at least twice continuously differentiable in r (t) and once continuously 
differentiable in t. Hence 
ap ap a2p 2 dP = -dr + -dt + Ih-(dr) . 
ar at ar2 
(7.3) 
Now we can substitute for dr from (7.1) in the first term of the right-hand side. Since dz 
is of order ..Jdt , (dr)2=a2dt+ higher order terms in dt. Thus (7.3) becomes 
(7.4) 
where 
and 
- 177 -
= P(t,n,r(t» ~'(t,n,r(t» dt + P(t,n,r(t» o'(t,n,r(t» dz 
~ =- ~- + - + 1/202-, 1 [ a pap a
2 p 1 
P ar at ar2 
,lap 
0=-0-
p ar 
Equation (7.5) holds for bonds of all maturities. 
(7.5) 
(7.6) 
(7.7) 
The models are completed by invoking the third assumption to prevent riskless arbitrage, 
In the spirit of the Black-Scholes option pricing model. By constructing a portfolio of two 
bonds with different maturities such that it is instantaneously riskless, arbitrage is prevented if 
this portfolio realizes the same return as a loan at the short rate. This condition implies that 
the ratio (~'(t ,n ,r (t »-r (t »/o'(t ,n ,r (t» must be the same for both bonds. Since the initial choice 
of maturities was arbitrary, this ratio, which is denoted by q (t ,r (t» and called the "price of 
risk", is constant for all maturities. 
By substituting (7.7) into the "price of risk" we obtain 
, 1 ap 
~ = r-qo-. p ar 
which if used to replace ~' in (7.6) gives after rearrangement 
(7.8) 
(7.9) 
This is the basic bond pricing (or "t~rm structure") equation for which the solution, subject to 
the boundary condition P(n,n,r(n»=l has been shown to be (see e.g. Vasicek (l977,p.182-3» 
p (t ,n) = EI [exp A (n)] (7.10) 
where 
n n n 
A (n) = -Jr (s )ds - V2Jq 2(s,r (s »ds + Jq (s ,r(s »dz (s) 
lit
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The solution in (7.10) can be successfully employed only in special situations, for if we do not 
know the probability density of the exponent, A (t), then the 'expectation' in (7.10) cannot be 
evaluated. However, in this case, numerical methods could be applied directly to equation 
(7.9). Even when we do know the probability density function of A (t), evaluation of the 
'expectation' will generally require numerical techniques. Equation (7.10) has been shown to 
have analytical closed form solutions for some specific distributions, that is, where specific 
choices concerning the process r (t) and risk parameter q are made. 
7.2.2. Simple One Factor Models 
The simplest model possible is the random walk model with /l(t ,r )=/l and aCt ,r )=a, both con-
stant through time. However, under a random walk the variance of the interest rate increases 
without limit; hence very large negative and positive rates become more and more likely. The 
Ornstein-Uhlenbeck process, or 'elastic random walk' model used by Vasicek, i.e. 
dr = a(r * -r )dt + adz a>O , (7. 1 1) 
does not have this problem, since the short rate is always drifting towards its long term equili-
brium value, r *. However, the elastic random walk does permit transient occurrences of nega-
tive rates. The probability of reaching negative values depends upon the parameters a, r * , and 
a and is, therefore, an empirical issue. 
Cox, Ingersoll and Ross suggest the process 
dr = a(r * -r )dt + a~rdz. (7.12) 
which precludes the possibility of the short rate being negative. Since the sample path of the 
diffusion process is continuous, the interest rate cannot become negative without passing 
through zero. For this process, a(O,t )=0 and J..l(O,t »0. Thus, whenever the interest rate reaches 
zero, it is certain to become positive immediately. Dothan (1978) suggested the geometric ran-
dom walk model 
dr = a(r * -r )dt + (Jrdz. 
which has the same property. 
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(7.13) 
The choice of functional form for the risk premium q (t ,r (t)) has also differed among 
authors. Boyle (1979), who used the elastic random walk model for the spot rate within a 
study of portfolio immunization, assumed that q (t ,r )=0. This is equivalent to assuming that the 
Local Expectations Hypothesis holds (see chapter four). Vasicek assumed that the risk prem-
ium was constant through time and independent of the spot rate, that is q (t ,r )=q a constant. 
The assumptions made by CIR on preferences, the dynamics of the investment opportunity set, 
and the dynamics of the state variable, restrict the form of q (r ,t) to be proportional to './r. 
The shape of the term structures permitted by these models is restrictive, by virtue of the 
fact that apart from deterministic shifts in the utility dependent parameter q (t ,r), the whole of 
the term structure can be inferred from the current value of the instantaneous rate. Cross sec-
tionally all the possible spot rate curves approach a common asymptote as n ~oo, and so this 
"long rate" must be constant over time as well. 
The graph of the spot rate curve over time (chapter six, figure 6.4) suggests that a con-
stant long rate is not likely to be a reasonable representation of the long rate in the gilt-edged 
market. Brown and Dybvig (1986) made the same observation for U.S. government bonds. 
However, for real rather than nominal rates, recent U.K. evidence (Brown (1988») from index-
linked gilts suggests that this may be a more realistic view of the long real rate of interest. 
7.2.3. Multi-Factor Models 
The models thus far have assumed that the short interest rate was the only state variable 
affecting bond prices, and its movements were taken as exogenous. However, there are clearly 
underlying economic factors that influence the interest rate. Aggregate wealth, the distribution 
of wealth among investors, the expected rate of return on physical investment, taxes, govern-
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ment policy and inflation probably all influence the behaviour of the interest rate. Both Richard 
(1978) and CIR (1985) have explicitly considered non-interest rate variables. For example, in 
their two factor model, CIR have the expected inflation rate as one variable and the real rate of 
interest as the other variable. However, in practical applications, it has been usual to model 
bond prices using interest rates as instrumental variables for "economic" factors. 
Thus Brennan and Schwartz (1979,1982) develop a two factor model where the state 
variables are the long rate and the instantaneous rate. This is based upon the assumption that 
the long rate contains information about the future values of the instantaneous rate. The model 
can be described by 
dr = ~I(r ,I ,t)dt + crI(r ,I ,t)dz I 
dl = ~2(r ,I ,t )dt + cr2(r ,I ,t )dz 2 
(7.14) 
where r (t) is the short rate, l (t) is the long rate, and z I(t) and z 2(t) are instantaneously corre-
lated Wiener processes both with zero mean and variance dt . 
By Ito's Lemma and the no arbitrage condition, the resulting bond pricing equation is a 
function of r ,I and the market price of short interest rate risk, say q 1 (r ,I ,f), which is again 
independent of maturity. The solution is independent of the market price of long interest rate 
risk, which is analogous to the Black-Scholes result that the price of an option is independent 
of the expected rate of return on the underlying asset (see also Brennan and Schwartz (1979». 
As with the one factor models, choices for the form of the stochastic processes and risk param-
eter have to be made. For example, Brennan and Schwartz (1979) used the following process 
for the short rate within, their two factor model 
dr = a(l-r )dt + ardz. (7.15) 
Thus the short rate drifts towards the long rate, which follows a stochastic process that pre-
eludes negative values,i.e. 
(7.16) 
By the same argument that prevented the short rate in the CIR model equation (7.12) from 
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taking negative values, the long rate in equation (7.16) is prevented from taking negative 
values. However, if the long rate were to take the value zero in equation (7.16), it would be 
certain to stay at this level. As with the elastic random walk model, this is only likely to be a 
serious problem if the interest rate is already close to zero. 
A general difficulty with these models is that they do not permit a closed form analytical 
solution. However, Schaefer and Schwartz (1984) have shown that if the two stochastic 
processes are orthogonal (uncorrelated) an approximate closed form solution can be derived. 
The difficulty arises in determining orthogonal state variables. There is no reason for the long 
rate and the short rate used by Brennan and Schwartz to be uncorrelated. For example, the 
short rate could depend upon expectations of short term inflation, while the long rate could 
depend upon the long run rate of inflation. Indeed, Schaefer and Schwartz provide evidence 
that the short and long rate are far from orthogonal. However, these authors also found that the 
long rate and the spread (the difference between the long rate and short rate) were orthogonal, 
an idea that was first proposed and tested by Ayres and Barry (1979,1980). This empirical 
phenomenon has been consistently observed in a number of separate studies (e.g. Schaefer 
(1980c) and Nelson and Schaefer (1983)). Hence, Schaefer and Schwartz suggest a two factor 
model in which the long rate follows a CIR-type process and the spread follows an elastic ran-
dom walk process, which is more reasonable than the same process for the short rate due to 
the transitory occurrence of negative values. The approximate closed form solution was found 
to give results close to those obtained from full numerical solution. 
7.2.4. "Term Variable" Models 
For the one factor models described above, the permissible shapes for the implied forward rate 
curve are too highly constrained and do not match the observed curves (see chapter 6, figure 
6.4). Furthermore, the two factor models, though more flexible, still incorporate a risk premium 
factor which is ultimately dependent upon individual investor preferences. This makes the 
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resulting formula difficult to estimate and difficult to implement (see e.g. Brennan and 
Schwartz (1982». Motivated by these problems, Ho and Lee (1986), in the framework of a 
discrete trading economy, take the initial forward rate curve as (exogenously) given. Next, the 
entire curve is assumed to fluctuate according to a binomial process.! In this model, the no 
arbitrage condition places a restriction upon the parameters of the binomial process and pro-
duces a unique bond pricing formula. This formula is free of preference dependent parameters, 
and fully captures the initial forward rate curve. 
Recent (unpublished) studies extending this work have highlighted the limitations of both 
the original Ho-Lee presentation and of this type of model generally, i.e. Heath, larrow and 
Morton (H1M) (1987), Carverhill (1988) and Dybvig (1989). The main problem with the Ho-
Lee class of models is that a naive choice of the innovations process can lead to problematic 
model properties. For example, the innovations process used by Ho and Lee leads to the posi-
tive probability, albeit small, of negative interest rates. This has been remedied by H1M and 
Carverhill who have developed continuous time versions that do not permit negative interest 
rates. Dybvig (1989) has developed a model in the spirit of Ho and Lee, in that it uses the ini-
tial term structure, that is also free of the possibility of negative interest rates. 
7.2.5. Conclusions 
The main conclusion from the review of the previous studies is that the most fruitful future 
path is an empirical one. Indeed Dybvig has argued that all the theory has been done, and that 
the remaining questions are of an engineering nature? It is certainly likely that further 
advances in theory will not precede a much greater understanding of the dynamics of the term 
structure of interest rates observed in markets around the world. 
1 The binomial approach was first used to model contingent claims (options) by Cox, Ross and Rubin-
stein (1979) and Rendleman and Bartter (1979). 
2 This view was expressed during discussions following a preview of his paper (1989). 
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Thus the empirical work in this chapter focuses on the time senes properties of the 
interest rates that comprise the tenn structure in the market for British Government Securities. 
Particular attention is paid to modelling the variance of these processes, and assessing the 
explanatory power of the alternative models. 
7.3. Modelling the Dynamics of the Short and Long Interest Rates 
In this section, univariate time series models are identified and estimated for the short and long 
rate of interest. The identification stage commences with the specification of a general dynamic 
model (with mean reversion) which has the models denoted by equations (7.11-7.13) as special 
cases. This pennits a comparison of the models detennined by the subsequent data based 
simplification, and those used in the single factor arbitrage theories (i.e. Vasicek and CrR). 
These single factor theories of the term structure assume that the state variable x follows 
a specific fonn of the diffusion process 
dx = ~(x ,t )dt + o(x ,t )dz , (7.17) 
which has instantaneous drift ~, instantaneous variance 0 2, and where z (t) is a Wiener process 
with zero mean and variance dt. In particular, they are all special cases of the following pro-
cess 
dx = a ( x * - x) dt + o(x) dz : (7. 18) 
the Vasicek model (7.11) has o(x)=o, a constant; the CrR model (7.12) has o(x)=o-{X; and the 
Dothan model (7.13) has o(x)=ox. The discrete time equivalent of (7.18), for use in empirical 
work, is 
* Llxt = a (x - Xt-l ) + Ut. (7.19) 
where Llxt = Xt - Xt-I> and where the disturbance tenn Ut is assumed not to be autocorrelated. 
However, equations (7.12) and (7.13) propose that U t is not homoscedastic (as in equation 
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(7.11)), which will invalidate inferences concerning coefficients estimated under ordinary least 
squares. Specifically, heteroscedasticity will bias the sampling variance and cause inefficient 
estimation of the coefficient of mean reversion, u. However, correct inferences can be made by 
using White's (1980) heteroscedasticity-consistent covariance matrix estimator which generates 
adjusted standard errors for the estimated coefficients. 
In order to distinguish between the single factor models, the form of the heteroscedasti-
city must be determined. The Breusch-Pagan (1979) test for heteroscedasticity may be used for 
this purpose. Under the null hypothesis of homoscedasticity in the residuals at, n.R 2 (where n 
is the number of observations and R 2 is the coefficient of variation) from the regression of Ul 2 
on the k variables thought likely to influence the variance, is distributed as X2(k-l). Choosing, 
in addition to the constant term, the right hand side variables as x, and x 2, allows us to distin-
guish further between equations (7.12) and (7.13). For if the Breusch Pagan statistic detects 
heteroscedasticity, refuting the Vasicek model (7.11), then the influencing variable is likely to 
be relatively most significant in the Breusch Pagan equation. However, it is possible neither 
variable appears more significant than the other. In this case, a solution is to divide equation 
(7.19) by x and re-estimate the residuals. If equation (7.13) is the correct model, then the 
Breusch Pagan test should not detect any heteroscedasticity. If (7.12) is the correct model, the 
squared residuals will still be related to (l/x), which may be used as the right hand side vari-
able in the Breusch Pagan test equation. 
The above procedure ignores the possibility that the variance term may be influenced by 
other variables and in more complex ways. In particular, it is possible that the variance 
changes through time, independently of the state variable. A class of models designed to han-
dle this form of heteroscedasticity is the autoregressive conditional heteroscedasticity (ARCH) 
models. These models were first proposed by Engle (1982) for modelling inflation, but have 
become increasingly successful at modelling the variance of speculative price series (see e.g. 
Taylor (1986), Bollerslev (1987) and Engle, Lilien and Robins (1987)). Following Engle 
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(1982), the ARCH(q) model in the disturbance terms (applied to equation (7.19» is given by 
Axl = a ( x * - XI-I) + UI , (7.20) 
q 2 
hi =eo + LejUI-j, 
j=1 
where 0/-1 is the information set at time (-1 and hi is the conditional variance which is a 
linear function of the last q squared innovations. An LM test for the presence of an ARCH( q) 
model is obtained by taking ARCH (q )=n.R 2 from regressing 11,/ on a/~1 , ... , a/~q. Under the 
null hypothesis of no ARCH effects, ARCH (q) will have an asymptotic chi-squared distribution 
with q degrees of freedom. 
An alternative more parsimonious model than the ARCH(q) model is the Generalized 
Autoregressive Conditional Heteroscedasticity GARCH model of Bollerslev (1986). The 
GARCH(p,q) model (applied to equation (7.19) is 
(7.21) 
Pantulla (1986) has shown that the variance equation can be expresscJ as 
2 m 2 p 
UI = (0 + L(ej + <p) )UI _) - L<PjVI-) + VI , 
)=1 )=1 
where m = max(p ,q) and VI is serially uncorrelated. Thus, u/ will have the usual properties of 
an ARMA(m,p) process, so that identification tests for the orders of p and m can be carried out 
on the u/ series. The GARCH model can be shown to be an infinite order ARCH model with 
exponentially declining weights and, therefore, allows the estimation of high order ARCH 
models in a parsimonious manner. 
Not only is it possible that the form of the variance used by Vasicek and CIR is too sim-
pIe, but also it is possible that the drift term fails to account for all the short run dynamics of 
the interest rate. In other words, the implicit AR(1) structure does not fully represent the 
dynamics of interest rates. In the spirit of Hendry (1979), and to preserve the desirable charac-
teristics of a mean reverting series, we estimate the model 
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j=n 
Axl = a. (X* - XI-I) + L~jAxI_j + UI. 
j=l 
(7.22) 
with terms as defined in (7.19), for each of the interest rate series. The model (7.16) is the 
special case ~j=O for all }=1.2 •...• n. 
7.3.1. The Data and the Results 
The data are weekly observations on the one year and eighteen year spot interest rates in the 
gilt-edged market for a year either side of the Big Bang.3 This data was obtained using the 
approximation and estimation techniques developed and described in chapter six. Table 7.1 
provides some descriptive statistics on the two series, and the two series in first differences. 
The short rate at time t will be denoted as '1 and the long rate at time t as II' The differenced 
series display some evidence of leptokurtosis, more especially in the short rate. A time-varying 
variance can account for an observed distribution with "fatter tails" than the normal distribu-
tion, providing additional reason to test for heteroscedastic residuals. However, the 
Kolmogorov-Smimov test for departures from normality is unable to reject the null hypothesis 
of normality in both cases.4 
Table 7.2 provides the estimated coefficients and t statistics for the autoregressions (equa-
tion 7.22) with lags up to four periods for both the short and the long rate. The autoregression 
technique is preferred to an examination of the sample autocorrelation and partial autocorrela-
tion functions, in the manner proposed by Box and Jenkins (1976), as the standard errors of 
the autocorrelation coefficients can be biased in the presence of a time-varying variance. Lags 
up to four periods are assumed to be sufficient to capture adequately the short run dynamics of 
interest rates. Indeed, table 7.2 shows that the long rate may be modelled witl10ut inclusion of 
3 Although, we are not entirely satisfied with such a short data set for this particular time series 
analysis (for fear of not fully capturing mean reversion), the data set is adequate for the purpose of deter-
mining the effect~ of Big Bang, which is the overall aim of this study. 
4 This test is described in chapter 5, section 5.3 
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any lagged dependent variables while the current change in the short rate depends only on the 
previous change in the short rate. However, this immediately informs us that the short rate 
process which best describes the data does not possess the Markov characteristic required by 
the single factor term structure models. However, the long rate does possess this characteristic 
and thus could be used in these models. 
After removing the insignificant lagged variables in the two interest rate models (see table 
7.2), the coefficients were re-estimated and the results are given below. The figures under the 
estimated coefficients are the t statistics. Standard errors were calculated using the White 
(1980) heteroscedasticity-consistent covariance matrix estimator. 
The Estimated Short Rate Process 
~ Pt = 0.064 ( 10.05 - 't-1 ) + 0.270 ~ 't-1 
(2.425) (22.45) (2.291) 
R"2=0.08 ~=0.268 LM (4)=3.51 BP (2)=4.49 ARCH (1)=0.91 ARCH (4)=4.34 
The Estimated Long Rate Process 
~ ,~= 0.065 ( 9.472 - 't-1 ) 
(1.834) (31.03) 
iP=0.02 ~=0.182 LM (4)=3.18 BP (2)=1.50 ARCH (1 )=1.07 ARCH (4)=5.61 
(7.23) 
(7.24) 
The R"2 figure is the R 2 coefficient of variation adjusted for degrees of freedom. The 
BP (k) and the ARCH (q) statistics are the Breusch Pagan and ARCH tests for heteroscedasticity 
explained earlier. The LM (p) statistic is a Lagrange Multiplier statistic, distributed as X2(P), 
that tests the null hypothesis of zero autocorrelation in the residuals up to lag p. Autocorrela-
tion has the same consequences for inference as heteroscedasticity, and can also be used to 
detect miss-specification of the model. For reference, critical values for the X2 distribution are 
4 Note that BP (k) is distributed as X2(k -1), whereas ARCH (q) is distributed as X2(q ). 
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given in table 7.3. 
The short rate process has an estimated coefficient of mean reversion of 0.064 which is 
significantly different from zero. Furthermore, the estimated equilibrium rate r = 10.05% is not 
significantly different from the sample mean. There is no significant autocorrelation in the resi-
duals which augers well for this model. There is no evidence of ARCH effects and on exa-, 
mining the sample autocorrelation and partial autocorrelation coefficients of the squared residu-
als, also no evidence of GARCH effects. However, the Breusch Pagan test equations do indi-
cate that the variance is not constant, contrary to the assumption made by Vasicek. However, 
these equations are unable to distinguish between a model with the variance related to the level 
of the interest rate (CIR) and a model with the variance related to the square of the level 
(Dothan). Furthermore, the tactic of scaling also provides inclusive results. What is clearly 
most important concerning this model is the significant influence of the previous change in the 
short rate on the current change in the short rate. This makes this particular series inappropri-
ate for use as the short rate of interest in the CIRNasicek term structure theory. 
However, it would be interesting to determine whether this result for the whole of the 
two year sample is repeated for both the periods before and after Bang Bang, modelled 
separately.5 While the model (7.23) could not be refuted for the period before Big Bang, the 
previous change in the short rate was not important in determining the current change in the 
short rate after Big Bang. Thus, the short rate studied could be modelled as Markov process 
after Big Bang and, therefore, could be used in applications of the CIRNasicek theory. 
The estimated equilibrium long rate l* is 9.472%, and is not significantly different from 
the sample mean. The coefficient of mean reversion is 0.065, and although just not statistically 
significant at the five percent level, is sufficiently numerically significant to retain. To interpret 
5 Primarily however, we are working with the full two year weekly data sample in this chapter as no 
explicit comparative exercise is being undertaken. This maximizes the degrees of freedom and thus the 
power of the tests in this chapter. This means that we can begin the comparative exercises in the next 
chapter with the greatest degree of confidence in the results from this chapter, which is essential as they 
have a direct bearing on the courses of action taken in the next chapter. 
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further this mean reversion coefficient, equation (7.24) may be solved as a first order difference 
equation, and the median time of decay found. It is found that a shock to the long rate will 
take just over ten periods (weeks) to be half absorbed. As explained earlier, the elastic random 
walk model is preferred to the simple random walk model which can cause explosive time 
paths in both positive and negative directions. There is no significant evidence of ARCH 
effects or autocorrelation in the regression residuals given by the appropriate statistics. How-
ever, within the ARCH equations, and from the GARCH analysis of sample autocorrelation 
functions, there is some evidence of a significant relation between the current .. ..triance and that 
four periods (weeks) previously, which could indicate a regularity in the trading patterns by 
market participants. The Breusch Pagan statistic does not indicate the presence of heteroscedas-
ticity of the CIR/Dothan type, but the individual testing equations indicate that there is 
sufficient cause to cast doubt the constant variance assumption. The evidence is less clear than 
in the case of the short rate and, like the short rate, does not enable a distinction to be made 
between the CIR or Dothan model. 
7.4. Modelling Interest Rates in Two Factor Models 
In two factor models, equations (7.14)-(7.16), each state variable is permitted to enter the mean 
and variance process of the other state variable. In section 7.3, current changes in the short 
rate were found to depend upon past changes in the short rate. It is possible that the lagged 
dependent variable was acting as a proxy variable for the long rate, which could be included in 
a two factor model. Equally, it is possible that the short run dynamics of the short rate will not 
be affected by the inclusion,of the long rate. Thus, with the inclusion of a lagged dependent 
variable in the short rate process, the Brennan and Schwartz processes (7.15) and (7.16) were 
estimated. 
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The results for the two processes, after removing insignificant lagged dependent variables, 
were as follows. Again the figures in parentheses are the heteroscedasticity-consistent t statis-
tics. 
~ fr = 0.072 ( 11- 1 - rl -1 ) + 0.236 ~ rl -1 (7.25) 
(2.288) (1.973) 
iP=0.10 6=0.265 LM (4)=5.90 BP (4)=1.91 ARCH (1 )=0.43 ARCH (4)=3.91. 
~ II = /1- 1 ( 0.054 - 0.002 rl -1 - 0.003 /1- 1 ). (7.26) 
(1.269) (-0.457) (-0.392) 
R2=0.00 6=0.182 LM(4)=5.94 BP(4)=3.91 ARCH (1)=1.51 ARCH (4)=6.73. 
Immediately we see that the lagged dependent variable retains a significant statistical presence 
in the short rate process, though its influence is reduced by the inclusion of the long rate, 
almost to the critical value of statistical significance using the heteroscedasticity-consistent 
standard errors. There is no significant evidence of autocorrelation or ARCH effects in the resi-
duals, and the Breusch Pagan test statistic and equations do not detect any significant heteros-
cedasticity. Thus a constant variance cannot be rejected despite the consequeDces concerning 
negativity. 
We must reject the Brennan and Schwartz specification for the long rate of interest. On 
comparing this specification to the elastic random walk specification (7.24), it is found that 
none of the extra variables makes any significant additional contribution to explaining the long 
rate of interest. The residuals in (7.26) do pick up the same weak ARCH effect detected in the 
earlier model (7.24). 
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7.4.1. The Orthogonality Proposition and the "Spread" Process 
The empirical evidence so far has highlighted the potential pitfalls of using certain term struc-
ture theories without ensuring that the dynamics of the state variables are fully represented in 
the model. In particular, the dynamics of the short rate may not be consistent with the models 
of CIR, Vasicek and Brennan and Schwartz. 
Schaefer and Schwartz (1984) suggested that there may be good reason, ex ante, not to 
use the short rate in a two factor model. They demonstrated that by assuming the two state 
variables were orthogonal, a key simplification to generating an approximate closed form solu-
tion in such models could be obtained. Then they provided evidence (and cited other evidence) 
that the short rate and the long rate tended to be highly correlated. Instead, they recommended 
the use of the "spread" process (the long rate minus the short rate) in two factor models, after 
Ayres and Barry (1979,1980) who had noticed the regularity with which the spread was 
orthogonal to the long rate. Schaefer(1980c) and Nelson and Schaefer (1983) have also found 
the spread to be orthogonal to the long rate. 
The correlations for the three interest rate processes are gIven In table 7.4, where 
SI = II - r l denotes the spread process. The figures cannot reject the orthogonality proposition. 
Given the results for the short rate process, it would be useful to know whether the spread pro-
cess could be used as a state variable in the two factor model. Descriptive statistics for the 
spread and the differenced spread series are given in table 7.1. Although the kurtosis for ~ is 
large relative to the normal distribution value of three, it is not significantly large to refute a 
hypothesis of normality by the Kolmogorov-Smimov test. The general dynamic specification, 
equation (7.22), is used to model the spread process and, after discarding insignificant lagged 
dependent variables and re-estimating the final model, the result was as follows. 
The Estimated Spread Process 
~ 51 = 0.132 ( -0.605 - SI-l ) 
(3.095) (-3.171) 
(7.27) 
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R2=0.08 ~=0.229 LM (4)=3.54 BP (2)=0.40 ARCH (1 )=8.03 ARCH (4)=11.98 
Equation (7.27) says that the spread process follows an elastic random walk with an 
equilibrium value of -0.605 and a coefficient of mean reversion of 0.132. This coefficient 
implies that a shock to the spread process would have a "half-life" of just less than five weeks. 
The observation of a negative equilibrium rate (and a negative sample mean) cannot be 
regarded as typical, as it implies that, on average, the term structure was downward sloping 
across the sample period. While the autocorrelation statistic and BP statistic are not significant, 
there is clear evidence of an ARCH(1) effect in the spread series. This is certainly the most 
likely cause of the leptokurtosis in the data distribution. The ARCH effect also shows up 
clearly when examining the sample autocorrelation and partial autocorrelation functions of the 
series of squared residuals from equation (7.27). However, ARCH effects do not prevent the 
spread process being used as a state variable in a two factor model of the gilt-edged market, 
presuming that the hypothesis of normality can still be sustained. But, their presence contrasts 
strongly with the assumption made by Schaefer and Schwartz (1984) that the spread follows an 
Ornstein-Uhlenbeck (constant variance, elastic random walk) process.6 
The results for the spread and the long rate of interest indicate that these would be suit-
able interest rate processes for use in modelling the term structure of interest rates in the gilt-
edged market using a two factor (Brennan and Schwartz - type) model. However, one may 
question whetper the degree of explanation provided by this two factor model is as substan-
tially different from the explanatory power of a comparable one factor model (using, for exam-
ple, the long rate) as the increased flexibility of term structure shape gained from a two factor 
model might suggest. To gain a first insight into this question, and to motivate the empirical 
work undertaken in chapter eight, equations of the the following form were estimated, and the 
coefficients of variation (adjusted for degrees of freedom) compared, 
6 Such an assumption was not, of course, necessary for the solution procedure developed in that paper. 
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i =2,3, ... , 17. (7.28) 
i =2,3, ... , 17. , (7.29) 
where Mi,t is the change over time (-1 to ( in the ith year spot rate. The results are given in 
table 7.6 below. As expected two factors out perform one factor. But what is more significant 
is that except for low maturities, the added increment in ji2 is less than the remaining propor-
tion of unexplained variation'? 
7.5. Conclusion 
This chapter sought to describe the stochastic processes underlying key rates of interest in the 
term structure of interest rates in the market for British government securities. This permitted 
tests of certain assumptions made by the arbitrage theories of the term structure. In particular, 
it was found that the short interest rate possessed more complex short run dynamics than had 
been assumed, and that the variance of process defined as the spread (the difference) between 
the long and the short rate of interest possessed features that had not been previously modelled 
in this context, namely characteristics suggestive of an ARCH process. 
The implication of these results is that if we wish to use these arbitrage models, we must 
verify the assumptions that they make to ensure that the explanatory power of these models is 
maximized. However, further tests are conducted that suggest that even if such considerations 
are taken into account a two factor arbitrage model may still not provide the desired level of 
explanatory power to fully capture the dynamics of the term structure. Indeed, the degree of 
variation in portions of the terms structure left unexplained was on occasions in excess of 
7 These tests are not, and should not be interpreted as, full and complete tests of the CIR and Brennan 
and Schwartz models. The actual models consider the price of risk, deal with infinitesimally small changes 
and combine state variables differently. However, these tests and earlier results are certainly suggestive of 
their maximum potential. 
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thirty percent. The suggestion is that a better model is likely to include more than two factors. 
This issue, and the implications for testing the efficiency of the dynamics of the term structure, 
are examined in the next chapter. 
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TABLE 7.1 
SUMMARY STATISTICS 
RATE Mean Min Max Std Dev Valiance Skew Kurt K-S 
, 10.12 8.59 11.70 0.903 0.815 0.276 1.853 0.216 
~, 
-0.01 -0.74 0.87 0.278 0.077 -0.020 3.911 0.687 
l 9.40 8.51 10.54 0.496 0.246 0.310 2.244 0.714 
~l 0.01 -0.40 0.53 0.166 0.027 0.369 3.609 0.965 
s -0.72 -1.95 0.42 0.514 0.264 -0.402 2.140 0.192 
~s 0.01 -0.72 0.70 0.221 0.049 0.047 5.880 0.326 
TABLE 7.2 
AUTOREGRESSIONS ON INTEREST RATE SERIES 
SERIES a f31 f32 f33 f34 
~ '1 0.066 0.221 0.114 -0.064 0.149 (2.333) (1.845) (0.981) ( -0.769) 0.365) 
~ II 0.081 -0.079 -0.041 0.071 0.150 
(2.065) ( -0.633) (-0.434) (0.681) (1.644) 
TABLE 7.3 
Critical Values for the 
Chi-Square DistIibution 
Degrees of 90% 95% 99% 
Freedom 
1 2.71 3.84 6.63 
2 4.61 5.99 9.21 
3 6.25 7.81 11.3 
4 7.78 9.49 13.3 
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TABLE 7.4 
ORTHOGONALITY TESTS 
Ar ,AI As,AI Ar ,As 
0.612 -0.02 -0.802 
TABLE 7.5 
Rtx 100% 
Model 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 
1 Factor 49 58 62 64 63 61 56 50 46 47 51 60 72. 84 93 98 
Al 
2 Factor 98 92 86 81 78 76 72 68 63 62 64 70 78 87 94 99 
AI.As 
Diff'nce 49 34 24 17 15 15 16 18 17 15 13 10 6 3 1 1 
Unexpl'd 2 8 14 19 22 24 28 32 37 38 36 30 22 13 6 1 
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
Term Structure Movements and Market Efficiency 
8.1. Introduction 
The lesson of chapter seven, which used a time-series approach to modelling the term structure 
of interest rates, was that the arbitrage theories of, for example, Cox, Ingersoll and Ross (1985) 
and Brennan and Schwartz (1979), were unable to provide a full explanation of the dynamics 
of the gilt-edged term structure. One reason was that, on occasions, the dynamics of the spot 
interest rates were not consistent with the dynamics assumed in the models. The other reason is 
that the typical empirical forms of these models may not include a sufficient number of state 
variables (factors) to capture fully the movements in the term structure. 
The focus of this chapter is on the common factors affecting bond returns. Empirical 
techniques will be used to determine the number, and possibly the identity, of the common fac-
tors affecting bond returns. These factors will then be used to develop further efficiency tests. 
Firstly, as the extraction of common factors forms one half of the empirical procedure to test 
the arbitrage pricing model of Ross (1976), this is a natural first step. Since this theory is 
founded upon market efficiency, failure to refute the theory can also be interpreted as evidence 
that the market is efficient. Furthermore, since the term structure models in chapter seven can 
be regarded as arbitrage pricing models, a test of APT can be seen as a test of a multi-factor 
version of these theories. However, the main use of underlying factors is in determining 
whether there are anomalies in the shape of the term structure, upon which trading profits may 
be made. For example, if the term structure was characterized by a steep upward linear slope, 
then, ceteris paribus, a rise in the whole curve would be expected next period. However, if it 
was too steep given current expectations of future rates, the long end would fall and just the 
short end rise next period. The tests conducted in this chapter will be designed to test whether 
it is possible to trade profitably, and risklessly, on these inefficiencies. 
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The chapter begins with a description of the extraction of the common factors affecting 
movements in the term structure, and interprets these factors in terms of their geometrical 
influence on the spot rate curve.Section, 8.3, is concerned with testing the arbitrage pricing 
theory for the gilt-edged market, along the lines suggested by Roll and Ross (1980). While, all 
tests of APT are fraught with difficulty, it is felt that in a bond market they are considerably 
reduced relative to the equity market, so generating reasonably powerful tests. Section 8.4 con-
siders the relationship between the common factors and bond returns with the purpose of test-
ing market efficiency by seeking evidence that suggests the existence of profitable trading 
rules, as described above. That is, it considers "term structure movements and market 
efficiency" . 
8.2. The Extraction of Common Factors 
To establish the number of common factors affecting bond returns, the technique of principal 
components is used.! In principal components, a set of m variables, say Xl, ... ,Xm are 
transformed linearly and orthogonally into an equal number of new variables Y 1, ... ,Ym. They 
are chosen such that Y 1 has maximum variance, Y 2 has maximum variance subject to being 
uncorrelated with Y 1 and so on. The transformation is obtained by finding the latent roots 
(eigenvalues) and vectors (eigenvectors) of the covariance matrix. The eigenvalues, arranged in 
descending order of magnitude, are equal to the variances of the corresponding y -variables, 
which are the unstandardized principal components. Often the first few components account for 
a large proportion of the total variance of the X -variables and may then, for certain purposes, 
be used to summarize the original data. 
1 Principal components fonnally resembles the technique of factor analysis. See Lawley and Maxwell 
(1971) for further details of factor analysis and the precise distinction between principal components and 
factors analysis. 
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In chapter seven, the ability of one and two factor models to explain the movements in 
the term structure was assessed by setting up simple regression equations linking changes in 
various points along the term structure and changes in either one or two common factors, sug-
gested by the theory (see equations (7.28 & 7.29). The results suggested either that a two fac-
tor model may not provide a full explanation of movements in the term structure, or that the 
two factors suggested from the theoretical work are not the two factors affecting movements in 
the term structure, or are bad proxies for them. For now, we shall ignore the latter possibility, 
and embark upon a search for the number of factors affecting the movements in the term struc-
ture. 
Thus, the principal components analysis was performed on the time senes of first 
differences on the set of j=1,2, ... ,18 annual maturity spaced spot interest rates, i.e., 
(8.1) 
where 
[ ]
11' 
R. = _1_ j - 1 
j,1 d. 
j ,I 
where dj,1 is the discount factor at time t (with t incrementing in weeks) for payments receiv-
able j whole years ahead from t. The sub-set of this weekly data set that was studied in 
chapter seven was the two series given by j=1,18.2 
2 Before describing the results of the principal components analysis, it is essential to remind the reader 
of the properties incumbent in the spot rate data as a direct result of the estimation method employed in 
chapter 6. In chapter 6, a series of term structures were generated using a linear approximating function 
comprised of six cubic B-spline basis functions. There was good reason for choosing this number of func-
tions, but the consequence of this decision is that all the fitted values (e.g. interest rates and bond prices) 
have dimensionality essentially of six. Hence, the principal components analysis that is about to be con-
ducted has a pre-determined maximum number of components, i.e. six. It is necessary to ensure that this 
data provides a good approximation to the actual values (i.e. as if the approximation methodology fitted 
every point on the term structure curve exactly) to prevent the restriction to six components (as a max-
imum) eliminating vital explanatory information. We have seen in chapter 6 how well the fitted prices 
track the actual market prices and consequently how little information is contained in the residuals from 
fitting the term structures. A similar comparison of the correlations between movements in actual and 
fitted prices would provide similarly useful information here. The correlations so calculated are all in ex-
cess of 96% with two exceptions at 71 % and 79%. Clearly, little explanation remains in the residuals. 
Furthermore, a principal components analysis upon rates of return in the market prices of all the underly-
ing bonds indicates that the first six components account for 95% of the total variation. So restricting the 
maximum number of components to six will not significantly affect the principal components analysis of 
spot rate movements. 
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The results of the principal components decomposition of the covariance matrix of the 
spot rate movements are given in tables 8.1, 8.2, and 8.3. The three tables give the eigenvalues 
and corresponding eigenvectors for the periods across, before and after Big Bang respectively. 
The particular software chosen for the principal components, standardizes the variables (here 
the rates of return), subtracts their means and divides by their standard deviations, before com-
puting the principal components. The resulting components have the property that they are 
mean zero, have unit variance and are orthogonal. The correlation coefficients between a prin-
cipal component vector and the set of original variables are identical to that components load-
ing vector. The sum of squared factor loadings equals the characteristic root (eigenvalue). The 
fraction of the variance of the original variables explained by a principal component is its 
characteristic root divided by the number of variables. 
The results of the principal components are striking. For each data set, there is one com-
ponent which dominates the co-movements in the spot rates. This one component accounts for 
87% of the variance of the original variables. Almost 100% explanation is provided by a further 
three components, explaining 7%, 4% and 2% respectively.3 The dominant component 
corresponds to roughly parallel shifts in the spot rate curve. This strongly accords with the 
manner in which the spot rate curve moved through this data set (see figure 6.4). It appeared to 
have moved in a largely parallel fashion. The impact of this factor on the average term struc-
ture for the period may be seen by calculating and graphing the following relationship 
(8.2) 
where M j is the sample mean of Mj,l' ~j,k is sensitivity of the Jth spot rate to the k com-
ponent (i.e. the element in the J th row of the k th eigenvector), and c is some constant number. 
This may be interpreted as adding (and subtracting) c standard deviations of factor k's 
influence on variable M j to the mean of that variable, and is analogous to the method of 
3 The remaining fourteen components are of negligible size and are not reported in the tables of eigen-
values and eigenvectors 
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constructing prediction intervals about simple regression lines. The graphs of these intervals 
for c =2, are given in figures 8.1-8.3 corresponding to tables 8.1-8.3. Considering figure 8.1, the 
the parallel shift effect of the first factor can be clearly seen. The second factor appears to 
correspond to changes in the overall slope of the spot rate curve. The third factor corresponds 
to changes in the curvature of the spot rate curve. The fourth factor is difficult to interpret and, 
anyway, has a very small effect on the spot rate curve. In the sub-sample groups, figures 8.2 
and 8.3., the dominant component is still a parallel shift in the spot rate curve. However, while 
the period before Big Bang (table and figures 8.2) maintains the interpretation of the factors 
given to the whole data set, the same cannot be said of the period after Big Bang. Figures 8.3 
show that the second most important factor refers to a change in curvature and the the third 
most important factors corresponds to a change in slope (the reverse of the other samples). 
Furthermore, the fourth factor can be interpreted as a change in curvature also. 
Since commencing this study, I became aware of an unpublished paper by Dybvig (1989) 
which also uses principal components to study the factors moving bond interest rates. His 
study considered two data sets, a monthly time series of U.S. Treasury Bills with a monthly 
maturity up to nine months, and an annual time series of U.S. annually dated short maturity 
bonds (less than five years to maturity). He found that one factor completely dominated the 
market, similar to this study, but that its effect was even more significant accounting for over 
95% of the total explanation in both data sets. The variables analysed were slightly different to 
those studies here, but not fundamentally so. Rather than work with the differences used here, 
he chose to analyse the innovations in the current term structure. These were obtained from 
first order vector autoregressions on the set of spot rates.4 
4 Although it is theoretically cleaner to work with innovations rather than first differences, it is in prac-
tice unlikely to give very different results. 
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8.3. Testing the Arbitrage Pricing Theory 
An important body of research in financial economics is concerned with the forces that deter-
mine the prices of risky securities. The desire to understand these forces has led to the 
development of a number of competing models of asset pricing. These include the original 
Capital Asset Pricing models (CAPM) of Treynor (1961), Sharpe (1964), Lintner (1965) and 
Mossin (1966), the intertemporal models of Merton (1973), Long (1974), Rubinstein (1976), 
and Breeden (1979), and the Arbitrage Pricing Theory (APT) of Ross (1976). Each model 
derives a relationship between the expected return on an asset and one or more measures of 
exposure to systematic risk. 
For many years, empirical work on asset pricing was dominated by the CAPM: its appeal 
being the postulation of a simple, measurable relationship between risk and expected return. 
The main implication of the theory is that expected return should be linearly related to an 
asset's covariance with the return on the market portfolio: 
(8.3) 
where 
~i = (Jim /(J~ 
is the "beta coefficient" of asset i, E (R i ) its expected return, and Yo and Yl are constants that do 
not depend on i. In particular, Yo is the risk free rate of return Rf and Yl is the difference 
between the return on the market portfolio Rm and the risk free rate of return, i.e. the "market 
price of risk". Thus expected returns are given by the risk free rate plus a risk premium ca1cu-
lated as the price of risk times the quantity of risk (beta). The CAPM relationship relies upon a 
, 
number of restrictive assumptions, for example, homogeneous expectations among investors, 
the absence of taxes, and the equality of borrowing and lending rates. Models with these 
assumptions relaxed have been derived by Lintner (1969), Brennan (1970) and Black (1972). 
Authors responsible for extending the model into a continuous time framework have been 
referenced above. 
- 203 -
Black, Jensen and Scholes (1972) and Fama and MacBeth (1973) are important early 
examples of empirical tests of the CAPM. However, these and other works have been criticized 
in an influential article by Roll (1977). He argued that since the true market portfolio is empir-
ically unobservable, the results of investigations which use a proxy for the market portfolio 
must be ambiguous. In particular, empirical rejection of the model may indicate a violation of 
the theory; alternatively, it may simply reflect the miss-specification of the proxy variable. He 
concludes that "the theory is not testable unless the exact composition of the true market port-
folio is known and used in the tests". 
There have been two forms of response to the "Roll Critique": the first, associated pri-
marily with Shanken (see, Shanken (1986») is concerned with refining the statistical techniques 
involved; which he terms, "Living with the Roll Critique". His work develops an empirical 
framework in which prior beliefs about the correlation between a proxy and the true market 
portfolio can be explicitly incorporated. The usual notation of a proxy is expanded to accom-
modate a vector of variables which, together, account for much of the variation in the market 
portfolio return. In this context, the focus is on the 'multiple' correlation between the proxy 
and the market portfolio. He finds that if the statistical evidence of the proxy's inefficiency is 
sufficiently strong, then the inefficiency of the true market may be correctly inferred and 
CAPM rejected. The strength of this method increases with the presumed correlation and is 
conditional upon the accuracy of this prior belief. 
The second development that coincided with, though not necessarily in response to, the 
Roll critique, was the Arbitrage Pricing Theory produced by Ross (1976). Unlike, the CAPM, 
which has its basis in mean variance analysis and requires an optimizing investor to choose 
assets on the basis of expected returns and risk (variance), the APT is a mechanism which, 
given the process that generates security returns, derives asset prices from arbitrage arguments 
(similar to those used in the arbitrage term structure models in chapter seven). Although the 
strong assumptions concerning individuals preferences that are required in CAPM are not 
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necessary in the APT, an assumption of homogeneous expectations is necessary, as is a greater 
understanding of the return generating process. 
APT requires that returns on a security be linearly related to a set of K factors as shown 
in equation (8.4) 
where 
K 
Rjt = E (R jt ) + LFkl ~ik + Ujl 
k=1 
(8.4) 
Rit is the return on the i th asset over the period t-1 to t, E C.) is the expectations operator, Fkl 
is the value at time t of the k th factor that impacts on security i, ~jk is the sensitivity of secu-
rity i to factor k, and Uj is a term representing factors specific only to security i. If investors 
expect equation (8.4) to hold, Ross (1976) demonstrates that APT implies that 
where 
K 
E(R j ) = Rf + L~jkAk 
k=1 
Ak = E CRk ) - Rf . 
(8.5) 
Rk is the return on a portfolio that depends only upon the k th type of risk, and hence Ak is the 
risk premium on such a portfolio. Thus, equation (8.5) says that the risk premium on an indivi-
dual security depends upon the sensitivity of the security to the systematic risk factors multi-
plied by the risk premia attached to these risks. 
In order to test the APT, it is necessary to test equation (8.5), which means that estimates 
of ~jk 's are needed. However, to estimate the these, the relevant factors must be defined. The 
most widely used approach to this problem is to estimate the factors and the sensitivities simul-
taneously. Given estimates of the sensitivities, under the assumption that returns are generated 
by equation (8.4), the basic hypothesis to test is 
H 0 : There exists non-zero constants, (R f ,AI' ... , AK) 
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in the cross sectional regression (8.5). 
A complete specification of equation (8.4) would requires all the factors and sensitivities 
to be defined so that the covariance between any residual return (the Uj'S not explained by the 
equation) was zero. While it is not possible to produce this exact result, a close approximation 
can be achieved using principal components analysis. As explained earlier, principal com-
ponents will extract a set of factors equal to the number of securities, but such that a limited 
number of them can explain all but a negligible proportion of the covariance between the 
returns on the securities. 
The first step is to define a returns senes for application of the principal components 
analysis. If dj,1 is the price of a pure discount bond purchased at time ( (with ( incrementing 
in weeks) and having i whole years to maturity (with i incrementing in whole years), then the 
weekly rate of return on this bond would be given by 
(dj - 1I52,1 - dj,l-l) 
d j ,1-1 
(8.6) 
This kind of rate of return implies the following pattern of trading. An investor purchases at 
time (-1, say, a bond with i whole years until maturity. At time (, a week later, she sells this 
bond and buys a new bond having the same i length of time until maturity, this time i beyond 
(, and so on. Thus the original purchase price at time (-1 is dj,l-b and the selling price at time 
( is d j - 1I52,1. The pruchase price for the new bond at time ( is dj,I' and it will sell at dj-1/52,I+I. 
Although the focus directed by the previous chapter was on the factors underlying the 
movemtns in the spot rate curve (hence part one of this chapter), a comparison of equations 
(8.1) and (8.6) shows that the rates of return being used in the test of APT are not the same as 
the first differenced spot rates used earlier. While it would be preferable to maintain a con-
sistent choice of variables for analysis, the movements in the spot rate curve do not have an 
interpretable trading pattern, and so cannot be regarded as the rate of return on a security. Thus 
a further principal components analysis is carried out upon the returns series described by 
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equation (8.6).5 
The results for this principal analysis are given in tables 8.4 to 8.6. The eigenvectors are 
the sensitivities and the eigenvalues measure the proprotion of the variance of the original vari-
abIes exlained by the factors. The factors themselves can be reconstructed from the eigenvec-
tors and the set of returns. In the tables, the eigenvectors are scaled such that the squares of the 
elements equal the eigenvalue (as with the tables 8.1-8.3). Dealing firstly with the whole two 
year sample, it can be seen that the principal eigenvector and eigenvalueindicate that the first 
factor completely dominates the other factors. It corresponds to roughly parallel shifts in the set 
of returns on pure discount bonds. The second factor seems to correspond to a change in slope 
of the set of returns, and the third factor to twists, that is the set of retunrs becoming more 
concave or convex with respect to maturity. The fourth and subsequent factors are of negligible 
size, and we conclude that there are three factors influencing the rate of return on pure discount 
bonds.6 In the pre-Big Bang sample, this result is echoed, whereas in the post Big Bang sam-
pIe, the interpretation of the second and third most important factors may be interchanged. In 
all samples, the number of important factors and thier total explanatory power remains con-
stant. 
However, there have been some important studies which suggest that the number of fac-
tors m,\y be arbitrary. This criticism is in part due to the manner in which the equity market 
has been studied: a large number of securities makes factor analysis a cumbersome procedure, 
and so the securities involved have usually been packaged into portfolios which are then 
analysed.? Shanken (1982) has proved that the number of factors depends upon the way In 
5 Since, the rates of return are non-linear combinations of the spot rate movements, it would be 
surprising if this analysis gives different results in terms of number and magnitude of components. This is 
also the case due to the dimensionality considerations and the very close relationship between the underly-
ing price data on coupon bonds and the fitted prices and derivatives (discount factors, zero coupon bond 
prices, spot rates) explained earlier. 
6 The tables of eigenvalues and eigenvectors refer only to the first four components. 
7 Chen (1983) has described a method that allows APT to be tested across large numbers of securities. 
However, his procedure, which involves forming a small number of portfolios of securities based upon an 
initial factor sol\.ltion for use in further tests, has been questioned by Dhrymes, Friend and Gultekin 
(1984). 
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which the securities are packaged into portfolios. Empirical evidence of this phenomenon has 
been provided by Diacogiannis (1986) for the U.K. market. Furthennore, Kryzanowski and To 
(1982) for Canada and Dhrymes, Friend and Gultekin (1984) for the U.S. have shown that the 
number of factors is an increasing function of the number of securities in each portfolio. That 
it is linear rather than convergent must cast doubt upon the robustness of factor analytic tech-
niques. However, Roll and Ross (1984) point out that it is always possible to induce factors 
that are idiosyncratic rather than systematic when the sample size of securities increases. For 
example, factors specific to a gIVen industry sector may begin to emerge as the number of 
securities in each portfolio become large, but such factors have nothing to do with APT 
because by definition they are diversifiable. Therefore, they argue that this phenomenon does 
not necessarily deprive APT of its empirical content. 
The implications for this study are reasonably clear and relatively straightforward since it 
is concerned with bonds rather than equities. Firstly, there is no need with the current sample 
size of eighteen bonds to fonn portfolios. This immediately removes any arbitrariness from that 
source. As explained in the note to the first section, the dimensionality of the data is predeter-
mined, and so including any further bonds would not have any significant impact. 
The next step in the analysis is to test the cross-sectional model, equation (8.6). Roll and 
Ross (1980) showed that it was possible to use the method that Fama and MacBeth (1973) had 
used to test CAPM, in the case of the APT model. Fama and MacBeth estimated security 
"betas" from time series data and then perfonned the cross sectional regression (8.3) at 
monthly intervals over time. This provided estimates of the price of risk over time and the 
average value and standard error could be computed. In the context of the APT, this means 
estimating the factor sensitivities from time series data, and then running a set of cross-
sectional regressions of returns upon these sensitivities, in order to estimate the price of risk, A, 
for each factor. Roll and Ross also show that this methodology is analogous to a generalized 
least squares (GLS) procedure (1980,p.l090). 
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The disadvantage with the GLS procedure is that it will only take account of one known 
source of bias in the standard errors of the estimated AS; that is, the downward bias induced if 
one were to use the mean return vector for a single cross-sectional regression. It is possible 
that there are other sources of potential bias, for example, heteroscedasticity. Thus, the follow-
ing approach is adopted: firstly, run an ordinary least squares regression on the mean return 
vector, but use adjusted standard errors which account so far as is possible for known biases; 
secondly, run a set of ordinary least squares regressions over time, as Fama and MacBeth, to 
act as a check on the first procedure. 
The least squares regression results based upon the mean return vector are reported in 
table 8.7. The Fama-MacBeth time series of cross-sectional results did not contradict the 
findings using the mean return vector with adjusted standard errors. The first column in table 
8.7 refers to the particular data set used to measure the mean returns and estimate the factor 
sensitivities. The first two rows correspond to the two year sample running across Big Bang, 
and the factor sensitivities used are those given in table 8.4. The third and fourth rows use the 
factor sensitivities given in table 8.5 which corresponds to the year before Big Bang; while the 
fifth and sixth rows correspond to the year after Big Bang, with factor sensitiv'ities taken from 
table 8.6. 
The difference between the two rows for each sample is in the choice of the risk free rate 
Rf in equation (8.5). A value for this term must be assumed rather than estimated. While, a 
value for Rf could be obtained as the constant term in the regression, Roll and Ross have 
shown (1980, p.1 091), that this causes the estimates of the risk prices to be no longer indepen-
dent, which invalidates inferences based upon t-statistics upon the individual coefficients. 
Instead it is recommended that a rate is assumed, taken over to the left hand side of equation 
8.5, and subtracted from the expected returns E (Ri) prior to estimation. Two interest rates are 
assumed: one that is thought to be close to the actual risk free rate over the sample periods, 
and one which is thought riot be close. The two rates chosen, were 10% and 5% respectively.8 
8 It is possible that the risk free rates in the sub-samples are not equal to each other or that for the 
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The next four columns in table 8.7 give the estimated Ak coefficients together with their 
t -statistics.9 It is known that there is likely to be heteroscedasticity in the residuals of the 
regression and other sources of bias in the sampling variance, which causes inefficient estima-
tion of the coefficients. To correct for this so far as is possible, the t -statistics are calculated 
using White's (1980) heteroscedasticity-consistent covariance matrix estimator, which adjusts 
the standard errors of the estimated coefficients. The R 2 figure is the coefficient of variation. 
The subsequent four columns report the results of diagnostic tests for autocorrelated and/or 
heteroscedastic residuals which will invalidate inferences as explained above. We will only 
achieve a powerful test of the APT if the diagnostic tests produce figures that are not statisti-
cally significant. The LM (p) figure is a Lagrange Multiplier statistic, distributed as X2(P), which 
tests the null hypothesis of zero autocorrelation in residuals up to lag four. The BP (g) figure is 
the Breusch-Pagan (1979) test for heteroscedasticity. Under the null hypothesis of no heteros-
cedasticity in the residuals, at, n.R 2 (where n is the number of observations) from the regres-
sion of a/ on the g variables thought likely to influence the variance is distributed as X2(g -1). 
Here we include the factor loadings and, in the spirit of the later tests for the influence of qua-
dratic terms, the squares of the factor loadings. The ARCH (1) and ARCH (4) figures are tests 
for autoregressive conditional heteroscedasticity in the variance, as proposed by Engle (1982) 
and described in detail in chapter seven. The ARCH model has the conditional variance depend-
ing upon the past q squared innovations. 
Considering firstly the two year sample, it can be seen that under the assumption of a ten 
percent risk free rate, the coefficients on the sensitivities of returns to the three important fac-
tors are all significantly different from zero, and the coefficient on the beta of the fourth factor 
is not significant. Furthermore, all the diagnostic tests are not significant at the five per cent 
whole sample. However, trying to account for this by choosing a different "close to the actual" rate for 
each sample introduces a further variable to be accounted for in the interpretation of the results. Hence the 
fixed rate assumption. 
9 These coefficients are therefore inclusive of the assumed risk free rate. 
- 210 -
level and the iF is 67%. The effect of assuming a wildly inaccurate risk-free rate is dramatic; 
three out of four of the diagnostic tests are significant, the iF has fallen to 7% and the biases in 
the t-statistics are clear. The results for the sub-samples are less easy to interpret, since the 
diagnostic tests statistics take values close to or in excess of the critical values. This means that 
it is not possible to make a strong statement concerning the impact of Big Bang on market 
efficiency from this approach. However, when the data set is considered as a whole there is no 
reason to doubt market efficiency nor to reject the AfYf. 
Several authors have pointed out that tests against specific alternative hypotheses might 
be more powerful than ones with no alternative hypothesis assumed. In the context of an 
equity market, it has been suggested that variables such as firm size or measures of idiosyn-
cratic risk could be included in an alternative to the APT hypothesis. to Specifically, this 
involves estimating the coefficients of the usual cross-sectional regression, but augmented with 
variables representing these other hypothesized influences. Thus we have 
K 
E(Rd = Rf + L~ik Ak + YSi 
k=1 
where Si is the value of the additional variable for security i. 
(8.7) 
In the context of discount bonds, an appropriate alternative hypothesis can be constructed 
by considering the linearity of the APT model. The APT hypothesis says that expected return 
is linearly related to the factor betas. It has been suggested (see Beenstock and Chan (1986» 
that by forming an augmented regression with squares of betas as additional variables, the 
linearity hypothesis and hence the APT model may be tested. I I As there is no reason why the 
square of one beta should have more influence than the square of another, a priori, all single 
and joint combinations of squared betas were added as explanatory variables and their 
significance tested. 12 In the full sample model, under the assumption of a ten per cent risk free 
10 See for example, Roll and Ross (1980), Reinganum (1981) and Chen (1983). 
11 While the inclusion of quadratic terms is suggestive of non-linear effects, this model is still, of 
course, "linear in the parameters". 
12 This also controls, in a rather crude fashion, for omitted variable bias. 
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rate, there is no statistically significant evidence of any non-linearity in the cross-sectional 
model. Thus the linear factor APT model cannot be rejected. However, in the sub-samples 
there is some evidence of non-linearity in the period prior to Big Bang. This could indicate a 
rejection of APT or evidence of market efficiency. Given the results for the sample overall, it 
seems reasonable to interpret this as evidence of an improvement in efficiency after Big Bang. 
Using a five per cent risk-free rate induces some of the coefficients on non-linear terms in all 
the samples to appear significant, again indicating the effects of assuming an unreasonable 
value for this rate. 
8.4. Term Structure Movements and Market Efficiency 
There are two elements to this section of the chapter. Firstly, the predictability of the individual 
factors is examined, to determine whether those factors underlying the movements in the 
market display inefficiencies. Secondly, the relationship between these factors and bond market 
returns are analyzed in a manner which will identify anomalies in the shape of the term struc-
ture upon which profitable, riskless, trades may be made. Thus, we conduct tests in the spirit 
of the traditional dichotomy of efficiency tests, autocorrelation tests and trading rule tests, 
albeit in a manner very different from the traditional equity market orientated tests. I3 
8.4.1. The Predictability of Common Factors 
For this analysis, we use techniques explained in chapter seven to test for the Markov property 
in a time series, that is, we estimate 
j=n 
d!k,t = a (!: - !k,t-l ) + "L hjl1!k,t-j + Uk,t, 
j=l 
13 Autocorrelation tests of the traditional fonn were conducted in chapter 5. 
(8.8) 
- 212 -
for each of the k =1 , ... ,4 factors. The coefficient a is the coefficient of mean reversion, and if 
the factor is unpredictable the b coefficients representing short run dynamic adjustment should 
be insignificantly different from zero. 
In general, there is little evidence that the b coefficients are significant, table 8.8. There is 
certainly no evidence of systematic effects among the first, and dominant, factor. In the full 
sample, only the third factor shows some persistence, which cannot be regarded as serious as 
this factor only accounts for some 1.3% of the total variance of returns. The pre-Big Bang 
sub-sample does not provide any evidence of non-Markovian properties, while the post-Big 
Bang data set produces non-Markovian second, third and fourth factors. This can be seen as 
evidence against market efficiency after Big Bang, but as with the autocorrelation tests 
described in chapter five, tests of this form generally have low power. Thus, it is desirable to 
conduct tests that can detect the possibility of profitable trading. 14 
8.4.2. Anomalies in the Shape of the Term Structure 
An anomaly in the shape of the term structure is taken to mean that the yield curve takes a 
particular shape at time t -1, which does not fully reflect the shape it takes at time t, in the 
absence of news. For example, if the term structure were observed to be a positive linear func-
tion of maturity, it would be expected to rise above this level at all maturities next period. 1S If 
it was found that, in such situations, the short maturity end rose but the long end fell below 
current 'levels, we could say that the term structure was, on average, too steep. This is an ano-
maly, since a portfolio which took a long position in a long dated bond and short position in a 
short dated bond could have made a riskless profit. If the yield curve had a persistent ten-
dency to be too steep or, alternatively, not steep enough, then this can be viewed as strong evi-
dence of market inefficiency. 
14 Trading rule tests of the traditional type, such as the Alexander (1961) filter rule (see chapter four), 
were not conducted in chapter five, as the implied trading strategy is not representative of gilt market trad-
ing activity. 
15 Though not necessarily by the same amount due to considerations of risk. 
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Unfortunately, the complex shape of the term structure and its subsequent movements 
means that such anomalies are not easy to detect from the yield curve itself. 16 However, the 
underlying principal components can be used to study the separate elements of the shape of the 
term structure. Hence, tests in the spirit of the introductory example may be conducted. Since, 
the principal components are derived from returns, that is, price movements, they measure 
movements in the elements of shape rather than the levels of these elements of shape. It is 
however straightforward to calculate levels from a series of differences. 
Thus two series of factor levels were constructed; one measuring the current (linear) 
slope, and the other measuring the current curvature (concavity with respect to maturity). If 
there is high correlation between these levels and the subsequent return on appropriately con-
structed portfolios, then this is evidence of an anomaly in the shape of the term structure. 
For the case of the slope component, an appropriate portfolio is one of the form 
described in the introductory example, that is, it has a long position in a long bond, a short 
position in a short bond. The holdings of each bond are determined, using the immunization 
idea of setting the duration of assets equal to the duration of liabilities, by matching the dura-
tion of the long and short bond holdings. Hence if q, is the holding in the long bond and qs is 
the holding in the short bond, then since the duration of a pure discount bond is simple its 
maturity, we choose qs and q, to solve 
(8.9) 
where s and I are the maturities (durations) of the two bonds. Normalizing q, = 1, gives solu-
tions qs = lis .17 For the purpose of constructing such portfolios, short bonds are defined as 
bonds with a maturity of no more than five years, medium bonds are those with a maturity of 
between six and fourteen years, and long bonds have maturities of fifteen years and over. This 
corresponds approximately with the turning points in curvature factors (tables 8.4-8.6). Given 
16 See figure 6.4., and the discussion of modelling difficulties in chapter seven. 
17 We note that since the holdings do not sum to unity, there will be a net cash position with these 
portfolios. 
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this definition, there are twenty portfolios that can be constructed, and the correlations between 
the returns series on the portfolio and slope level are given in table 8.9. The upper figure in 
each case refers to the period before Big Bang and the lower figure to the period after Big 
Bang. None of the correlations is large, they are all less than 0.45, however those above 0.28 
are statistically significantly different from zero. A significant positive [negative] correlation 
indicates that the term structure was on average too steep [fiat] over the period in question. 
Before Big Bang, all coefficients are significantly different from zero. Their positive sign indi-
cates that the term structure was on average too steep before Big Bang. After Big Bang all the 
coefficients are not significantly different from zero, and so this shape anomaly has been 
removed. This is strong evidence of an improvement in efficiency after Big Bang. 
To measure the impact of changes in concavity on a portfolio requires that it should have 
positions in a short, a medium and a long bond, such that if the medium bond has a long 
[short] position, then the short and long bonds have short [long] positions. Once more, use of 
the immunization idea, assists in the determination of the holdings in the portfolios. If the 
holding of the medium term bond is given by qm and its duration by m, then we would choose 
the holdings to solve 
(8.10) 
However, this equation alone does not define the holdings. By adding a zero cash requirement, 
i.e. qm = qs + q" and normalizing one of the holdings to unity, e.g. qm = 1, we can determine 
the remaining holdings as 
qm = 1 
q, = 1 qs (8.11 ) 
m - I 
qs = 
S - I 
Given the definition by maturity (duration) of short, medium and long bonds, there are 
one hundred and eighty possible portfolios that can be constructed. However, those portfolios 
with medium maturity bonds having maturities near the borders between the classes of bonds 
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are less likely to give reliable conclusions regarding concavity anomalies, unless the concavity 
factor has turning points unsympathetic with the division of bonds used. The evidence (tables 
8.4-8.6) suggests that some of the extreme medium maturity portfolios should be interpreted 
with caution. 
Nevertheless the correlations between the return on all the three bond portfolios and the 
curvature factor were calculated, and comparative figures for the periods before and after Big 
Bang are given in table 8.10. Overall, just over half of the correlations are reduced in magni-
tude after Big Bang, providing further evidence of the improved efficiency after Big Bang. A 
significant positive [negative] correlation means that the term structure was on average too 
pointed / concave [flat] over the period in question. The results are enhanced by considering 
just those results for portfolios with medium maturity bonds having the most central maturities, 
and those positioned in the upper right hand portion of the tables. These two criteria maximize 
the ability of the portfolio to reflect concavity, by centralizing the middle maturity and spread-
ing the extreme maturities of the portfolio. Within this sub-set of portfolios there is a reduc-
tion in correlation following Big Bang in almost seventy per cent of the portfolios. Although 
overall, most of the correlations are significantly different from zero, only a few are in excess 
of fifty percent, and then only by a small margin, and the number of significant correlations 
was reduced after Big Bang. Furthermore when the two periods are taken together, the max-
imum correlation is 0.39. 
The two portfolio analyses in this section, based upon term structure movements seem to 
support earlier results concerning the impact of Big Bang on market efficiency. Although these 
tests are not trading rule tests in the strictest sense, the use of portfolios in the correlation 
analysis means that it is reasonable to infer that rules using these portfolios would have gen-
erated profits before Big Bang, but will not do so after Big Bang. So although there is a small 
reservation on the power of the tests, there is no reservation concerning the qualitative result 
with regards to Big Bang and market efficiency. 
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8.5. Conclusions 
This chapter has examined the components underlying movements in the term structure to 
detect market inefficiencies evidenced by anomalies in the shape of the term structure curve. A 
principal components analysis of the covariance matrix of underlying returns produced evi-
dence that three factors are important in determining movements in the terms structure. These 
were shown to influence the level of the curve, the slope of the curve and the concavity of the 
curve, with the most important factor being that influencing the level of the curve. This result 
is not surprising given that the term structure had been shown in chapter six to have moved in 
an extensively parallel fashion throughout the two year sample period. 
These factors are used first used to test the APT model, using the procedures developed 
by Roll and Ross (1980). This achieves two aim~: firstly, it determines whether linear factor 
models, of which the theoretical models In chapter seven are but one form, are appropriate 
models for this market; and, secondly, it is a joint test of the APT model and market 
efficiency. The tests could not reject the APT model, and also provided some weak evidence of 
the inefficiencies present in the market before Big Bang. It is also argued that many of the 
hazards involved in testing the APT are removed by using a bond market rather than an equity 
market, lending additional power to the tests. 
The main efficiency testing involved examining the factors themselves. Firstly, the ran-
dom walk hypothesis was tested, and it was found that, in general, the changes in the factors 
were unpredictable. The evidence regarding the impact of Big Bang was however fairly bal-
anced. Hence, secondly, more powerful tests were constructed by examining the levels of the 
factors, precisely the level of the slope and the curvature factors. The current state of the shape 
of the term structure has certain implications for its future path, and hence bond returns. If the 
current shape does not fully reflect this movement, abnormal returns may be made by holding 
appropriately constructed bond portfolios. By examining the correlations between bond port-
folio returns and the levels of the factors, the extent of any anomalies in the shape could be 
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identified. The advantage of principal components is that the separate components of shape 
could be examined individually, preventing contamination of the results by other influences of 
shape. It was found that there were no anomalies in the slope after Big Bang but evidence that 
the slope was, on average, too steep before Big Bang. In terms of curvature, the effect of Big 
Bang is not so great, and the correlations larger. However, the balance of the evidence is 
favourable to Big Bang and market efficiency. It must be remembered that even though many 
of the correlations are significantly different from zero, to design profitable trades based upon a 
factor which accounts for less than two per cent of the variation in the term structure, probably 
requires much higher correlations than those produced here. 
TABLES.1 TABLE 8.2 
Principal Components of IlR 1,1, ••• , IlR 18,1 
(28/10J85 - 1611 0/87) 
Principal Components of All 1,1, ••• , M 18,1 
(2811 01R5 - 2411 0/86) 
eigenvalues of cov,lM II •••• M Ut1) eiaenvalues of COy I (All 1.1 ••• , All 18.1 ) 
15.62406 1.14662 0.79642 0.37998 15.71960 1.43908 0.54224 0.20302 
corresoondin2 ei2envectors (columns) corres ~ndina e~envectors (columns) 
0.S3300 0.40057 0.02697 0.37867 0.81448 0.39754 0.39300 0.14314 
0.89622 0.38517 0.07387 0.20720 0.88256 0.37947 0.27190 0.05401 
0.92943 0.35071 0.10557 0.03928 0.92606 0.34738 0.14162 -0.03172 
0.94017 0.30340 0.11279 -0.09874 0.94499 0.30682 0.01814 -0.09753 
0.94528 0.25072 0.08761 -0.18470 0.95014 0.26464 -0.07999 -0.12924 
0.94709 0.19463 0.02477 -0.21120 0.95455 0.22564 -0.14586 -0.11872 I 
0.97006 0.13199 -0.06521 -0.19305 0.96131 0.18478 -0.18808 -0.07706 
0.97367 0.06125 -0.16381 -0.14444 0.96781 0.13562 -0.21067 -0.01648 
0.96356 -0.01426 -0.25109 -0.07877 0.97134 0.07463 -0.21342 0.05243 
0.94786 -0.08620 -0.30056 -0.01451 0.97066 0.00451 -0.19642 0.11865 
0.94063 -0.15140 -0.29861 0.03945 0.97361 -0.08557 -0.14809 0.14190 
0.94347 -0.20768 -0.24689 0.07540 0.97043 -0.17639 -0.08352 0.14144 
0.95004 -0.25292 -0.15359 0.09473 0.95822 -0.25941 -0.01044 0.11435 
0.95143 -0.28382 -0.02866 0.09686 0.93734 -0.32738 0.05906 0.06779 
0.94175 -0.29638 0.11220 0.08112 0.91564 -0.37248 0.11596 0.00988 . 
0.92103 -0.28883 0.25028 0.04708 0.90236 -0.39301 0.15069 -0.05553 I 
0.S9352 -0.26114 0.36508 -0.00202 0.90312 -0.38054 0.15365 -0.12547 
0.85873 -0.20781 0.43653 -0.06856 0.90089 -0.30374 0.09825 -0.19628 
----------
TABLES.3 
Principal Components of All 1,1 • •••• All 18,1 
(2711 O,IR6 - 16/1 0/87) 
eigenvalues of COy I (M lJ •••. , All 18.1 ) 
15.65267 1.22760 0.78691 I 0.33036 
corres Xlnding eigenvectors (columns) 
0.85917 0.09322 0.36092 0.35046 
0.91543 0.19942 0.29826 0.18233 
0.93503 0.27070 0.22777 0.02303 
0.93583 0.29485 0.16362 -0.10225 
0.94047 0.26360 0.11912 -0.17833 
0.95954 0.17053 0.09563 -0.20256 
0.97819 0.03048 0.08549 -0.18682 
0.97820 -0.12848 0.07772 -0.14327 
0.95566 -0.27359 0.06553 -0.08627 
0.92886 -0.36622 0.04013 -0.03257 
0.91488 -0.40333 0.01063 0.01218 
0.92265 -0.38163 -0.03615 0.04191 
0.94409 -0.30914 -0.09628 0.06164 
0.96534 -0.18755 -0.16551 0.07303 
0.96767 -0.02875 -0.23860 0.07461 
0.94018 0.14162 -0.30217 0.06728 
0.89070 0.28723 -0.34768 0.05705 
0.84038 0.38924 -0.37315 0.04646 
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TABLE 8.4 TABLES.S 
Principal Components Analysis on Returns 
(28[10/85 - 16/10/87) 
Principal Components Analysis on Returns 
(28/1 0/85 - 24/1 0/86) 
eigenvalues of covariance matrixl%J eigenvalues of covariance matrix (%) 
0.00526 0.00039 0.00018 0.00003 0.00499 0.00035 0.00007 0.00003 
{91.10) (6.35) (1.30) (0.72) (89.381 (6.59) (3.09) (0.45) 
correspondin2 ebtenvectors (columns) corres..QQ.nding eigenvectors (columns) 
0.00198 0.00036 0.00067 0.00092 0.00216 0.00077 0.00044 -0.00106 
0.00401 0.00050 0.00173 0.00133 0.00416 0.00180 0.00095 -0.00157 
0.00603 0.00065 0.00301 0.00152 0.00615 0.00298 0.00142 -0.00182 
0.00819 0.00058 0.00421 0.00139 0.00851 0.00405 0.00178 -0.00180 
0.01016 0.00084 0.00501 0.00091 0.01036 0.00492 0.00194 -0.00134 I 
0.01189 0.00145 0.00518 0.00061 0.01201 0.00554 0.00166 -0.00096 
0.01352 0.00262 0.00456 0.00012 0.01356 0.00577 0.00119 -0.00036 
0.01496 0.00393 0.00354 -0.00066 0.01470 0.00609 0.00043 0.00057 
0.01618 0.00536 0.00185 -0.00098 0.01593 0.00560 -0.00067 0.00109 
0.01755 0.00625 -0.00015 -0.00129 0.01713 0.00465 -0.00169 0.00149 
0.01906 0.00635 -0.00175 -0.00136 0.01842 0.00315 -0.00257 0.00174 
0.01993 0.00525 -0.00317 -0.00026 0.01918 0.00091 -0.00305 0.00037 
0.02116 0.00310 -0.00381 0.00518 0.02063 -0.00173 -0.00249 -0.00033 
0.02218 0.00047 -0.00374 0.00115 0.02209 -0.00355 -0.00169 -0.00128 
0.02336 -0.00236 -0.00326 0.00135 0.02306 -0.00526 -0.00100 -0.00149 
0.02372 -0.00552 -0.00179 0.00136 0.02284 -0.00605 0.00064 -0.00153 
0.02388 -0.00861 0.00008 -0.00001 
0.02315 -0.01029 0.00268 -0.00288 
0.02303 -0.00595 0.00217 0.00011 
0.02132 -0.00378 0.00476 0.00362 
TABLE 8.6 
Principal Components Analysis on Returns 
(27/10/86 - 16/1 0/87) 
eigenvalues of covariance matrixl%) 
0.00572 0.00061 0.00014 O. ()()()() 1 
(88.04) (9.37) (2.10) (0.17) 
corresj>9nding eigenvectors {columns) 
0.00185 -0.00017 0.00062 0.00124 
0.00393 -0.00020 0.00157 0.00165 
0.00601 -0.00069 0.00280 0.00172 
0.00806 -0.00149 0.00382 0.00093 
0.01018 -0.00161 0.00462 0.00011 
0.01201 -0.00101 0.00491 -0.00036 ' 
0.01374 0.00078 0.00456 -0.00070 
0.01550 0.00279 0.00350 -0.00076 
0.01672 0.00541 0.00222 -0.00070 
0.01828 0.00751 0.00029 -0.00040 
0.01998 0.00848 -0.00081 -0.00034 
0.02097 0.00795 -0.00195 0.00050 
0.02199 0.00598 -0.00226 0.00069 
0.02265 0.00277 -0.00266 0.00024 
0.02405 -0.00088 -0.00238 0.00004 
0.02490 -0.00542 -0.00174 0.00028 
0.02512 -0.01038 -0.00132 -0.00013 
I 0.02529 -0.01384 -0.00077 -0.00047 
I 
N 
N 
N 
I 
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TABLE 8.7 
Estimated Risk Premia Coefficients of APr Model 
Data Set ~1 xlo-3 ~xlo-3 ~ xlo-3 ~4 xlo-3 R2 IM(4) BP(8) ARCH (1) ARCH (4) 
(R,) 
eVaL ±1.96 ±1.96 ±1.96 ±1.96 9.49 14.06 3.84 9.49 
85-87 0.463 1.026 0.671 -0.026 0.67 6.85 7.32 0.18 1.59 
(10%) (2.567) (7.567) (4.446) (-0.177) 
85-87 3.929 1.525 1.654 0.62 0.07 10.14 15.87 7.46 3.18 
(5%) (19.293) (9.502) (8.700) (2.428) 
85-86 -2.807 1.549 -0.083 0.421 0.80 7.76 9.72 0.05 4.91 
(10%) (9.730) (5.935) (-0.380) (1.883) 
85-86 0.680 2.504 0.364 -0.227 0.64 5.84 12.84 1.577 0.758 
(5%) (2.349) (8.547) (1.859) (-0.783) 
86-87 3.963 0.681 0.832 0.255 0.61 8.79 14.01 0.57 2.05 
(10%) (16.803) (3.507) (5.066) (2.032) 
86-87 7.411 0.909 1.983 1.202 0.54 10.285 12.957 0.01 0.98 
(5%) (33.484) (5.678) (10.815) (5.497) 
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TABLE 8.8 
AUTOREGRESSIONS ON PRINCIPAL COMPONENTS 
SERIES a b 1 b 2 b 3 b4 
!l. f 1,1 0.515 -0.296 -0.100 0.012 0.038 
85-87 (3.316) (-1.901) (-0.670) (0.089) (0.355) 
!l. f 2,1 1.378 0.409 0.292 0.145 0.117 
85-87 (5.400) (1.864) (1.626) (1.016) (1.126) 
A f 3,1 2.304 0.732 0.429 0.289 0.207 
85-87 (6.269) (2.244) (1.620) (1.540) (2.049) 
!l. f 4,1 1.562 0.266 0.212 0.088 -0.073 
85-87 (5.306) (1.056) (1.025) (0.542) (-0.728) 
!l. f l,t 0.419 -0.156 -0.084 0.187 0.078 
85-86 (2.271) (-0.787) (-0.430) (0.975) (0.449) 
!l. f 2,1 1.317 0.412 0.373 0.129 0.101 
85-86 (3.557) (1.275) (1.465) (0.578) (0.572) 
!l. f 3,t 1.036 -0.299 -0.284 -0.175 -0.082 
85-86 (2.837) (-0.898) (-0.953) (-0.721) (-0.541) 
!l. f 4,1 1.310 0.250 0.170 -0.103 -0.232 
85-86 (2.883) (0.671) (0.559) ( -0.419) (-1.384) 
!l. f l,t 0.559 -0.329 -0.047 -0.136 -0.113 
86-87 (2.078) (-1.285) (-0.205) (-0.6725 (-0.784) 
!l. f 2,1 2.780 1.126 0.746 0.517 0.332 
86-87 (4.943) (2.277) (1.902) (1.882) (2.283) 
!l. f 3,1 1.923 0.838 0.488 0.307 0.176 
86-87 (4.432) (2.332) (1.603) (1.392) (1.157) 
!l. f 4,t 2.381 0.885 0.727 0.498 0.132 
86-87 (4.691) (2.105) (2.240) (2.056) (0.894) 
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TABLE 8.9 
Correlations between the return on a two bond portfolio and the "slope" 
factor 
Short bond Long bond maturity 
maturity 15 years 16 years 17 years 18 years 
1 year 0.32 0.33 0.32 0.30 
0.19 0.22 0.22 0.21 
2 years 0.34 0.35 0.35 0.32 
0.10 0.13 0.14 0.14 
3 years 0.38 0.40 0.40 0.37 
0.10 0.14 0.16 0.15 
4 years 0.41 0.41 0.42 0.39 
0.07 0.11 0.13 0.13 
5 years 0.43 0.44 0.44 0.41 
0.05 0.09 0.11 0.11 
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TABLE 8.10 
Correlations between the return on a three bond portfolio and the 
"curvature" factor 
Medium bond maturity = 6 years 
Short bond Long bond maturity 
maturity 15 years 16 years 17 years 18 years 
1 year 
-0.38 -0.44 -0.44 -0.46 
0.35 0.22 0.13 0.05 
2 years 
-0.38 -0.42 -0.43 -0.45 
0.34 0.21 0.11 0.04 
3 years 
-0.39 -0~44 -0.44 -0.46 
0.31 0.18 0.09 0.01 
4 years -0.39 -0.45 -0.46 -0.48 
0.20 0.05 -0.04 -0.10 
5 years 
-0.38 -0.44 -0.44 -0.46 
0.14 -0.03 -0.08 -0.13 
Medium bond maturity = 7 years 
Short bond Long bond maturity 
maturity 15 years 16 years 17 years 18 years 
1 year -0.40 -0.45 -0.46 -0.49 
0.17 0.02 0.07 -0.14 
2 years -0.39 -0.45 -0.46 -0.49 
0.13 -0.02 -0.10 -0.16 
3 years -0.40 -0.46 -0.46 -0.49 
0.08 -0.08 -0.15 -0.21 
4 years -0.41 -0.47 -0.47 -0.51 
-0.41 -0.47 -0.48 -0.51 
5 years -0.41 -0.47 -0.48 -0.51 
-0.21 -0.30 -0.32 -0.35 
Medium bond mannity = 8 years 
Short bond Long bond mannity 
maturity 15 years 16 years 17 years 18 years 
1 year -0.38 -0.44 -0.45 -0.48 
-0.04 -0.18 -0.23 -0.28 
2 years -0.37 -0.43 -0.44 -0.47 
-0.08 -0.22 -0.26 -0.30 
3 years -0.37 0.43 -0.45 -0.48 
-0.16 -0.27 -0.30 -0.34 
4 years -0.36 -0.42 -0.44 -0.48 
-0.28 -0.36 -0.37 -0.40 
5 years -0.34 -0.41 -0.42 -0.45 
-0.36 -0.42 -0.41 -0.41 
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Medium bond maturity = 9 years 
Short bond Long bond maturity 
maturity 15 years 16 years 17 years 18 years 
1 year 
-0.42 
-0.49 -0.50 -0.53 
-0.24 
-0.33 -0.33 -0.36 
2 years 
-0.42 -0.48 -0.49 -0.52 
-0.28 -0.35 -0.36 -0.39 
3 years -0.42 -0.49 -0.50 -0.53 
-0.33 -0.39 -0.39 -0.40 
4 years 
-0.41 -0.48 -0.49 -0.53 
-0.39 -0.43 -0.43 -0.44 
5 years 
-0.40 -0.47 -0.47 -0.51 
-0.43 -0.46 -0.45· -0.46 
Medium bond maturity = 10 years 
Short bond Long bond maturity 
maturity 15 years 16 years 17 years 18 years 
1 year -0.40 -0.47 -0.48 -0.51 
-0.41 -0.44 -0.42 -0.44 
2 years -0.39 -0.46 -0.47 -0.50 
-0.43 -0.46 -0.44 -0.45 
3 years -0.39 -0.46 -0.47 -0.49 
-0.46 -0.48 -0.46 -0.47 
4 years -0.37 -0.45 -0.45 -0.48 
-0.49 -0.50 -0.48 -0.49 
5 years -0.35 -0.43 -0.43 -0.45 
-0.51 -0.52 -0.49 -0.51 
Medium bond maturity = 11 years 
Short bond Long bond maturity 
maturity 15 years 16 years 17 years 18 years 
1 year -0.40 -0.49 -0.49 -0.51 
-0.41 -0.44 -0.43 -0.44 
2 years -0.40 -0.48 -0.48 -0.50 
-0.43 -0.46 -0.44 -0.45 
3 years -0.39 -0.47 -0.47 -0.49 
-0.45 -0.47 -0.45 -0.46 
4 years -0.37 -0.45 -0.45 -0.46 
-0.47 -0.49 -0.47 -0.48 
5 years -0.35 -0.43 -0.42 -0.42 
-0.48 -0.50 -0.48 -0.49 
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Medium bond maturity = 12 years 
Short bond Long bond maturity 
maturity 15 years 16 years 17 years 18 years 
1 year 
-0.38 
-0.49 -0.47 -0.44 
-0.51 
-0.52 -0.49 -0.49 
2 years 
-0.37 -0.47 -0.45 -0.42 
-0.52 -0.53 -0.49 -0.50 
3 years 
-0.38 -0.46 -0.44 -0.40 
-0.53 -0.54 -0.50 -0.51 
4 years 
-0.33 -0.44 -0.41 -0.37 
-0.55 -0.55 -0.52 -0.52 
5 years -0.30 -0.41 -0.36 -0.32 
-0.56 -0.56 -0.52 -0.52 
Medium bond maturity = 13 years 
Short bond Long bond maturity 
maturity 15 years 16 years 17 years 18 years 
1 year -0.25 -0.44 -0.38 -0.31 
-0.51 -0.53 -0.48 -0.49 
2 years -0.23 -0.42 -0.36 -0.29 
-0.52 -0.53 -0.48 -0.49 
3 years -0.22 -0.40 -0.33 -0.26 
-0.53 -0.54 -0.49 -0.50 
4 years -0.18 -0.37 -0.29 -0.23 
-0.54 -0.55 -0.50 -0.51 
5 years -0.14 -0.33 -0.24 -0.19 
-0.54 -0.55 -0.51 -0.52 
Medium bond maturity = 14 years 
Short bond Long bond maturity 
maturity 15 years 16 years 17 years 18 years 
1 year -0.20 -0.48 -0.36 -0.25 
-0.51 -0.55 -0.49 -0.50 
2 years -0.18 -0.46 -0.34 -0.23 
-0.52 -0.55 -0.49 -0.51 
3 years -0.17 -0.45 -0.32 -0.19 
-0.53 -0.56 -0.50 -0.52 
4 years -0.11 -0.38 -0.23 -0.15 
-0.53 -0.56 -0.50 -0.52 
5 years -0.11 -0.38 -0.23 -0.15 
-0.54 -0.56 -0.51 -0.52 
9.1. Summary and Implications 
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CHAPTER NINE 
Summary and Conclusions 
The main theoretical findings of this study are contained in chapters 2, 3 and 4. In chapter 2, it 
was shown that the changes introduced by Big Bang could only be justified on economic 
grounds if there existed a "best-execution" rule. It was found that the only defence for main-
taining the separation of stock-brokers and stock-jobbers was that of ensuring that there was no 
conflict of interests when the role of principal and agent were combined. Chapter 3 contained a 
theoretical analysis that provided predictions of the consequences of Big Bang for operational 
efficiency, together with an examination of the market to determine the extent to which such 
predictions were realized. In chapter 4, it was demonstrated that an interpretation of the 
efficient markets hypothesis in terms of the traditional theories of the term structure follows 
very naturally from a recent reinterpretation of these theories. 
Chapters 2 and 3 also contain sections of interest to economic historians. As well as 
describing in detail the structure and operations of the market before and after Big Bang, the 
legal, technological and economic causes of Big Bang are analysed in order to set the event 
within the appropriate historical perspective. Contrary to popular opinion which has identified 
and dated the trigger mechanism for Big Bang as the deal between the Chairman of the Stock 
Exchange and the Government in 1983, it is argued that the path to stock exchange deregula-
tion was the inevitable consequence of earlier, longer term and mostly economic events, facili-
tated by technological developments. Big Bang is thus the result of economic and principal and 
logic rather than legal expediency and compromise. 
Chapters 6 and 7 contain sections of methodological interest. First, a type of approxima-
tion function, a basis of B-Splines, was adapted for use in approximating the discount function 
for coupon bonds. While the use of spline functions for this purpose is not new, these particu-
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lar functions avoid the problems involving ill-conditioned matrices that affect the performance 
the standard spline functions. Other procedures to aid application to term structure measure-
ment are also developed, including formulae for calculating appropriate confidence intervals. 
The method described in chapter 7 for analysing the the dynamics of interest rates is more gen-
eral than that typically used when modelling the term structure. It is standard practice to posit 
some form of diffusion process to represent the dynamics of these rates. Application of the 
general-to-specific approach, used in econometric modelling, demonstrates that on occasions 
the dynamics of interest rates take on more complex forms than those usually assumed. 
The main empirical results concern the impact of Big Bang on informational efficiency, 
and these are contained in chapters 5, 6, and 8. Traditional autocorrelation tests are conducted 
in chapter five, though use is made of some recently developed maximum likelihood autocorre-
lation tests which have greater power than the standard battery of tests used in this kind of 
study. The implication of the results of these tests and an extensive analysis of the autocorre-
lations themselves is that market efficiency improved substantially after Big Bang. In chapter 6, 
the present value of the coupon stream of each bond (discounted by the measured discount fac-
tors) is compared to its market price. Having controlled for tax effects, the residual between 
these figures should be identically zero, if the market is efficient. In the period before Big 
Bang, there was evidence of residuals in excess of a margin permitted for measurement error, 
and this was much less the case in the period after Big Bang. Chapter 8 tested efficiency by 
searching for anomalies in the shape of the term structure. This was done by examining the 
correlation between the returns on portfolios of pure discount bonds, which could risklessly 
profit from particular anomalies in shape (e.g. too steep or too flat), and principal components 
representing such components of shape. These tests also indicated that efficiency had been 
improved by the Big Bang. 
The empirical results point conclusively to the fact that the informational efficiency of the 
gilt-edged market was substantially improved by the changes brought in by Big Bang. This is 
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valuable information for both the Bank of England and the Stock Exchange who will wish to 
know the impacts of the changes that were introduced. 
The methodology for estimating the term structure will have direct relevance for gilt-
market investors, those wishing to price contingent claims on gilt-market securities and the 
Bank of England who seek to price new issues. Chapter 6 presents a method which is more 
accurate than the standard spline fitting technique, and that will certainly rival the alternative 
Bernstein Polynomial approach. This procedure is regarded as the major contribution of this 
thesis. 
In chapter 8, it was found that there were three factors influencing the movements in the 
term structure. Current modelling exercises tend to use a two factor model, which is consistent 
with the first two of these factors. The presence of an important third factor will be of 
significance to all concerned with modelling the term structure and related securities. One 
future course of action is explored in the next section. 
9.2. Suggestions for Further Research 
In the area of theoretical research, the topic of modelling structural changes in securities mark-
ets could be fruitfully pursued. The majority of existing microstructure models do not consider 
the impact on spreads or volatility of prices of once and for changes in market structure, such 
as a changes in the number of participants or the manner in which prices are reported and 
trades actioned. Some of the comments in chapter three highlight the relevant issues, but 
further development would clearly be desirable. 
There are several possible extensions to the empirical work in this study. Firstly, the 
measurement of term structures can be applied to other bond markets, such as the U.S. bond 
market. Secondly, the relative performance of the B-Spline and Bernstein Polynomial tech-
niques could be analyzed. Thirdly, and most importantly, must be that of fitting term struc-
tures and fitting a term structure model, such as the Schaefer and Schwartz (1984) model, 
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fonning portfolios based upon the residuals between these two pricing models to search out 
arbitrage profits and thus test efficiency. The reason why this cannot be done at present is that, 
from the work in chapter eight, a three factor model would be needed. Currently, the most 
complex models use two factors, which can be viewed as representing the level and the slope 
of the tenn structure (the short rate and the spread process). The curvature probably reflects 
expectations of future volatility, and until our understanding of the process generating volatility 
improves, such a three factor model and extensions to the pricing of contingent claims will 
have to remain a future goal. An extension to that work would then be an examination of the 
real versus nominal (inflation inclusive) term structure of interest rates dichotomy, as recently 
examined by Cox, Ingersoll and Ross (1985, p.401-405) in the context of this fonn of model. 
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